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ABSTRACT 
 
he purpose of this study is to establish what is meant by reflexive control, how 
it can be applied, and the methods that can be used to apply it. The study 
combines reflexive control with the broader concept of systems theory, and 
the author also examines issues from perspectives that are rarely discussed in Western 
source material. At the same time, by making extensive use of publicly available Rus-
sian and Western documents, the author also attempts to lessen the aura of secrecy 
around the topic, which often characterises the debate in the West and which may 
well be unfounded. 
 
To understand what lies behind reflexive control, the author discusses the interface 
between cybernetics and systems theory. The study focuses on reflexive systems, one 
manifestation of these concepts, in which the system attempts to adjust its operations 
in accordance with a similar system used by the adversary. In other words, it attempts 
to reflect the other side’s system in its own activities.   
 
The study goes through the development of the concept during the Soviet era and 
concludes with the developments in the field in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Having reviewed the history of reflexive control, the author discusses its con-
cepts and application in connection with the debate in Russia on the nature of warfare 
and influencing military decision-making. A comprehensive model of reflexive con-
trol is presented in the study using these principles. 
 
At the end of the study, the author places the findings made in this research in a 
broader context. The conclusions lend credibility to the assumption that Russia is 
using an analysis of the adversary’s command and control systems at all operational 
levels. It is thus highly improbable that the activities are based on pure opportunism. 
Instead, as this study suggests, Russia’s attempt to conceal the higher-level strategy is 
a more likely explanation.  
 
In his conclusions, the author also suggests that the assumption in the Russian ap-
proach to information operations (which arises from an objective world view) is that 
when specific information is fed through a specific information channel, the response 
can be anticipated. This differs from Western thinking. The difference may also ex-
plain some of the challenges faced by Western researchers in studying Russian infor-
mation operations. 
 
 
Keywords: Command and Control, Cybernetics, Decision-making, Information 
Warfare, Reflexive Control, Reflexivity, Russia, Soviet Union, Systems, Systems 
Theory 
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PREFACE  
he Russian theory of reflexive control (here after RC) has intrigued Western 
researchers for decades. One of the first and most complete descriptions of 
the theory was written by Diane Chotikul in 1986 for the US’s Naval Post-
graduate School. Now, Antti Vasara, a Finnish analyst, has produced the first truly 
comprehensive update of RC in recent years.  
Vasara assembled over 100 documents on the topic and close to half were Russian 
publications. [Full Disclosure: this author was one of his sources] His primary re-
search begins with the work of Vladimir Lefebvre, who most believe is the originator 
of the theory of reflexive control. It was Lefebvre’s 1984 work “Reflexive Control: 
The Soviet Concept of Influencing an Adversary’s Decision-Making Process” that 
gained him the most notoriety. Vasara scanned the journals Voennaya Mysl’ (Military 
Thought), Armeysky Sbornik (Army Journal), and Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal) to un-
cover a host of articles on the topic that support and update his work well beyond 
Lefebvre’s work. 
Vasara begins the discussion from the point where the RC concept originated, in the 
works of Soviet theoreticians studying cybernetics, decision-making, and systems and 
control theory. That discussion is followed with a look at Russian command and con-
trol systems. In one 2007 Military Thought article that he summarized, it was noted that 
a system can make decisions and organize its activities by taking into account the 
decisions of another complex system interacting with it, where reflexion is understood 
as the reflexion of the adversary’s analytical decision-making process. This can cause 
a system to make decisions advantageous to one’s own, which is the basis of thought 
behind RC. 
Based on Vasara’s understanding of these and other theoretical constructs, he pre-
pared his own system-theoretical and cybernetic model of the Russian approach to 
command and control. It is composed of human decision-makers; the decision sup-
port system supporting a staff; the command system with its information relay and 
feedback channels; and the system subordinated to the commander and the corre-
sponding system of the enemy. Several diagrams support this contention. Influence 
operations, he added, are aimed at the commander first and at his staff second, as 
they are the main decision-makers of an opponent. 
The model is divided into a constructive (creative) method and a destructive method. 
The former employs procedures aimed at inducing the enemy to make desired deci-
sion, while the latter employs methods that attempt to weaken and disrupt the en-
emy’s decision-making. The model features different types of RC, different forms of 
control inputs, and different methods for exerting RC. Constructive inputs are based 
on the action of one’s own troops and the information, and psychological inputs are 
based on the starting point or the situational picture created for the enemy’s decision-
makers advantageous to one’s own side. Destructive inputs include the use of sur-
prise/deception by one’s own troops or the feeding of information to the enemy’s 
system and decision-makers to create confusion. In Vasara’s words, the model “en-
compasses all aspects of RC, from the methods of exercising it to its goals, using the 
division Ends-Ways-Means produced for Arthur Lykke’s military strategy article in 
1989.” 
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The core of RC, in Vasara’s opinion, is as follows (which is stated a bit late in the paper): 
Vladimir Lefebvre, the man behind the RC theory, attempted to develop reflexive 
equations to model the adversary’s decision-making process that could be used 
to calculate the options available to the adversary. This creates a situation where 
the other party to the conflict can gain an advantage if it knows the adversary’s 
situational picture and is aware how the adversary applies it to its own doctrine to 
solving the problem.  
 
Russian has long had an interest in an adversary’s decision support systems. The 
Kremlin’s security specialists appear to analyse an adversary’s command and control 
system at all levels. Thus, RC’s impact at the strategic level cannot not be ignored, 
Vasara notes, as it can be a systemic approach for use as a negotiating tool and, based 
on its Soviet upbringing, it will probably not disappear when power changes hands.  
 
Vasara also noted that in the past decade there has been a shift in Russian reflexive 
equations towards RC over an adversary in practical combat operations, as analysed 
particularly in the work of Kazakov, Kiryushin, and Lazukin, which discussed the use 
of so-called information packets on the battlefield. Vasara noted that in Russia’s case 
“conveying one’s own narrative and views through a large number of different chan-
nels and hoping that they are seized by at least some Western media is the goal,” 
making something available to use to back up its case. The main aim is to create 
several alternative truths. 
Vasara’s paper is unique for its attempt to decipher the Russian approach to RC and 
offer Western audiences another way to understand it based on the model he pro-
posed. His division of the topic into constructive and destructive measures is relevant 
to ascertaining the goal of Russia’s RC methodology. 
Finally, for the reader who thinks there are gaps in Vasara’s research, he explains why 
he chose specific language to describe RC and his model as he did, as well as what he 
saw as potential gaps in his research and conclusions. In short, he has offered analysts 
not only a creative approach to RC that others can study and use but also areas in 
which to study the concept further. Western institutes devoted to studying Russian 
deception techniques should put this paper on their required reading list. 
 
Timothy Thomas 
US Army, retired 
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Antti Vasara1 - Theory of Reflexive Control 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the research  
 
he ability to make decisions is one of the prerequisites for effective leadership.  
In a situation where the number of decision-makers is limited, exerting direct 
influence on them is an effective way of making policy and waging war. The 
changes in the information environment and the blurring of the distinction between 
war and peace over the last few decades have increased the number of potential de-
cision-makers and targets for influence operations. At the same time, efforts to influ-
ence decision-making are now being studied more comprehensively, both in the West 
and in Russia. The influence operations directly or indirectly carried out by Russia in 
the information environment have been studied from a wide range of different per-
spectives in recent years. The focus in this study is on reflexive control, one of the 
theories behind these operations. The reflexive control applied by the Soviet Union 
was already attracting interest in the West in the 1980s. However, with few exceptions, 
most researchers have ignored the cybernetic and system-theoretical aspect behind its 
use.  
 
In the Western research tradition, decision-making has been seen as particularly ra-
tional behaviour, as observed in game theory models or Economic Man thinking 
(Mill, 1836), or it has been examined against the background of limited rationality, as 
first discussed by Herbert Simon (Simon, 1955). The problem of limited rationality is 
also discussed by Kahneman (2003), who describes the dissonance that prevents us 
from making fully rational and objective decisions. Thus, in Western research on de-
cision-making, consideration is given to the subjective nature of decision-makers as 
part of the decision-making process. 
 
Likewise, since the late 1970s, decision-making by military organisations and military 
leaders has been described as a time-pressured process, and the well-known O-O-D-
A loop, developed by John R. Boyd in the United States, is an example of this (Boyd, 
1996). In this model, making decisions more quickly than the adversary is described 
as the crucial element in the battlefield. After Boyd, decision-making in hierarchical 
organisations has been studied by researchers such as Klein. In his view, individuals 
in fast-moving, time-pressured situations usually base their decisions on previous ex-
periences, prioritising solutions which in their view work best, instead of rationally 
considering different options (Klein, 2008). 
 
In the Russian context, debate on military leadership is not based on the above mod-
els, but stems from the understanding of dialectic and systemic nature of command 
and control process. This tradition did not disappear with the breakup of the Soviet 
                                              
1 Antti Vasara (b. 1977) Major (General Staff), works at the Infantry School (Army Academy) as the chief of 
Officer Education Department. 
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Union, when dialectical materialism lost its status as the official ideology. It is still 
widely used as a research philosophy in military leadership and in studies of the sub-
ject (Lalu, 2014, p. 368).  
 
A widely held view among scholars is that reflexive control is only used in information 
warfare and perception management. In this study, reflexive control is interpreted as 
a comprehensive approach and an umbrella concept, and to gain a better understand-
ing of the method, it was necessary to establish how the concept of warfare was 
viewed in Russia. This study therefore provides an overview of the basics of military 
cybernetics and systems theory, and the author also delves into Russian thinking, de-
cision-making and systems theory.  
 
To understand what lies behind reflexive control, the author discusses the interface 
between cybernetics and systems theory (cybernetic systems where the system is 
guided by the feedback on the way in which it functions). The study focuses on re-
flexive systems, one manifestation of these concepts, in which the system attempts to 
adjust its operations in accordance with a similar system used by the adversary. In 
other words, it attempts to reflect the other side’s system in its own activities. The 
author first discusses the 1960s writings of Vladimir Alexandrovich Lefebvre (b. 
1936), who developed the original theory, and who later moved to the United States, 
and then discusses the theoretical and practical applications of the concept in the 
Soviet Union in the 1980s. The discussion concludes with an overview of develop-
ments in the field in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The development 
of the reflexive control theory has continued in Russia during recent years, and it is 
based on the assumption that human decision-making can be objectively modelled. 
Having reviewed the history of reflexive control, the author discusses its concepts 
and application in connection with the debate in Russia on the nature of warfare and 
influencing military decision-making.  
 
According to Timothy Thomas, a senior US military analyst who has studied reflexive 
control, the measures applied in the Ukrainian conflict match the descriptions of re-
flexive control published in Russian military journals in the early 2010s. In his view, 
NATO’s strengthening of its forces on its border with Russia was precisely what Rus-
sia aimed to achieve when taking reflexive control measures (Thomas, 2015, p. 117).  
Thomas adds that the reflexive variations described by Valery Makhnin, a Russian 
military researcher, in 2012 are in line with the way in which the events at Maidan 
Square in Kiev were described in the Russian media, and that Russia might attempt 
to introduce the two-level control on its border with Ukraine described by Vladimir 
Kazakov and Andrei Kiryushin in their article in the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’ in 2014 
(ibid., p. 118). The topic has also been discussed by Can Kasapoglu, a researcher at 
the NATO Defense College, who suggests the use of reflexive control by Russia 
might cause an ‘analytical paralysis’ in the West. As a result, the West might opt for 
measures perceived as less risk-prone, which would actually help Russia to achieve its 
objectives through force (Kasapoglu, 2015, p. 12). 
 
The topic has also been discussed in Russia in recent years. Colonel General Sergei 
Surovikin, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces, has written that 
the aim of the Russian armed forces should be to achieve information superiority and 
the disorganisation and weakening of decision-making in the adversary’s government 
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and military structures (Surovikin & Kuleshov, 2017, p. 7). Both are also the goals of 
reflexive control. Indeed, according to the findings of this study, theoretical develop-
ment discussed in articles and practical action have progressed side-by-side. 
 
The dual reflexive model created for this study is described to enable future research-
ers to use it when trying to understand how Russia sees reflexive control as an element 
in the overall process of influencing decision-making, and how it attempts to influ-
ence decision-makers.  
 
In the conclusions presented at the end of the study, the author places the findings 
made in this research in a broader context. The conclusions lend credibility to the 
assumption that Russia is using an analysis of the adversary’s command and control 
systems at all operational levels. It is thus highly improbable that the activities are 
based on pure opportunism. Instead, as this study suggests, Russia’s attempt to con-
ceal the higher-level strategy is a more likely explanation.  
 
In his conclusions, the author also suggests that the assumption in the Russian ap-
proach to information operations (which arises from an objective world view) is that 
when specific information is fed through a specific information channel, the response 
can be anticipated: in the final analysis, individuals’ subjective opinions about the in-
formation are irrelevant. This differs from Western thinking. The difference may also 
explain some of the challenges faced by Western researchers in studying Russian in-
formation operations. 
1.2 Structure of the report   
 
The report starts with an overview of the development of systems theory and cyber-
netics in the Soviet Union and Russia from the 1950s to the present, describes differ-
ent command and control systems, and discusses the leadership principles applied in 
the Russian armed forces. This is used as a basis for a reflexive model of military 
decision-making. The aim is to show how cybernetic principles have shaped Russian 
military command practices, and how they may have been a factor behind the creation 
of reflexive control. 
 
In the main part of the report, the author describes the development that has contin-
ued side-by-side with cybernetic research since the 1960s, and that has shaped Soviet 
and Russian thinking on how to influence an adversary’s decision-making and deci-
sion-makers. The theory of reflexive control has emerged from these developments.  
The aim is to provide a detailed overview of the history and development of reflexive 
control and to broaden the understanding of the role played by reflexive control in 
influence operations. 
 
The theoretical part is followed by the presentation of a reflexive control model. The 
dual model, prepared in conjunction with this study, provides a broader approach to 
influence-exertion methods than the reflexive control models described in existing 
studies, and it is divided into constructive and destructive reflexive control methods. 
 
In the conclusions presented at the end of the report, the author analyses how systems 
theory and reflexivity have influenced the fundamentals of Russian strategic thinking, 
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and assesses the differences between Russian and Western ways of influencing deci-
sion-making. The author also reviews the usability of the reflexive control model cre-
ated in the report for future research and lists some of the topics for additional re-
search arising from this study. 
1.3 Existing literature on systems thinking and reflexive control theory 
 
In recent decades, systems theory, cybernetics, and reflexive control have been exten-
sively studied around the world, but few researchers have drawn attention to the par-
allels between them. In addition to the research carried out in the West, the topic has 
also been extensively studied and discussed in the Soviet Union and Russia, and these 
research and publication activities are reviewed at the end of this chapter. 
 
The study written by Diane Chotikul, who has worked at the US Naval Postgraduate 
School, provides the most detailed source of information on the relationship between 
systems theory, cybernetics, and reflexive control for this document. Her work ‘Soviet 
Theory of Reflexive Control in Historical and Psychocultural Perspective: A Prelimi-
nary Study’ (Chotikul, 1986) has served as a basis for the positioning of this document 
and prompted the author to examine these three concepts as complementary and 
parallel functions. Chotikul’s study is also important, because it provides a detailed 
analysis of the cultural differences between the Soviet Union and the West. Under-
standing of cultural differences also helps to understand the fundamentals of reflexive 
control. 
 
The article ‘Reflexive Control in Soviet Military Planning’ (Reid, 1987) by Clifford 
Reid, who has also worked at the US Naval Postgraduate School, has served as the 
second cornerstone of this study. The article is contained in the publication ‘Soviet 
Strategic Deception’ (ed. Dailey & Parker, 1987). In his article, Reid describes the 
birth and development of reflexive control. Reid uses articles and literature published 
in the Soviet Union as a basis for a comprehensive description of reflexive control 
methods.  
 
Timothy Thomas, who has worked as a researcher at the Foreign Military Studies 
Office of the US Army, is the most frequently quoted researcher into reflexive control 
in the West. He has studied the Russian approach to warfare, Russian thinking, and 
reflexive control since the mid-1990s. Thomas’s research has also been noted in Rus-
sia, and his texts are often quoted in Russian military journals. In his article ‘Reflexive 
Control in Russia: Theory and Military Applications’ (Thomas, 2002), published in 
the journal ‘Reflexive Processes and Control’, Thomas divides the development of 
reflexive control between the 1960s and the 2000s into four distinct phases, and this 
division is also used in this study.  
 
In addition to these articles, the book ‘Recasting the Red Star’ (Thomas, 2011), dis-
cussing the development of Russian military power and reflexive control in the early 
2010s, and ‘Russia Military Strategy – Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopoli-
tics’ (Thomas, 2015), which complements the former work and discusses the possible 
use of reflexive control in Ukraine from a variety of different perspectives, have also 
been used as sources in this study. Thomas’s work ‘Thinking Like a Russian Officer: 
Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on the Nature of War’ (Thomas, 2016) 
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has also been used in the sections of this study discussing Russian military command 
practices and decision-making. The latest works by Thomas, ‘Kremlin Kontrol’ 
(Thomas, 2017) and ‘Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements’ (Thomas, 
2019) were used by the author in reviewing the most recent developments. The arti-
cles and the other literature from the 2010s used in them also served as sources for 
this study. 
 
In his doctoral dissertation ‘The Origins and Development of Systems Thinking in 
the Soviet Union’ (Susiluoto, 1982), Ilmari Susiluoto studied the creation and devel-
opment of systems theory in the Soviet Union to determine the link between the 
planned economy and systems thinking. In his dissertation, Susiluoto concludes that 
the Soviet aim was to exert scientific control over society using a combination of 
cybernetics and systems theory. Similar conclusions have been presented by Slava 
Gerovitch, a researcher at MIT. In his work ‘From Newspeak to Cyberspeak – a His-
tory of Soviet Cybernetics’ (Gerovitch, 2002), he describes the development of sys-
tems theory and cybernetics in the Soviet Union from the 1950s to the 1980s. The 
findings of Gerovitch and Susiluoto are also supported by the conclusions made by 
Benjamin Peters in ‘How Not to Network a Nation’ (Peters, 2016). In his book, Pe-
ters, a researcher at MIT, discusses the Soviet attempts to create a nationwide infor-
mation network. The development of cybernetics is closely connected with these ef-
forts.  
 
‘Venäjän informaatio-psykologinen sodankäyntitapa terrorismin torjunnassa ja viiden 
päivän sodassa’ (Russia’s Information-Psychological Warfare in Counter-Terrorism 
Operations and the Five-Day War) (Berger, 2010), written by Heidi Berger, was also 
used as a source. In her book, Berger presents key definitions of reflexive control and 
discusses its operational use. Her conclusion is that Russia uses reflexive control in 
its domestic and foreign policy, and at all levels of warfare (Berger, 2010, p. 145). 
Unlike Berger, the author has attempted to model reflexive control more extensively 
as part of the strategic psychological-social deception used by Russia and the con-
frontation between societies. 
 
‘Warfare in Hybrid Environment – Reflexive Control as an Analytical Tool for Un-
derstanding Contemporary Challenges’ (Huhtinen, Kotilainen, Streng, & Särmä, 
2018) is one of the most recent articles discussing reflexive control. The authors con-
clude that reflexive control is a broader concept than information warfare, and un-
derstanding it also helps to analyse the multidimensional concept of hybrid warfare 
(Huhtinen et al., 2018, pp. 72–73). Another purpose of this study is to increase the 
understanding of reflexive control as a concept that entails more than merely infor-
mation warfare. 
 
Russian information operations and reflexive control have also been studied at the 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs. In the second part of its report ‘Fog of 
Falsehood – Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine’ (Pynnöniemi, 
2016), reflexive control is characterised as a component in the Russian approach to 
strategic deception. Katri Pynnöniemi, the report’s author, notes that reflexive control 
is one way of achieving the enemy’s self-disorganisation. According to Pynnöniemi, 
the enemy can be targeted with specially selected pieces of information capable of 
causing changes in its information processes or information systems in accordance 
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with the intention of the entity using the weapon (Pynnöniemi, 2016, pp. 36–37). 
Similar conclusions are reached in this study, although it draws on a broader range of 
research material. 
 
An article discussing the application of reflexive control principles in information and 
cyber operations has been published in the ‘Journal of Information Warfare’ (Jaitner 
& Kantola, 2016). One of the authors’ conclusions is that reflexive control is a result 
of a long-term process and provides only one perspective on theories about infor-
mation warfare. One aim of this study is to broaden the perspective beyond infor-
mation warfare. 
 
‘Russian Reflexive Control’ (Giles, Seaboyer, & Sherr, 2018) is an example of the 
more recent studies of reflexive control. It was written by Keir Giles and James Sherr, 
both researchers at Chatham House, and Anthony Seaboyer, a teacher of political 
history at the Royal Military College of Canada. In line with this author’s conclusions, 
these researchers also highlight the long-term and systematic nature of reflexive con-
trol. 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned publications, reflexive control has also been stud-
ied in Sweden (Furustig, 1994; Värnqvist, 2016), in the United Kingdom (Blandy, 
2009), in Latvia (Berzinš, 2014) and in NATO (Kasapoglu, 2015). While using these 
publications in this study, attempt has also been made to identify gaps in existing 
research and the author has questioned some of their assumptions.  
 
From the perspective of combining theory and practice, it should be noted that in 
Western research, reflexive control has been interpreted as a factor explaining past 
and present Russian activities in Chechnya (Berger, 2010), in Georgia (Berger, 2010; 
Blandy, 2009; Thomas, 2011; Värnqvist, 2016; Giles, Seaboyer & Sherr, 2018), on the 
Crimea (Kasapoglu, 2015; Giles, Seaboyer & Sherr, 2018), in eastern Ukraine (Berzinš, 
2014; Giles, Seaboyer & Sherr 2018; Thomas, 2015) and in Syria (Giles, Seaboyer & 
Sherr, 2018). Prompted by these findings, the author decided to use the empirical 
material in accordance with the dual model prepared in the study. 
 
Of the Western studies discussing the Russian strategic culture and examining the 
topic from the perspective of a confrontation between systems, the author has used 
the article ‘The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approach to 
Warfare’ (Covington, 2016) by Stephen R. Covington. In his article, Covington, a 
veteran expert on Russia, describes the comprehensive Russian approach to warfare 
from a Western perspective. This perspective is complemented by the article ‘Russia’s 
quiet military revolution and what it means for Europe’ (Gressel, 2015) written by 
Gustav Gressel, an Austrian security expert and a researcher at the Council of Europe. 
The study ‘The Russian Way of War’ (Bartles & Grau, 2016), written by Lester W. 
Grau and Charles K. Bartles, two veteran researchers at FMSO, has been used as a 
source in matters concerning military command and control issues. 
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1.4 Primary research material  
 
The primary research material used by the author comprises Russian research litera-
ture on cybernetics, systems theory, command and control, decision-making and the 
theory of reflexive control. Field manuals and studies of military science subjects pub-
lished in the Soviet Union and used by the author are from the Russica collection of 
the Finnish National Defence University library.  
 
The study written by Vladimir Lefebvre, the man behind the original theory of reflex-
ive control, and the researchers associated with him, served as the key source of in-
formation on reflexive control. The following works by Lefebvre were used in this 
study: ‘Konfliktujustshie struktury’ (Lefebvre, 1967), ‘Algebra of Conscience’ 
(Lefebvre, 1984a) and ‘Reflexive Control: The Soviet Concept of Influencing on Ad-
versary’s Decision-Making Process’ (Lefebvre, 1984b). The author also used articles 
that Lefebvre has published in English during the past two decades and the work 
‘Lectures on the Reflexive Games Theory’ (Lefebvre, 2010). Other Soviet and Russian 
sources used by the author include the work ‘Voprosi voennoi sistemotehniki’ (Dru-
zhinin & Kontorov, 1976) by Druzhinin and Kontorov and the articles by Dimitri 
Novikov published over the past twenty years. 
 
The electronically archived articles published in Russian military journals since the 
late 1990s were accessed through the East View search service. The military theoret-
ical journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’ published by the Russian Ministry of Defence (and its 
Soviet predecessor) and its English version ‘Military Thought’, the journal ‘Armeiskij 
Sbornik’ of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and the journal ‘Morskoi 
Sbornik’ of the Russian Navy were the key Russian journals used as sources. A small 
number of articles published in other military journals were also used. 
 
The assumption at the start of the work was that the secret nature of the topic would 
make it difficult to obtain source material on theoretical aspects of reflexive control. 
However, this assumption proved unfounded as the work progressed: there was 
enough material from both Western and Russian sources. The hierarchy of the theo-
retical source material was the main problem concerning its use: it became clear that 
there is no ‘official’ truth of reflexive control and as a result, the author decided to 
use the original writings of Lefebvre as the basis for his interpretations and as refer-
ences for subsequent texts. It also emerged that a small number of key articles, such 
as ‘Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military’ (originally Thomas, 2002), 
published by Timothy Thomas in 2004 had been used as sources by both Western 
and Russian writers and in some of the articles, only a small number of sources were 
listed. In fact, it soon became clear that there were few texts with genuine added value 
and it may also be that too much prominence has been given to such writers as Chau-
sov or Makhnin. The absence of articles taking a critical view on reflexive control was 
a problem: the author was only able to find one article (Polenin, 2000) discussing the 
topic from this perspective. 
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1.5 Notes on key concepts and translation  
 
Before discussing the theoretical insights of previous research, a few observations on 
translation of key concepts is necessary. Of the Russian words used in this text, the 
word ‘upravlenie’ (управление) (‘control’) and its derivatives, such as ‘refleksivnoje 
upravlenie’ and ‘upravlenie voiskami’, are the ones with the largest number of mean-
ings (and translations).  
 
There is no corresponding word in the English sources, so attempts have been made 
to understand the language used by the Russian military. Thus, depending on the 
context, the word ‘управление’ has been translated as ‘control’, ‘management’ or 
‘command and control’ and differences between them have been created artificially 
in the original Russian texts.  
 
The author has followed the practice observed by Hall (Hall, 1991) when using Eng-
lish-language source material. In Hall’s view, the Soviet (Russian) approach to com-
mand and leadership differs from Western thinking. The Russian expression ‘uprav-
lenie voiskami’ is usually translated as ‘command and control’ (C2). However, literally 
it means ‘management of troops’, and thus it can also refer to other actions directed 
at military forces. These are not limited to warfare and successful operations as in 
Russian thinking, they also involve the maintenance of a high level of combat readi-
ness and preparing for combat missions. Raising morale, training and administration, 
and organising the troops are all part of the ‘management of troops’. In the Russian 
view, the end result of the battle depends to a great deal on the effectiveness of these 
actions taken before the combat. For this reason, ‘upravlenie voiskami’ cannot be 
directly translated as ‘command of troops’ (Hall, 1991, p. 132). 
 
However, ‘management of troops’ is not the correct translation for the Russian term 
either. This translation fails to convey the fact that the Russian term refers to a suc-
cessive management process and not merely to the direct action of commanding 
troops. ‘Giving orders’ (командование) is an instrument implementing the directing 
function, whereas ‘management’ (управление) implements the action itself. The fact 
that the Russian translation for ‘reflexive control’ is ‘refleksivnoje upravlenie’ (‘reflex-
ive management’) and not ‘kontrol’ is also relevant to this study. Management is a 
dynamic process, which includes both inputs and feedback. In Russian, the word 
‘control’ (контроль) is used to describe feedback functions and supervision. Thus, 
directing and execution are seen as two separate though continuous and mutually 
dependent (dialectical) functions (Hall, 1991, p. 132-133). 
 
When we descend to lower levels of command, the difference between these two 
functions gradually disappears. In the view of Ivanov, Savelyev and Shemansky, the 
authors of a Soviet book on commanding troops published in 1977, the decision-
making process is also the basis for the management of troops. At the same time, 
‘command’ and ‘administration’ become a single concept and ‘directing’ is a rough 
equivalent to ‘leadership’. In fact, ‘command and management of troops’ could be a 
better translation for ‘upravlenije voiskami’ (Hall, 1991, pp. 132–133), while at the 
same time, ‘refleksivnoje upravlenie’ could be translated as ‘reflexive management’ 
instead of ‘reflexive control’. However, the author has decided to adhere to the term 
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‘reflexive control’ used by other researchers to ensure that this study can be related to 
their work. 
 
As a rule, non-military applications of cybernetics, systems theory and reflexive con-
trol are outside the scope of this study. This rule is not absolute because in the Soviet 
Union, there was no separation between military and civilian research. In cybernetics, 
the author focuses on Soviet and Russian branches of cybernetics, while in military 
command and control, only the way in which it relates to systems theory and reflexive 
systems is discussed. Non-military applications of reflexive control are not discussed 
in this study even though since the early years of 2000s, it has been possible to apply 
reflexive control to nearly all branches of science in Russia (cf. Lefebvre, 2002; 
Novikov, 2015; Semenov, 2017).  
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2. THEORETICAL ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF 
REFLEXIVE CONTROL 
 
2.1 The importance of systems theory in Soviet and Russian military re-
search  
 
ccording to Sergey Bogdanov and Sergey Chekinov, two authoritative Russian 
military researchers, systems modelling and systems theory are instruments 
for producing effective ways of warfare that suit each particular situation and 
doctrine (Bogdanov & Chekinov, 2015, pp. 99–100). In their view, studying systems 
is essential in the efforts to solve problems of military theory and practice, and they 
note that system research may accelerate the adoption of new approaches to military 
science and make it easier to tackle its dialectical challenges.  
 
According to the definition presented by Bogdanov and Chekinov, research on mili-
tary systems is a theory of systems intended for military purposes (ibid., p. 102), and 
they conclude that all problems at military level can be solved by constructing a spe-
cific system for each of them. Problems can be identified by applying the strategy 
created for this system, while operational skills help to solve the problems and tactics 
produce the tasks for the system parts (ibid., p. 108, pp. 109–111). In this chapter, the 
author discusses how the hypothetical structure described above has been built and 
what types of systems for command and control were developed in the Soviet Union 
and have been developed in Russia.  
2.1.1 Soviet approach to cybernetics 
 
In contrast to the general Russian academic tradition, the cybernetic movement in the 
Soviet Union tried to instil preciseness and uniformity in Soviet science (Gerovitch, 
2002, p. 1). In the West, cybernetics remained a concept that was of interest to a 
relatively small circle of researchers, whereas in the Soviet Union, cybernetics became 
part of the scientific mainstream in the 1960s, and it was used as an ideological lan-
guage (ibid., pp. 2–3). In this chapter this process is described and the author attempts 
to place the theories of reflexive control and decision-making appropriately in the 
Soviet timeline of cybernetics and systems theory. This has been prompted by the 
willingness to understand current Russian models of decision-making and influencing 
decision-making. 
 
The topic is approached from the Soviet perspective, in which it was important to 
view the subjects on a holistic (systemic) basis. In this approach, all phenomena were 
examined on the basis of dialectical laws, in which the identified material phenomena 
constitute the real world, which is reflected in human thinking. As the existence of 
this universal connection was recognised by Soviet scientists, it was easy for them to 
approach planning and control on a ‘systemic’ basis. Unlike in the Western tradition, 
where problems are broken down, and each of them is examined separately, in Russia, 
the system is examined as a whole, and the aim is to identify all components that have 
a direct or indirect impact on the sector under examination. To Western eyes, this 
often seems complicated but in Soviet science, systemic approach meant identifying 
A 
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and examining objects (processes and phenomena) as a dialectical system of interac-
tive elements. Systemic approach is a concrete manifestation of Marxist dialectics, in 
which all world phenomena are interconnected (Chotikul, 1986, pp. 29–30). 
 
As early as 1912, Alexander Bogdanov, a Russian philosopher, developed the idea of 
tectology, a universal discipline of organisations. According to Bogdanov, all animals, 
machines, humans, thoughts and societies are ‘organised systems’, which are only dis-
tinguished by their level of complexity. In his dissertation, Susiluoto compares Bog-
danov’s thinking with the thoughts presented by von Bertalanffy, considered as the 
father of the general systems theory, in the 1960s and finds that there are clear simi-
larities between the two (Susiluoto, 2006, pp. 70–71). To Bogdanov’s misfortune, his 
thoughts were first denounced by Lenin in 1910 as incompatible with dialectics (Susi-
luoto, 1982, pp. 122–123), and when he tried to present his theories again, he incurred 
the wrath of Stalin, Lenin’s successor, who quickly branded Bogdanov’s thinking as 
dangerous (ibid., pp. 124–126, 129–132). During Stalin’s purges, tectology and Bog-
danov were linked to the thoughts of Bukharin, declared as an ideological traitor, and 
as a result, systems theory remained a banned topic until the end of Stalin’s rule (ibid., 
pp. 136–140). 
 
In 1929, Nikolai Bernstein, a Soviet neurophysiologist, wrote for the first time that 
when acting in a goal-oriented manner, human brain creates two models: the real 
world (the model describing what exists around us) and the goal (the model of what 
will exist around us in the future). Bernstein called the function linking these two 
models as the feedback arising from the joint impact of neurons and muscles. In 1934, 
he proposed that the concept ‘reflex arc’, according to which the stimulus-reaction 
link moves in a single direction should be replaced with the concept ‘reflex circle’, in 
which the stimulus and reaction also move in the opposite direction (Gerovitch, 2002, 
p. 109). Identical results were published by Norbert Wiener, one of the founders of 
cybernetics, 15 years later (Susiluoto, 2006, p. 99). However, Bernstein’s theories were 
not appreciated as they ran counter to the Pavlovian physiology, and in the Soviet 
Union, he was marginalised (Gerovitch, 2002, p. 109). 
 
In the West, Norbert Wiener, a US mathematician working at MIT, published the 
work ‘Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine’ 
in 1948. The book, which has become the classic work of cybernetics, is based on 
Wiener’s research and the ideas that arouse from his discussions with Arturo Rosen-
blueth. In the introduction to the book, Wiener states that cybernetics is a composi-
tion of the control and communication theory (Wiener, 1961, pp. 12–14) and illus-
trates this with his own experiences in the design of anti-aircraft human-machine sys-
tems (Peters, 2016, p. 17). Wiener presents in his book a number of key concepts, 
such as the role of anticipation in the next phase of the system (feedback loop), role 
of discrete information estimation in steering and the ‘black box’ according to which 
the human body can be monitored like a servomechanism, separated from its sur-
roundings (Wiener, 1961). For Wiener, cybernetics was a method through which in-
formation systems build organisations between neuron networks and human com-
munities (Peters, 2016, p. 17). 
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Wiener’s message had a number of similarities with the thoughts published by Alex-
ander Bogdanov 35 years earlier, which were banned during Stalin’s rule. Conse-
quently, in a Stalinist manner, Soviet Union started attacking cybernetics, using phil-
osophical criticism as the tool. Cybernetics was characterised as idealistic and imperi-
alistic and as an ideology directed against the interests of the working class. Because 
Bogdanov had already been branded anti-Soviet, a separate campaign against cyber-
netics was launched in the Soviet Union. According to Gerovitch, the word ‘cyber-
netics’ did not even appear in the 1953 edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, 
which contained all the information that Soviet citizens were allowed to access (Ger-
ovitch, 2002, p. 103). In 1950, the journal ‘Literaturnaya Gazeta’ characterised Norb-
ert Wiener as a “conman and a plotter, the kind of a person that capitalists use instead of genuine 
scientists”. According to the same journal, the computer enthusiasm in the United 
States was a “huge campaign aimed at fooling the ordinary people”. In a 1952 issue, the journal 
used such terms as “American pseudoscience” and “the science of modern-day slave masters” to 
characterise cybernetics. In 1954, the compact dictionary of philosophy described cy-
bernetics as a “reactionary pseudoscience”. According to Gerovitch, this campaign did not 
arise from the clash between cybernetics and Soviet science but it was prompted by 
the ideological struggle fought as part of the Cold War (Gerovitch, 2002, pp. 118–
119). However, according to Gerovitch and Susiluoto, at the same, the Soviet Union 
continued to develop computers and their usefulness in military applications was rec-
ognised (Susiluoto, 2006, p. 110; Gerovitch, 2002, pp. 119–121). 
 
After Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union was supposed to become a state for all its citi-
zens, and the aim was to return to the idealised model of ‘Leninism’. This atmosphere 
provided a fertile ground for cybernetic utopias (Susiluoto, 2006, p. 143) because in 
scientists’ view, a technocracy, in which computer-aided administration could prevent 
a rule of terror, would be an ideal replacement for Stalin. In October 1956, the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences arranged a seminar discussing industrial automation, which was 
the turning point in the development of cybernetics in the Soviet Union. Lyapunov 
delivered two reports to the seminar, one on the mathematical basis of the science of 
accounting and the other on machine translation. In his view, the key issue is the 
‘algorithmisation’ of control, or converting control and management into a chain of 
logical steps that could be transferred to a computer. Lyapunov characterised the 
construction of algorithms as a key issue and described cybernetics as a research field 
at the core of this particular problem. If computers are at the heart of automation, 
cybernetics would be at the heart of each computer (Gerovitch, 2002, p.194). 
 
Until then, ideological criticism had been directed against cybernetics at all levels but 
now the situation was completely reversed. Cybernetics was eagerly embraced by a 
large number of Soviet mathematicians and computer specialists who considered crit-
icism of cybernetics as an ideological conspiracy (Gerovitch, 2002, pp. 194–195). In 
1958, an entry on cybernetics appeared in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia. It was 
written by Andrey Kolmogorov, a Soviet mathematician, who enthusiastically char-
acterised cybernetics as not only a collection of mathematical tools but also as a sep-
arate discipline, which in terms of its systematic construction, was still in its infancy 
(Gerovitch, 2002, p. 196). Norbert Wiener’s work ‘Cybernetics’ was translated into 
Russian in 1958, and at the same time, Lyapunov launched the publication series 
‘Problemy kibernetiki’ (Problems of cybernetics) (Gerovitch, 2002, pp.196–197). 
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According to Gerovitch, support for cybernetic ideas came from two opposite camps. 
The philosophers defending cybernetics wanted to place dialectical materialism inside 
cybernetics. Cyberneticians did not attach much importance to the philosophical di-
mension of cybernetics and instead, they emphasised its experimental validity and 
practical uses. At the same time, however, the lack of ideological clarity meant that 
Soviet cyberneticians had to define their field of science in the face of continuous 
opposition (Gerovitch, 2002, p. 197; Peters, 2016, pp. 39–40). 
 
By the end of the 1950s, the ‘objective’ computer telling the truth had became the 
ideal and provided the basis for the budding cybernetic discourse. Mathematicians 
and computer specialists started to develop a new science that would combine a num-
ber of cybernetic theories, such as the regulatory technique, information theory and 
accounting theory into a single conceptual umbrella theory. Step by step, Soviet cy-
berneticians turned the earlier criticism on its head and tried to cyberneticise all fields 
of science. According to Gerovitch and Peters, this was a much more ambitious goal 
than what Norbert Wiener had tried to achieve with cybernetics. Cyberneticians also 
wanted to incorporate objectivity into all social sciences and in their view, the vague 
language of ideology should have been replaced with the precise language of cyber-
netics (Gerovitch, 2002, p. 199; Peters, 2016, pp. 36–37). 
 
High walls had been erected between different fields of Soviet science during Stalin’s 
rule. Each of the fields of science was dominated by one officially approved school 
of thought. Epistemic obstacles between different fields of science boosted the intel-
lectual and institutional authority of the official schools of thought (Gerovitch, 2002, 
pp. 200–201). In opposition to this, cybernetics became the main instrument in Soviet 
science in the efforts to bring down the obstacles between different fields of science. 
Soviet scientists worked hard to achieve ‘cybernetisation’ of contemporary science (= 
to systematically translate scientific discourse into a cyber language).  
 
In fact, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, cybernetics developed into an umbrella 
under which mathematicians, computer engineers, biologists and physiologists met, 
sharing theories, methods and hypotheses. According to Leonid Kraizmer, cybernet-
ics “embraced all fields of science - not completely but to the extent that we are talking 
about process management”. In line with the official version of dialectical material-
ism, Kraizmer, too, considered philosophy as the overarching theme but in his view, 
cybernetics is the only field of science that is not subjected to philosophy (ibid., pp. 
200–201). 
 
Alexey Lyapunov, who headed the cybernetic movement, first in Moscow and then 
in the secret city of Akademgorodok in Siberia, worked to institutionalise cybernetic 
research. Lyapunov contacted Aksel Berg, who had just retired from the post of So-
viet Deputy Defence Minister for Radioelectronics, suggesting that he should accept 
the chairmanship of a cybernetic council operating under the auspices of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences. This marked the start of the development of cybernetic ideas 
in the Soviet Union, and the efforts were spurred by the forceful personality of Berg 
(Gerovitch, 2002, pp. 204–206). 
 
Driven by the cybernetic ideology of Aksel Berg, equipment of Sergey Lebedev, pro-
gramming ideas of Alexey Lyapunov, and the equipment and networks of Viktor 
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Glushkov, rapid progress was achieved in cybernetics and computerisation in the So-
viet Union during Khrushchev’s rule and in the years immediately after his ouster. 
There were plans to introduce cybernetic applications to all areas of life so that we 
can talk of a real breakthrough of cybernetic utopias (Gerovitch, 2002, pp. 143–144). 
This was also the period when Vladimir Lefebvre was working at the institute of cy-
bernetics and the idea of reflexive control first emerged. It was only possible in an 
atmosphere that was more favourable to the development of cybernetics and systems 
theory. The groundwork for the current Russian theories of the fundamentals of the 
command system was also laid during those years. 
 
Boosted by the development of cybernetics, there was keen interest in computer sci-
ence topics and scientific decision-making in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Until then, decision-making was considered as an art based on experience 
and intuition. Ideological conviction and party allegiance were also seen as playing a 
role. When the lessons learned from the Great Patriotic War were assessed, it was 
concluded that the risks arising from wrong decisions were becoming higher. Thus, 
the aim was now to quantify decision-making and increase automation in technologies 
and industries (Chotikul, 1986, p. 84). 
2.1.2 The Soviet development in cybernetics, systems and control theory  
 
Development of cybernetics in the Soviet Union was hampered by the lack of a clear 
definition of the concept. In an article published in 1955, Lyapunov, Sobolev and 
Kitov defined cybernetics on the basis of three theories: information theory, theory 
of computers as brain-like self-organised processes, and automated management sys-
tems. Three years later, Lyapunov and Sobolev gave four different definitions for 
cybernetics: 
 
1. Cybernetics is a field of science that uses mathematical methods to study 
control systems and control processes. 
2. Cybernetics is a field of science that studies control and management pro-
cesses in equipment, living organisms and human communities.  
3. Cybernetics is a field of science that studies the transmitting, processing 
and storing of information. 
4. Cybernetics is a field of science that studies methods creating, transform-
ing and interpreting the structure of real control process algorithms. 
 
In 1959, the same authors published a new article that no longer contained the second 
definition. Even though this definition had been closest to Norbert Wiener’s original 
definition of cybernetics, Lyapunov and Sobolev felt that the differences between 
regulatory technique, information theory and computer science would disappear if it 
was included. In Lyapunov’s view, all intelligent activities involve regulatory processes 
managed by a control algorithm that can be implemented using a computer (Gero-
vitch, 2002, pp. 246–247). 
 
Andrey Kolmogorov criticised the versions of Wiener and Lyapunov, describing 
them as too simple. In accordance with his own theory, Kolmogorov considered in-
formation as the key concept in cybernetics and defined other cybernetics-related is-
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sues on its basis. Kolmogorov’s definition of communication is essential in this re-
spect. In his view, communication means ‘reception, storing and sending of infor-
mation’ that manifests itself in two forms: control and regulation. In control, the in-
formation received is processed into control signals whereas in regulation, the infor-
mation received is processed into regulatory signals. Sergey Yablonsky, a mathemati-
cian and Lyapunov’s student, gave still another definition for cybernetics. In his view, 
each control system can be defined with the help of algebraic logic (Gerovitch, 2002, 
pp. 247–248). These thoughts may have provided the basis for the method suggested 
by Lefebvre (presented later in this study), in which decision-making is modelled with 
solvable equations. 
 
The conclusion in the Soviet Union was that its model of cybernetics now differed 
significantly from the original Western concept. According to Soviet scientists, this 
was not a problem, however, as such theories as the ‘control system’ produced by 
Lyapunov and Yablonsky were considered much more detailed than the control con-
cept presented by Wiener in his model. In Wiener’s model, the sole purpose of control 
was to achieve a greater degree of organisation. According to Lyapunov, a system 
controls another system if the signal sent by it changes the behaviour of the other 
system. In Yablonsky’s view, control systems are a broad category, which also includes 
the systems that actually exert control, systems that are controlled and systems that 
are not connected with control in the traditional sense (such as chess) (Gerovitch, 
2002, pp. 249–250). In the final analysis, it can be said that cybernetics was not ex-
plicitly modelled but all definitions contained the need to model simple systems, links 
between them and exchange of information. 
 
By the early 1960s, Soviet cybernetics was already a universal method that was used 
to interpret science, technology, economics and even politics. One manifestation of 
this was the way in which ‘control’ a basic concept in Wiener’s theory was translated 
in cybernetic discourse. In the early 1950s, Soviet critics of cybernetics translated it 
directly into Russian, using the term ‘kontrol’. However, in 1958, supporters of cy-
bernetics translated the same word as ‘upravlenie’ (‘management’). ‘Control’ is a more 
limited concept, and the new translation was introduced to show that cybernetics can 
contribute to administrative decision-making (Gerovitch, 2002, pp. 253–254; transla-
tion of the word ‘upravlenie’ is also discussed in the introduction). 
 
From the military perspective, the link between systems theory and cybernetics in the 
Soviet Union became clear in the 1960s as ‘military cyberneticians’ viewed military 
systems (equipment and the humans operating them) as cybernetic systems. Already 
in 1958, Lyapunov had noted that cybernetic control algorithms were fighting against 
other algorithms. According to a definition presented in a 1972 book on decision-
making, every platform (tank, aircraft and ship) and all its elements constitute a cy-
bernetic system. The commanders and their control devices operate the control sys-
tem, the weapons and the technical components of the platforms are the systems that 
they control, and the commanders and their staff constitute the systems controlling 
the troops. The units or platforms subordinated to the commanders are the systems 
to be controlled. Researchers studying the military applications of cybernetics pro-
posed that computers and cybernetic control should not only be used in autonomous 
weapons systems but also in the command of military units (Gerovitch, 2002, p. 265). 
 
 16 
In fact, the first information technology centre operating under the auspices of the 
Soviet Ministry of Defence was the first facility to study automated command of 
troops. In the opinion of cyberneticians, computers can make more objective deci-
sions than individual commanders because computers do not base their decision-
making on intuition but on collective information and on a broader operational-tac-
tical view in specific areas. However, in the 1960s, these views did not yet lead to a 
cybernetic revolution as conservative military leaders forced the reformers to leave 
the armed forces. In the same connection, the first information technology centre 
became an ordinary scientific research centre expected to support the automation of 
individual military functions, instead of the automation of decision-making (Gero-
vitch, 2002, pp. 266–267). The activities were, however, continued, though in a 
smaller scale. 
 
The ideas suggested by Bezuglii and Gavrilenko in the journal ‘Military Thought’ in 
1991 can be considered as the culmination of the Soviet development of cybernetics 
and the starting point of cybernetics development in Russia. The two discuss the in-
corporation of the models of systems theory and cybernetics presented in the preced-
ing years into military systems. Bezuglii and Gavrilenko conclude that Soviet cyber-
netics and the general systems theory developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy do not 
offer a common definition for ‘system’ and that instead, a number of different defi-
nitions exist. The authors viewed this as a challenge and proposed that instead of a 
separate military systems theory, the general applicability of the system-theoretical 
processing should be understood (Bezuglii & Gavrilenko, 1991). 
 
Accordingly, they proposed the following definition for a military system: “a group 
of elements that executes or supports the execution of a mission in a military operat-
ing environment”. In their view, the 1991 Gulf War showed that military operations 
are becoming part of international politics and are directly related to problems at po-
litical level and not only to military problems. For this reason, it is essential that the 
focus in the modelling of systems is not only on battle systems but that consideration 
should also be given to overall political developments. In fact, the authors urge that 
armed forces should be developed on the basis of thoroughly constructed modelling 
based on workable theories (Bezuglii & Gavrilenko, 1991). The ideas of Bogdanov 
and Chekinov discussed at the start of this chapter are a natural continuation of these 
thoughts. 
2.2 Russian military principles of command and control  
 
Military leadership is always influenced by general attitudes towards leadership. These 
thoughts arise from the history of the country and its armed forces, combat experi-
ence and traditions. The principles of military command and control applied in Russia 
are discussed in this subchapter. Later in this study, these principles are combined 
with the cybernetics discussed earlier with the aim of modelling the overall concept 
of command and control. 
 
A series of articles published in the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’ in 2002 and 2003 pro-
vides a general description of what is expected of a military commander. The author, 
Major General Vorobyov, has contributed to the journal since 1957, and he has also 
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written a Russian book on tactics. The 2002 edition of the work is used as a basic 
textbook by officers studying tactics (cf. Thomas, 2016, pp.12–13). 
 
In accordance with dialectics, Vorobyov states that commanding officers who under-
stand the nature of battle and the objective laws guiding it, can understand what is 
happening, orientate themselves correctly and assess the situation. This forms the 
basis for their decision-making and the command process as a whole. However, in 
his view, it is wrong to think that all battles are similar and to reach conclusions from 
the course of a single battle. In fact, he suggests that the purpose of the military theory 
is to identify the law-like elements that are repeated in each battle and use them as a 
basis for instructions and recommendations. The principles of warfare provide mili-
tary commanders with an opportunity to combine objective and subjective dialecti-
cism in their own action. The principles are of passive nature, and do not guarantee 
victory but they have helped to construct scientific forecasts and anticipate results of 
the decisions (Vorobyov, 2002a, pp. 18–19). 
 
According to Vorobyov, if a commander is able to act with skill and anticipate devel-
opments, shows determination and tenacity and uses unorthodox methods, the com-
bat capability of his troops can be doubled or even tripled. To achieve this, the com-
mander must defeat the enemy, prevent its actions and force it to act in accordance 
with his own will (Vorobyov, 2002b, p. 64). Continuing on the same topic, he notes 
that the ability to foresee developments in the battlefield is the greatest manifestation 
of a commander’s skills. Decision-making and planning lie at the heart of military 
leadership: the victory must be planned well ahead of the troop deployment itself. 
This is based on realistic predictions, the ability to foresee the enemy’s strengths and 
the combat capability of one’s own forces (Vorobyov, 2003, p. 57). 
 
According to Vorobyov, today’s commanders must see any changes much earlier and 
analyse them more thoroughly than commanders in the past. His conclusion is that 
anticipating situations is based on the following principles: objective situational as-
sessment, tested and scientifically verified methodology, systems analysis and careful 
analysis of conflicting information. All conclusions should be based on reliable indi-
cators, calculations and convincing logic (Vorobyov, 2003, p. 58). 
 
Strong trust in existing models is reflected in Vorobyov’s writings, as in his view, 
commanders should always be able to rely on calculations and logic. A commander 
and his staff should work to eliminate all unanticipated developments and their aim 
should be to get the upper hand in the battle. To achieve this, stratagems and demon-
strations should be used to control the enemy’s action. Vorobyov, too, is of the view 
that computers cannot foresee everything. However, using the best available auto-
mated methods, a ratio of 1:6 or even 1:7 between plan and coincidence can be 
achieved (Vorobyov, 2003, pp. 59–60). 
 
Vorobyov also discusses the concept of time pressure. In his view, estimating the time 
available is an important part of the decision-making process and it is extremely im-
portant to be able to command troops in a dynamic manner, make quick decisions 
and delegate the tasks to lower-level officers. Quick decisions are not crucial as such; 
what matters is the ability to make correct assessments. Vorobyov also notes that 
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both sides fight for time and for this reason, the commander should prevent the en-
emy from winning by disorganising its troops, by deceiving them and by exploiting 
the disarray and the low level of readiness among the enemy. To gain time, it is crucial 
that one acts more quickly and in a more dynamic manner than the enemy (Vorobyov, 
2003, p. 60).  
 
Control or at least the sense of being in control is essential in authoritarian and total-
itarian systems, and there are also references to it in the Russian political tradition. 
Vorobyov also highlights the role of control, noting that the ability to manage the 
process of executing combat missions is key to the process of command and control. 
Control involves three phases: organisation, planning, and the direct presence of com-
manders as the lower level officers are carrying out the missions. According to Voro-
byov, such control mechanisms help to ensure that all parties involved carry out their 
duties in accordance with a uniform plan (Vorobyov, 2003, p. 63). 
 
Vorobyov notes that the control must be uniform, and it must have a purpose. It 
should be carried out so that it prevents incomplete or wrongly timed execution of 
tasks. It must be quick and effective so that commanders can react to problems before 
it is too late. Control mechanisms should support the combat operations led by the 
lower level officers by eliminating errors identified in the organisation and during the 
combat. At the same time, however, pedantic control should be avoided as this would 
make the lower level officers less prepared to show initiative. Exercising control is 
not only the commander’s responsibility as it is also the task of the deputy com-
mander, staff officers, officers in charge of branches of service and other command-
ing officers. Control can be exercised in many different ways but the best approach 
is to ensure that the commanding officers are present where the lower-level officers 
are placed (Vorobyov, 2003, p. 64). 
 
Other principles of warfare relevant to command and control discussed in this study 
are based on the articles written by Vorobyov and Kiselyov in 2008 and 2011. The 
articles discuss the development of the principles of warfare 
 
In their articles, Vorobyov and Kiselyov discuss extensively the changes in the prin-
ciples of warfare but highlighting the command and control of troops during combat 
as a principle of warfare is of relevance to this study. According to the two, the com-
plexity, inconsistency and the unique nature of today’s operational situation force mil-
itary commanders to apply creative thinking because otherwise, other principles of 
warfare could not even be used. At the same time, Vorobyov and Kiselyov are of the 
view that as fighting progresses, it becomes increasingly difficult to apply strict com-
mand principles, and they highlight the combat activities directed against command 
and control in recent wars (Vorobyov & Kiselyov, 2008, p. 87). 
 
In contrast to Soviet thinking, Vorobyov and Kiselyov emphasise the need to mini-
mise casualties and material losses in military operations. They suggest that in its cur-
rent position, Russia cannot use its armed forces in the same way as the Soviet Union, 
and the focus should instead be on constant readiness, decentralisation of materiel 
and flexible deployment of troops in any part of Russia (Vorobyov & Kiselyov, 2008, 
p. 89). In fact, Russia has observed this principle as it has enhanced the capability of 
its armed forces over the past ten years. 
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Vorobyov and Kiselyov highlight the information-psychological support for strategic 
operations as a separate principle of warfare. In their view, it is a new and extremely 
effective component of supporting operations. The instruments used in such support 
include imposing one’s own will on the adversary, using military policy and diplomatic 
means to deceive the enemy, gathering information on the high-security targets of the 
enemy and collecting information on one’s own troops for the command system. 
These support measures also include protecting one’s own troops against the infor-
mation disseminated by the adversary and spreading disinformation among the enemy 
troops (Vorobyov & Kiselyov, 2008, p. 89). 
 
Vorobyov and Kiselyov continue on this theme in their article on network-centric 
warfare (2011), noting that there is a gradual shift from the control of troops towards 
control of battle, in which the aim is to exert reflexive control over the enemy. At the 
same time, the principles of warfare are changing, and consideration must be given to 
integrated control of troops and systems as a new principle. In such situations, the 
commander must be able to take into account all links between the elements influ-
encing combat action and to anticipate their impacts (Vorobyov & Kiselyov, 2011, 
pp. 74–75). 
 
The expectations placed on a military commander and the principles of warfare de-
scribed above show that the Soviet emphasis on unitary leadership and the com-
mander’s role, combined with a solid logical and mathematical chain of reasoning and 
the ability to identify causal chains, still have a strong influence on how military lead-
ership is viewed in Russia.  
 
However, it should be noted that the way in which military commanders are expected 
to deploy troops, and provide them with support have changed since Soviet times: 
the aim is now to minimise both casualties and material losses. This principle is sup-
ported by the emphasis given to information and psychological operations: they help 
military commanders to achieve their goals without casualties to their own troops. 
More importance is now attached to command and control as it has been realised that 
applying them in a constant and flexible manner is a prerequisite for achieving any 
military success. In this connection, Kiselyov has in a latter article also pointed out 
that tools should be in place to keep secret all personal details of military commanders 
to ensure that they could not be easily targeted in the social media (Kiselyov, 2017, p. 
7). 
 
Like their Western counterparts, Russian military commanders are under constant 
time pressure and the critical importance of time and the need to make decisions more 
quickly than the adversary are emphasised in decision-making. However, unlike in 
Western mission-type tactics, military commanders are expected to keep an eye on 
their subordinates so that any deviations from the plan can be identified at an early 
stage and correct action ensured. Nevertheless, it was already noted in the Soviet Un-
ion that excessive control has detrimental effects as subordinates became passive and 
the pace of action slows down (see for example, Ivanov, Savelev & Shemansky, 1977, 
p. 123; Vorobyov 2003, p. 63).  
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2.3 Russian command and control systems 
 
The systems of military command and control developed in Russia can be assessed 
by combining the ideas arising from cybernetic modelling and systems theory with 
the principles of command and control. Systems theory was already extensively stud-
ied in the Soviet Union, and despite the problems resulting from changes in leadership 
and administrative structures in the 1990s, the work has continued on a comprehen-
sive basis. Below is a presentation of the division of systems used by F. G. Kolomo-
yets, who has written extensively on systems analysis and decision-making within sys-
tems in Russia and Belarus. The focus here is on the principle of reflexive system 
analysed by Kolomoyets. This is followed by a discussion of the overall system of 
command and control and its subsystems. 
 
In his article in the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’, Kolomoyets divides systems into simple, 
complex and large ones. In his view, military organisations are among the most com-
plex systems in existence. Kolomoyets adds that the systems theory has identified five 
empirically perceived operating principles of systems each of which is highly compli-
cated (Kolomoyets, 2007, pp. 222–223). The operating principle of reflexion is the 
most complex of these five principles. Kolomoyets explains that in accordance with 
the reflexive operating principle, a system can make decisions and organise its activi-
ties by taking into account the decisions of another complex system interacting with 
it. In this case, reflexion is understood as the reflexion of the adversary’s analytical 
decision-making process. The decision-maker of the first system might deliberately 
influence the fundamentals of decision-making in the other system and in this way, 
encourage decision-makers in that system to make decisions that are to its own ad-
vantage (ibid., p. 225). 
 
Kolomoyets notes that systems organised in accordance with the reflexive principle 
can be called reflexive systems. In his view, battle systems are classic examples of 
reflexive systems that achieve their goals by carrying out their own combat missions 
in armed combat against the enemy’s battle systems (ibid., p. 225). 
 
In this way, reflexivity has been introduced to system-theoretical discussion in Russia, 
and it can be used as a basis when examining decision-making systems in accordance 
with Kolomoyets’s principles: have they been deliberately built in accordance with the 
reflexive principle? 
 
The article by Vygovsky and Davidov, published in 2017 in the journal ‘Voennaya 
Mysl’, can be considered as a general description of the Russian system of military 
decision-making and its subsystems. Vygovsky and Davidov discuss the automation 
of decision-making systems and support systems.  
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FIGURE 1: Structure of military command and control (Vygovsky & Davidov, 
2017). 
 
In the context of this study, it is necessary to examine the functioning of the two key 
subsystems: the command and control (C2) system and the decision support system. 
These systems comprise the human decision-makers and the systems that can, when 
influenced, directly contribute to the effectiveness of reflexive control.  
 
A figure illustrating the basic features of a command system and its elements is shown 
below. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Expanded version of the command system (Ivanov, Savelev & 
Shemansky, 1977) 
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According to Ivanov, Savelev & Shemansky, the main task of the control organ is to 
obtain information on the state and functions of the object of control. In principle, 
control would be impossible without such information and the absence of the infor-
mation will ultimately lead to a conflict with the objective reality and the destruction 
of the system (Ivanov, Savelev & Shemansky, 1977, p.12). 
 
The authors note that when the process of command is analysed from the perspective 
of materialistic dialectics and cybernetics, the following can be said (irrespective of 
the operating environment and the method of implementation): 
 
– It is absolutely necessary to have a command system comprising the con-
trol organ, an object of control and direct communication and feedback 
between the two. 
– There are causal relationships between the components. 
– The functions of the command system are goal-oriented and require the 
existence of control parameters. 
– The system is of dynamic nature, and it is capable of transformation. At 
the same time, it is also able to absorb a large number of external inputs 
without its internal structure or characteristics being affected (Ivanov et al., 
1977, p. 16). 
 
Using the definition produced by the above mentioned study, the command system 
can be assessed on the basis of the division proposed by Kolomoyets in his article. 
According to this division, systems capable of functioning in this manner can be cat-
egorised as complex reflexive systems, which means that they take into account deci-
sions made by the adversary in their own actions and try to achieve a higher degree 
of reflex. 
 
Dovzhenko and Zavgorodni discuss the structure of decision support systems in their 
article ‘Decision support in the control of troops’. According to the authors, all evi-
dence shows that human brain has only limited processing capacity and for this rea-
son, it has become necessary to develop specialised systems for decision-makers. 
Dovzhenko and Zavgorodni suggest that these systems are created through a variety 
of different technical solutions, and they can be used to combine existing practical 
information with information-technology solutions and to create new processes for 
collecting, sharing and processing information (Dovzhenko & Zavgorodni, 2014, p. 
109).  
 
According to Dovzhenko and Zavgorodni, the ability to produce decision-making 
models that can be entered into databases should be the key feature of the decision 
support systems. The system must provide a basis for the construction of an extensive 
model database and for easy and simple creation of new models founded on existing 
ones (Dovzhenko & Zavgorodni, 2014, p. 112). 
 
Tikhanitsev, who works at the research department of the Russian military admin-
istration and actively contributes to the debate on research issues, has written about 
developing decision support systems for automated administration. He notes that in 
the context of the systems theory, the individual who decides to launch an operation 
(battle) merely adjusts the control parameters in order to construct a strategy allowing 
 23 
weapons systems and troops to achieve the goals set by the commander (within the 
limitations set). If there is only one solution to such a system-level problem, it can be 
determined by means of direct calculations (Tikhanitsev, 2012, pp. 75–76). 
 
However, Tikhanitsev admits that in combat troops are rarely in such a situation. If 
there are not enough troops or weapons, the goal can rarely be achieved with the 
prerequisites set. In such cases, in order to achieve a solution, new values for the 
target function (goal) must be calculated or estimated or some of the limitations must 
be adjusted. In that case, a rational solution can be achieved but solving the equation 
involves a large number of changing parameters and producing the calculations is 
difficult. Reaching a solution may prove impossible unless the decision-makers use 
the capabilities offered by automated support (Tikhanitsev, 2012, p. 76). 
 
According to Tikhanitsev, when such difficult calculation problems are encountered, 
the common practice in many countries is to use decision support systems or expert 
systems. Decisions on military and military-policy matters that place enormous re-
sponsibility on individual decision-makers are primarily taken on the basis of decision 
support systems. Tikhanitsev notes that Russia does not have a standardised decision 
support system and suggests that such a system is needed (Tikhanitsev, 2012, p. 77). 
In fact, there has been progress after the publication of Tikhanitsev’s article. For ex-
ample, the new national defence command centre relies heavily on computer-aided 
decision support systems. 
 
The article by Donskov, Nikitin and Besedin on intelligent decision support systems 
for electronic warfare is relevant to reflexive control. In their view, decision support 
systems used today are typically built as expert systems that support decision-makers 
without them having to take any active measures. In the authors’ view, the risk here 
is that the adversary can manipulate these automated systems with its signals. They 
note that as systems become more extensively automated, it becomes increasingly 
likely that there are attempts to control them on a reflexive basis. According to the 
authors, a decision support system may in itself exert reflexive control over the enemy 
and protect one’s own system against the control attempts made by the adversary 
(Donskov et al., 2015, pp. 136–137).  
 
The articles discussed above suggest that there is a great deal of interest in decision 
support systems in Russia and intensive development work is underway. In general, 
decision support systems can be characterised as complex systems that collect infor-
mation on such matters as their operating environments, on the enemy and on one’s 
own troops and that use this information as a basis for analysis and recommendations. 
2.4 Russian military decision-making 
 
Despite automated command systems and decision support systems, humans still re-
main behind all decision-making. The work by Ivanov, Savelev and Shemansky pre-
sents the Soviet view on human decision-making. After they had raised the topic, it 
was discussed in Russian military journals in the 1990s and the early years of the 2000s, 
while the conclusions were analysed by Lester W. Grau and Charles Bartles, two 
American researchers, in their work ‘The Russian Way of War’ published in 2016. 
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The authors approach decision-making from the perspective of the decision prepared 
by the commander for the battle. In their view, the commander’s decision must be 
based on the following: his psychological capabilities, level of knowledge, experience 
and knowledge of the situation, the time available for decision-making and combat 
preparations, the troops available to the commander and the nature of the orders 
issued by the higher-level commanders (Ivanov et al, 1977, p. 171). 
 
According to Ivanov, Savelev & Shemansky when the conditions are difficult, the 
purpose of the decision-making methodology is to help the commander to produce 
correctly timed and well-justified definitions of the basic structure of operations, and 
the tasks for the lower levels of command and the models of coordination between 
them. For this purpose, the methodology must meet a number of requirements that 
arise from the operating environment and the decision-making process itself (Ivanov 
et al, 1977, p. 185). 
 
They add that the methodology of the commander’s decision-making and the con-
tents of his decisions always depend on the following base values: the orders issued 
by the higher levels of command and its instructions on how to prepare for the com-
bat, changes in the situation (especially the time available for decision-making) and 
the personal characteristics of the commander and his subordinates (ibid, p. 186). 
 
They also emphasise that analysing and describing the reasoning behind individuals’ 
decisions is extremely problematic, especially when we are talking about commanders 
in difficult situations. The commander’s train of thought is often divided into three 
separate and successive phases: first he analyses the task, then he evaluates it and, 
finally, makes the necessary decisions. The authors do not share this view because in 
their opinion, it is not in accordance with the reality, advanced methods or the theory 
of cognitive science. The separate and successive nature of the three factors can be 
questioned. In fact, it is more a matter of perception than reality (ibid., p. 187). Since 
then, the same problem has also been studied in Western research on human decision-
making. Examples include the Recognition-Primed model by Klein, in which experi-
enced decision-makers usually make their decisions very quickly on the basis of similar 
situations in the past and without analysing different options (Klein, 2008, pp. 457–
458). 
 
In the context of this study, it is essential to understand the Russian concept of how 
a commander makes his decisions. Ivanov, Savelev & Shemansky support the view 
based on dialectical materialism, in which human awareness is a reflection of the ob-
jective reality. In other words, a ‘soul’ does not exist. This means that the decision-
making process, like any other intentional activity, must start with sensory observa-
tions of the real situation, after which it must change into abstract thinking and, fi-
nally, into action. The authors consider this as a dialectical method of observing real-
ity, as a process of perceiving the objective world. Failure to act in accordance with 
this cognitive model will lead to serious errors, especially if these errors have been 
made by higher level commanders and the errors made by the decision-maker are 
added to them (Ivanov et al., 1977, pp. 198–199). 
 
The authors note that, as a result, specifying the commander’s tasks and assessing the 
situation are not separate phases but a uniform and creative decision-making process. 
The assessment of the situation does not start after the specification of the task but 
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it continues and deepens so that all advantages and disadvantages of the options are 
fully understood. Searching for the right option should start at the beginning of the 
decision-making process and during the process, an experienced commander is able 
to determine which of the options are feasible. The commander weighs up the re-
maining options (2–3) at the conclusion of the decision-making process, assessing the 
estimated end results (own and enemy casualties, attrition of material resources, allo-
cation of time, etc.), and selects the best option. At this stage, both the mind and the 
will of the commander matter. The worst option is to decide not to decide (to do 
nothing). After selecting the best option, the commander transforms it into an order 
and makes his decision known to the lower levels of command. The decision-making 
process is now complete (Ivanov et al., 1977, pp. 200–201). 
 
The authors note, however, that the decision resulting from this process (like any 
decision) is only of relative importance. In their view, the most important of the de-
cision-making methods presented above is the perception of reality in accordance 
with dialectical materialism. When decisions are made, it is also important to use the-
oretical methods of logical thinking, such as analysis, synthesis, abstraction, generali-
sation, induction, deduction, analogies and comparisons, all together or as combina-
tions (Ivanov et al., 1977, pp. 202-204). 
 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a slightly critical look was taken in Russia 
at these command theories, which seem rather sterile when examined from the West-
ern perspective. The article by Volostnov and Golod in the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’ 
is an example of this, and it also touches on the problems of managing troops, a topic 
already discussed above.  
 
Volostnov and Golod put together earlier concepts in their search for the core idea 
of command and control. In their view, command is an intentional, creative, organi-
sational and a technical process that is put into practice by commanders and their 
staffs. It creates impacts on the troops subordinated to them. The ultimate goal of 
command and control is to organise troops for their combat missions and to ensure 
that they can effectively carry out their combat missions within the time allocated to 
them and with minimum losses. Secondly, when examined through the cybernetic 
perspective, all command takes place in a closed cybernetic system, in which objects 
in contact with each other transmit information in an appropriate manner. Thirdly, 
the command process is part of the military system. In this connection, the principles 
defining the content of ‘control’ are those that define the functioning of complex 
military systems (Volostnov & Golod, 1992). 
 
In his article in the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’ in 2001, Major General Ryabchuk outlines 
the principles for commanding troops in the 2000s and in doing this, he also touches 
on the theories of reflexive control. Ryabchuk, who also holds a doctoral degree in 
military science, starts by noting that in the Soviet tradition, control was seen as a 
peacetime activity carried out by commanders and their staffs to keep the troops com-
bat-ready and to prepare them for battle. He criticises this approach by stating that it 
does not contain the idea of controlling the enemy’s activities through one’s own 
action. In his view, great military leaders have always worked to exert control over the 
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enemy as part of their own military strategies. In military theory, such action is con-
sidered as part of battlefield support measures, such as deception and disguise, and 
not as a crucial element of battle (Ryabchuk, 2001, pp. 13–14). 
 
According to Ryabchuk, the enemy should not merely be considered a target for re-
connaissance and influence operations. In his view, it is clear that the enemy, too, tries 
to identify and destroy critical targets, disrupt command and control activities as well 
as to deceive and disguise and that the enemy, too, wants to achieve victory. The 
commander should be prepared for this. Ryabchuk quotes Tukhachevsky, Marshall 
of the Soviet Union, in whose view, only the party whose combat operations proceed 
according to plan is exerting control over the troops. Thus, proper control of the 
battle cannot only be a matter of exerting control over one’s own troops but, in a 
sense, it should also involve exerting control over the enemy (ibid., p. 14). 
 
Ryabchuk admits that until now, it has been possible to criticise this approach but the 
information technology of the 21st century and advances in reconnaissance methods 
also open up tremendous opportunities for exerting control over the enemy. Accord-
ing to Ryabchuk, the problems concerning troop control nowadays arise from the 
need to organise command and control in interaction between two complex, dynamic 
and mutually hostile battle systems. These battle systems, which are structured both 
hierarchically (units) and horizontally (branches of service), share the same goals, 
troops and instruments in the efforts to achieve their goals, the same information and, 
above all, the intellectual capabilities and goal-orientation of the commander. Accord-
ing to Ryabchuk, intellectual capability is the key weapon and crucial to achieving 
victory over a well-armed, well-equipped and well-trained enemy (Ryabchuk, 2001, 
pp. 14–15). Makhnin, whose writings are presented later in this study, has reached 
similar conclusions. 
 
Ryabchuk concludes his article by noting that today’s military commanders have ac-
cess to more systems helping them to select the best possible options when making 
decisions. Nevertheless, in his view, success in the battlefield is guaranteed by the 
personal characteristics of a military commander, which comprise a high intellectual 
capability, high ethical standards, and psychological and professional capabilities.  
When available in sufficient quantities, these characteristics provide a basis for an 
effective approach to command and control (Ryabchuk, 2001, p. 17). 
 
To sum up the above discussion, the role of humans in decision-making is recognised 
in Russia (as it was already recognised in the Soviet Union). However, in the past, this 
was not a factor highlighted in the manuals. Even though the personal experience of 
military commanders and its use in decision-making were emphasised in the books 
and articles published in the Soviet Union, this was not accompanied by practical 
proposals. Universal objectivity as a guiding principle in dialectical materialism and 
assessing situations merely on the basis of objective reality may well have been a factor 
contributing to this. In the articles written after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
there has been more emphasis on thinking and social relations between individuals 
even though they, too, use idealistic and lofty concepts when talking about human 
beings. There is no mention of human weaknesses or the stress arising from combat. 
Command is seen as a successive process or as a process carried out in parallel with 
the latest information systems. Intellectual capabilities and imposing one’s will on the 
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enemy emphasised by Ryabchuk in his article should be seen as a continuation of 
Soviet thinking. However, he also discusses the use of information technology and 
engaging in combat against an enemy with superior resources.  
 
Generally speaking, the commander still plays a key role in Russian decision-making. 
Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, two US researchers, make the same conclusion. They 
note that commanders that have studied in Western military organisations cannot just 
put on a ‘red hat’ and expect to understand the way in which Russian military com-
manders and staffs work. The role of Russian military commanders and staffs in de-
cision-making substantially differs from the Western practice and focusing reflexive 
control on commanders and their personal characters is partially based on this. As 
noted by Grau and Bartles, in the West, a weak commander can manage if he has a 
competent staff. However, this would not be the case in the Russian system (Grau & 
Bartles, 2016, pp. 51–54). 
2.5 Reflexive model of command and control 
 
Based on the theories discussed above, a system-theoretical and cybernetic model of 
the Russian approach to command and control has been prepared for this study. It 
consists of 1) human decision-makers (commander and his staff) who are influenced 
by the conflict and the nature of the conflict, as well as military leadership; 2) the 
decision support system supporting the staff in its decision-making; 3) command and 
control system with its information relay and feedback channels; and 4) the system 
subordinated to the commander and the corresponding system of the enemy. This 
system functions in interaction with the operating environment and the correspond-
ing cybernetic systems above and below it. The overall purpose of the system is to 
exert influence on the corresponding system of the enemy at different levels, and it 
also takes into account the functions of the enemy’s system. Disruptions arising from 
the external operating environment or enemy action also impact the systems used in 
the model. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Reflexive model of the military command and control system prepared 
in this study 
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We can only understand the Russian theory of command and control if we understand 
the efforts to automate this system as comprehensively as possible. As noted by Grau 
and Bartles, the primary Russian goal has been to optimise decision-making in ac-
cordance with the needs of maneuver warfare, in which situations change rapidly and 
flexibility is required. To achieve success, a commander cannot use complex planning 
processes and rely on thorough staff work as the system must be based on clear orders 
issued on time by a commander with a good understanding of the situation. Moreo-
ver, the orders must provide instructions for using the operating models for which 
the troops have already received training and that are applied in the combat. Likewise, 
according to the Russian view, comprehensive automation of command and control 
helps commanders to make decisions more quickly than the enemy (a quicker com-
pletion of the O-O-D-A loop). According to Grau and Bartles, the Russian com-
mander-centred decision-making is better suited for such automation than the pro-
cesses used by NATO and the United States, which require a greater degree of human 
involvement during the planning process. On the basis of the goals described above, 
they note that in Russian decision-making, the aim is to prepare a plan based on train-
ing already carried out, under which the combat mission can be executed in an opti-
mum manner and not to create a tailored plan for perfect execution of the task (Grau 
& Bartles, 2016, pp. 57–58). 
 
In the context of this study, it is important to identify the potential targets for influ-
ence operations in this highly automated command system, which is designed for 
quick commander-centred decision-making. It can be concluded from the above that 
the commander is likely to be the prime target and the staff the secondary target. This 
is because influencing them will impact the whole system (in the same way as exerting 
influence on a higher-level commander). Influence on the commander and his staff 
can be exerted through their thoughts (command and control and thoughts about the 
conflict as background factors), through the plans that they have prepared (the aim is 
to influence the fundamentals of the plans), or through decision support systems (so-
lutions advantageous to one’s own side are fed into the decision-making process). 
Efforts may also be made to exert direct influence on individuals (especially the com-
mander). Efforts may also be made to influence the command system, even though 
this will produce more limited results. The ultimate method of exerting influence on 
the enemy is to cause more disruption in the operating environment. All these options 
are discussed in the dual model of reflexive control. 
2.6 Theory of reflexive control  
 
When the ideas of Vladimir Lefebvre, the man behind the original theory of reflexive 
control, are adapted to the reflexive systems discussed above, it can be noted that at 
system level, reflexive control is a process in which two opposite (military, political or 
economic) reflexive systems try to reach a higher level of reflexion than the other 
system possesses. In this process, the system with a lower level of reflexion is in a 
reacting position and unable to determine the real intentions behind the adversary’s 
action. In military systems, it may involve a confrontation between command and 
battle systems, at political level, a struggle between two opposing coalitions, and at 
economic level, a struggle between two competitors operating in the same market.   
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However, from the perspective of the methods used, the definition is not precise 
enough and does not provide answers concerning practical action. For this reason, 
this report will examine how the theory and practice of reflexive control have evolved 
over the past 50 years, and this is done by delving into the background assumptions 
and development of reflexive control. The author relies on the division of the devel-
opment of reflexive control into four distinctive phases used by Timothy Thomas in 
his 2002 article ‘Reflexive Processes and Control’. Thomas divides the process into 
the research phase (from the early 1960s to the late 1970s), practical orientation (from 
the late 1970s to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991), psychological-pedagog-
ical phase (1990s) and the psycho-social phase (from the late 1990s) (Thomas, 2002, 
p. 61). Developments in the 2010s are discussed separately because in recent years, 
consideration has been given to ideas and models that did not appear in the earlier 
writings.   
 
The author discusses the roles of individuals that have contributed to the develop-
ment of the reflexive control theory, such as Lefebvre, Lepsky and Novikov (all civil-
ian researchers) and Druzhinin, Ionov, Kontorov, Leonenko, Chausov and Makhnin 
(all military researchers) (cf., Chotikul, 1986, p. 80; Thomas, 2004, pp. 239–240; 
Thomas, 2011, p. 121; Thomas, 2015; Thomas, 2017). The approach is mainly based 
on their writings, and their original ideas and the references to these ideas and writings 
in later articles on the topic have been used as the selection criteria. 
2.6.1 Philosophical and political background to the reflexive control theory 
 
When reflexive control is examined on a comprehensive basis, we should consider 
the social situation where the development work started and how the concept is ex-
pected to function. Vladimir Lefebvre, the man who developed the theory (and who 
later moved the United States) notes in his book ‘Algebra of Conscience’ that the 
differences between the Western and Soviet societies went much deeper than gener-
ally assumed. This comment is used by the author as a basis for examining the societal 
assumptions behind reflexive control. According to Lefebvre, these differences al-
ready manifested themselves in the background assumptions concerning good and 
evil (Lefebvre, 1984a, pp. 6–8). According to Chotikul, Lefebvre refers to the differ-
ences between the two systems in the areas of ethics and morality (Chotikul, 1986, p. 
23; Lefebvre, 1984a, p. 87). 
 
According to Lefebvre, declaration of absolute good was at the core of the Soviet 
ideology: a good human being is honest, morally pure, modest, and has simple needs. 
The existence of evil was not denied; in fact, it could be used if that was necessary to 
secure victory for the good (in other words, the end justified the means). Maintaining 
an enemy image was one of the instruments used to emphasise the moral good in the 
Soviet system and the character and extent of the Soviet propaganda was one mani-
festation of this (Lefebvre, 1984a, pp. 83–91). It seems that the same operating model 
is also behind Russia’s current information operations targeting its own citizens (cf. 
Hakala, 2018; Gessen, 2018). 
 
The emphasis in the Soviet system was on control, which required long-term planning 
and anticipation. In the economy, this manifested itself in five-year plans, in the Soviet 
armed forces in cybernetic theories of troop control and predictions that the whole 
 30 
system of command and control would be automated. Background assumptions of 
dialectical materialism also led to a holistic and systemic approach to the issues con-
cerning ordinary Soviet citizens. All phenomena were interpreted through dialectical 
materialism, and in accordance with this approach, all real-world phenomena were 
seen as influencing each other. This interaction was supposed to result in the real 
objective world, which was seen as being reflected in human conscience (Chotikul, 
1986, pp. 29–30). 
 
Chotikul suggests that the Soviet Union was still basically a peasant society in the 
1980s where people had the capacity to endure hardship and were willing to submit 
to authority. As a result, Soviet citizens were well aware that they had little say in their 
country’s affairs. Chotikul suggests that these values are part of the Russian search 
for “an integral outlook which would give an answer to all questions of life, unite theoretical and 
practical reason and give a philosophical basis to the social idea”. According to Chotikul, this 
need was one of the factors that prompted the Soviet system to adopt the systems 
theory and cybernetics in a more comprehensive scale than Western countries (Chot-
ikul, 1986, p. 40). In his own study, Gerovitch notes that cybernetic concepts were 
incorporated into dialectical materialism to ensure that the comprehensive nature of 
cybernetics could be combined with the philosophical world view (Gerovitch, 2002, 
pp. 257–260).  
 
In her own study, Chotikul suggests that the philosophy of dialectical materialism also 
explains the functioning of the Soviet control system. According to dialectical mate-
rialism, human awareness is a reflection of social existence in a community. It is social 
(not private) awareness (Spirkin, 1983, Chapter 3). Against this background, the best 
way to exert control over individuals is to influence the observations that they made 
of their environment. The more firmly beliefs can be embedded in the cultural context 
in which decision-making occurs, the greater social control becomes. In this way, re-
flexive control can be applied to influence the opinions of both adversaries and the 
citizens of one’s own country. According to Chotikul, reflexive control represents an 
extension of the concept of reflection in the Marxist-Leninist philosophy (Chotikul, 
1986, p. 45). An example of this is the situation in the 1980s, in which the cultural 
context within which decisions were made had been successfully shaped by the Soviet 
system. As a result, the ‘cognitive map’ of most people now only contained the deci-
sions that the leaders wanted them to make (ibid., p. 47). The nostalgia felt for the 
Soviet Union in the present-day Russia shows that these efforts were at least partially 
successful (Gessen, 2018, pp. 176–182). 
 
A clear ideological duality helped to rationalise the restrictions and prohibitions that 
were imposed on Soviet citizens. When examining the developments presented later 
in this study, it should be remembered that maintaining an enemy image and the belief 
that there are dark and sinister forces opposing Russia is deeply ingrained in Russian 
folklore and the system itself. By exploiting the cognitive dissonance built into the 
Soviet system, Soviet leaders were able to project the hatred of Communism onto 
Western imperialists, while at the same time, citizens could identify themselves with 
their leaders (Chotikul, 1986, p. 58). This same confrontation and projection are still 
used in Russia to maintain the enemy image (see for example, Gessen, 2018, pp. 464–
468).  
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According to Chotikul, the projection of hate arising from the theory of cognitive 
dissonance creates the need to control the awareness of the subjects. At the same 
time, it can be used as an argument to support Lefebvre’s concept of ‘multiple-tier 
awareness’, in which individuals are directly aware of their inner world, while at the 
same time they are also aware of the awareness of their own inner world (Chotikul, 
1986, p. 59). 
 
In order to understand the theory of reflexive control, we should also understand the 
Russian concept of ‘leader’ (‘вождь’, vozhd), which was commonly used to describe 
such figures as Stalin and which is now also occasionally used when references are 
made to Putin (see for example, Berdy, 2018). People identify themselves with the 
leader, and he is idolised by reinforcing the division into ‘good and evil’ discussed 
above: the leader is presented as pure, and he is above all suspicion, fear or guilt. Even 
though the leader can act in an arbitrary or coercive manner, the end justifies the 
means and even cruel acts may be needed to combat the anarchy on the opposite side 
(Chotikul, 1986, p. 60). 
 
In Lefebvre’s view, the concepts of reflex help to describe leadership in such a com-
munity. According to his theory, all members of the community act in a restricted 
reality, while the leader also acts in a special reality of his own. He plans his actions, 
projecting the plan onto his own reality, and starts to put it into practice. This can 
only be done if the leader can, in addition to the actions taken by the members of his 
own community, also identify the factors influencing his own actions (Lefebvre, ac-
cording to Chotikul; Chotikul, 1986, p. 62). The example given by Lefebvre aptly 
describes the differences between the concept of Western and Soviet leadership. In 
the West, the leader is seen as an influential member of a group guiding its activities, 
whereas in the Soviet Union/Russia, the leader is the only member of a group who 
makes decisions. This has also similarities with the special status of the commander 
in Russian military decision-making discussed above. 
 
In the context of reflexive control, it is also important to understand the role of ‘dou-
blethink’ (Двоемыслие) in Russia and the former Soviet Union. As the Communist 
Party controlled official thinking and expression, Soviet citizens had to make a dis-
tinction between private and public life. In accordance with the concept of double-
think, people deliberately lived (and still live) in a way that contradicts their own be-
liefs or they adjust their ethics to their needs, daily comforts or career aspirations. 
This is relevant to reflexive control in that people living in such a system are more 
inclined to accept manipulation of the truth as it does not have any direct impact on 
their own lives. Doublethink, combined with fundamental immorality and a pervasive 
dialectical approach provided the real basis for the Soviet system, and its impacts are 
still felt in the present-day Russia (Chotikul, 1986, p. 66; Gessen, 2018, p. 72–74, pp. 
299–301). 
 
The expressions ‘half-lie’, ‘white lie’ and ‘tactical truth’ (Kari, 2018) or vranyo (враньё), 
a widely used concept in Russia, are also part of the same cultural context. Even the 
authorities use it in censorship and when keeping information secret. Half-lies always 
have some truth in them, which makes them more effective. According to Chotikul, 
reflexive control is easiest to achieve and implement in a society where lies, half-lies, 
suspicion and secrecy are accepted and natural elements of social reality. At the same 
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time, Chotikul also suggests that reflexive control could be incorporated into social 
control because the Soviet system was characterised by a suspicious, control-oriented 
and complex relationship between an authoritarian government and citizens expect-
ing authoritarian leadership (Chotikul, 1986, p. 86). It is safe to say that this still char-
acterises the relationship between the Russian people and its leaders (Gessen, 2018, 
pp. 301–304). 
 
In order to function properly, reflexive control also requires understanding of the 
Russian practice of secrecy and deception (maskirovka) and the principle of risk avoid-
ance behind it. In accordance with the principles of maskirovka, the enemy must also 
view reflexive control measures as probable, and they must match its ideas of Russian 
doctrine and strategic assumptions. Understanding these assumptions is an important 
part of the methodology of reflexive control. For example, Kahneman notes that 
cognition is primarily influenced by standardised processes used by individuals to 
make decisions and perceive their environments (Kahneman, 2003, pp. 699–700). 
These processes result in cognitive errors as they get into contact with entirely un-
known matters. For this reason, it is important to understand the motivations and 
strategies behind the actions and not only rely on assumptions (Chotikul, 1986, pp. 
69–73). In the context of risk avoidance, Chotikul suggests that the Soviet Union was 
a risk-averse society and for this reason, one of the main aims of the reflexive control 
was to minimise risks and to make situations more predictable for decision-makers 
(ibid., p. 75). 
 
To sum up the section on societal background assumptions, it can be said that control 
has always played an important role in Russia, because of reasons arising from the 
operating environment, history and social factors. As a result, the factors behind re-
flexive control have existed for decades but until the 1960s they were used intuitively 
and subconsciously and not within the framework of a comprehensive theory. Con-
trary to what Chotikul suggests (ibid., pp. 76–77), reflexive control cannot be consid-
ered as an inevitable development or something that is built into the Russian mindset. 
Instead, this study attempts to show that after the terror reign of Stalin, there was a 
need to develop a system of ruling over the country’s citizens that was not based on 
mass executions and prison camps. Because of social background factors and the cy-
bernetic visions discussed above, there was a need for reflexive control in the Soviet 
society, which prompted systematic research on ‘soft’ influence operations. This re-
search and the influence operations may first have been directed at the country’s own 
citizens after which they were incorporated into the planning of military operations 
and the use of military force (Pynnöniemi, 2018, cf. Peters, 2016, p. 4). 
2.6.2 Research period, 1960s - early 1970s 
 
Theoretical development of reflexive control (research period) had its origins in cy-
bernetics research carried out in the Soviet Union during Khrushchev’s rule in the 
1960s. With his pioneering work in those years, Vladimir Alexandrovich Lefebvre (b. 
1936) made an important contribution to the development of reflexive control. 
 
Born in Leningrad, Lefebvre received his academic degree at the physics and mathe-
matics faculty of the Lomonosov Moscow State University and started his research 
career in the early 1960s in the first computer centre operating under the auspices of 
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the Soviet Ministry of Defence, His research topic at the facility was applied military 
cybernetics (Lefebvre 2002, p. 83; Chotikul, 1986, p. 86; Semenov, 2017, p. 609). At 
the same time, he also took part in the work of the logics research group known as 
the Moscow Methodological Club (MMC). Lefebvre continued the work on problems 
concerning human thinking launched in the MMC by Stsedrovitsky and Aleksejev and 
presented his own interpretation of the solutions. He also attended conferences of 
psychologists and philosophers where he gave his original presentations of reflexivity. 
Lefebvre started studying reflexive processes in conjunction with the pioneering 
methodological research carried out in the MMC and the research on psychology and 
ergonomics carried out in practical military environments (Lefebvre, 2002, p. 83; Se-
menov, 2017, p. 609). 
 
By the year 1963, Lefebvre had reached the conclusion that the decision-making mod-
elling systems used at the time were incomplete. In his view, the classical game theory 
could not simulate reality because in it, each of the actors made its decisions inde-
pendently without giving any consideration to the adversary’s decisions. He started 
studying the logic of ‘reflexive games’ and presented a modelling system that differed 
from the game theory. Lefebvre’s system comprised three subsystems, one of which 
was the simulation of the adversary’s decisions. In response to his critics, in whose 
view one should keep one’s own and the adversary’s decisions separated, he proposed 
the concept of reflexive control. According to Lefebvre, the adversary always uses 
information about the other side when making decisions. A situation where the other 
party tries to shape the information to suit its own needs will lead to a model where 
the confrontation is examined through objective and subjective factors (Lefebvre 
1984b, pp. 7–9; Semenov 2017, p. 609). Thus, the dialectics of Russian thinking ex-
tends to the fundamentals of reflexive control. 
 
The following year, Lefebvre proposed that decision-making elements should be 
modelled using location-based indexing. Such elements as goal, doctrine, ‘map’ and 
decision were given numeral indices to ensure that decision-making could be pre-
sented in concise form as an iterative mathematical process. When different factors 
were presented as mathematical symbols, algorithms and algebra formulas could be 
used to describe decision-making processes, which eliminated the challenges and 
vagueness typical of natural languages and graphics. Lefebvre called these calculation 
formulas ‘reflexive equations’ (for a simple example of such equations, see Appendix 
1). These ideas presented by Lefebvre were tested and were found to be efficient and 
to contain a great deal of creativity. In fact, the theory of reflexive control attracted a 
great deal of interest, and it was favourably received, especially in military circles 
where its advantages and potential were quickly recognised (Lefebvre, 1984b, pp. 5–
31). Lefebvre’s cybernetic approach to reflexive systems was also appreciated in aca-
demic circles, and he discussed the results of his studies in respected publications of 
the Soviet Academy of Sciences (1965) and in the first edition of ‘Systems Research’, 
the philosophical-methodological annual publication of the institution (1969). He was 
also invited to take up a distinguished scientific post in the Central Economics and 
Mathematics Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (ЦЭМИ) (Semenov, 2017, 
pp. 609–610). 
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Lefebvre was not alone in his interest in the topic, and parallel to his work, he set up 
an unofficial group of like-minded individuals for psychological-cybernetic research. 
The group had the following members: V. E. Lepsky, G. L. Smoljan, P. B. Baranov 
and A. F. Trudoljubov (Semenov, 2017, p. 609). Most of them would play a role in 
the development of reflexive control. 
 
According to Lefebvre, the use of his reflexive equations would require a new ap-
proach to conflict. Instead of examining a conflict as interaction between two oppo-
site systems (such as armies), Lefebvre’s model saw a conflict as interaction between 
two decision-making processes determining the way in which the armies act. In this 
model, a conflict is examined as reflexive action between the opposing parties, which 
can be modelled as reflexive equations, provided that all options available to the par-
ties are identified (Lefebvre, 2010, p. 143; Reid, 1987, p. 294). In that case, reflexion 
means that each of the parties formulates its decisions by modelling its own and the 
adversary’s decision-making and the options available to them. Lefebvre’s research 
produced algorithms and structures for studying this reflexive interaction. 
 
In Lefebvre’s view, control over the enemy is an indirect process: “Control over the 
adversary’s decision-making, which ultimately means imposing a specific behavioural strategy on the 
adversary through reflexive interaction, is not the result of a direct process, and it cannot be achieved 
by using force. It can be achieved by providing the adversary with grounds for making logical decisions 
that have been predetermined by the other party. Transferring the grounds for decisions means linking 
X to a reflexion specific to Y’s situation: In this way, X can start exerting control over the decision-
making process. The process in which the grounds for decision-making are transferred from one party 
to the other is called reflexive control. All diversion (provocation, lying and deception) is the result of 
reflexive control.” (Lefebvre, 1967, pp. 33–34). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: Linking X with Y’s decision-making process (Lefebvre, 1967) 
 
 
In the late 1960s, Lefebvre described the above model of thought based on equation 
solving and its relationship with second-order cybernetics. In his view, it was possible 
to separate structures (objects), the complexity of which corresponded to the ob-
server’s own complexity. For example, in such cases, a military commander can act as 
a researcher analysing the enemy army that his forces are facing. According to 
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Lefebvre, the commander can start his analysis by modelling the geographical location 
of the enemy army and the structure of its actions. However, this analysis is not 
enough to solve the commander’s problem. According to Lefebvre, the main goal of 
the commander is to determine the enemy’s plans and ascertain the extent to which 
the locations and operational structures of the enemy army are real, and the extent to 
which they are the result of deception aimed at encouraging the commander to make 
the wrong decisions. In this example, the commander must reflect on the inner world 
of the object that he is studying (Lefebvre, 1967, pp. 9–10). 
 
According to Lefebvre, the difference between the researcher (the commander), and 
the object of his studies becomes blurred at this stage. An external observer who 
considers himself a person studying an object is in a difficult position: what can he do 
if the object that he is studying is also studying its adversary (ibid., pp. 9–10)? Thus, 
Lefebvre’s thinking is in line with second-order cybernetics, in which there is a ‘system 
of an observer’ outside the relations between previous systems (Novikov, 2015, pp. 
17–18; cf. Lefebvre, 2002, pp. 84–85).  
 
According to Lefebvre’s own definition, the other party gains an advantage if it has 
information on the adversary’s situational assessment, and if it knows how the adver-
sary uses its own doctrine to analyse the situation. In this case, it is possible to con-
struct a solvable equation of the options available to the decision-makers. It is partic-
ularly important to be able to influence the adversary’s situational awareness, his goals 
or doctrine and to ensure that the adversary does not notice the influencing attempts 
(Lefebvre, according to Chotikul; Chotikul, 1986, p. 78). In an article published in 
2002, Lefebvre writes that he had independently developed a second-order cybernetic 
concept which could be used to examine the impact of information on a system that 
was aware of itself and the system exerting influence on it (Lefebvre, 2002, pp. 83–
84).  
 
Lefebvre’s definitions contain the core of reflexive control: the first part (gaining ad-
vantage) describes the goals, and the second part (exploiting the situational assess-
ment and information) the method. The conclusion in the Soviet Union was that the 
focus in effective decision-making must be on the mind of the adversary or its oper-
ational code. This required the ability to reflect the inner world structure of the party 
to be controlled and the ability to create credible models of its behavioural strategy.  
In such situations, reflexive control means emulating the adversary’s decision-making 
by understanding the factors behind it. The ultimate aim is to disrupt the adversary’s 
‘decision-making algorithm’ and exert control over it. It was realised in the Soviet 
Union that the ‘quality’ of the adversary’s decision-making was irrelevant, because 
reflexive control could be applied if the elements and content of the decision-making 
could be modelled sufficiently comprehensively (Chotikul, 1986, pp. 78–79). It was 
also observed that the effectiveness of Lefebvre’s equations in fundamental psycho-
logical and applied military environments provided a basis for defeating an enemy 
that relied on the classical game theory founded on a traditional strategy (Semenov, 
2017, p. 610). 
 
The reflexive control developed by Lefebvre comprised two parts: reflexion, which 
comes from psychology, and control, which comes from cybernetics. Reflexive con-
trol could be used to exert influence on the adversary’s activities, and it could be 
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applied if the adversary’s cognitive map was thoroughly understood. In this case, ob-
jective observations of the situation made by the adversary could be modified without 
the adversary noticing anything. To achieve the situation described above, the atten-
tion should be on psychological aspects and subjective factors characteristic of the 
adversary (Chotikul, 1986, p. 79). 
 
In his 2002 article, Lefebvre notes that there were fundamental differences in the way 
in which second-order cybernetics evolved in the Soviet Union and the West in the 
1960s. In the Soviet Union, it developed into the conceptual basis for influencing the 
enemy’s decision-making process (Lefebvre, 2002, p. 85). Lefebvre emigrated to the 
United States in 1974, but his work was continued in the Soviet military and civilian 
sector (Semenov, 2017, p. 610). The development of the military applications was 
continued by such officers as Druzhinin, Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, 
and his colleague Kontorov. They followed on Lefebvre’s ideas and concluded that 
exerting control over the enemy required in-depth knowledge of the enemy’s policies, 
ideology, military doctrine, goals, organisation, psychology, bilateral relations, and 
emotions, as well as the state of its troops and the personal characteristics of its mili-
tary commanders. These could be made into a filter through which the information 
used by the commander in his decision-making was filtered (Druzhinin & Kontorov, 
1976, pp. 199–201). ‘Orientation’ (Boyd, 1996) is a similar concept used in Western 
research into decision-making. 
 
Lefebvre’s ideas and the book by Druzhinin and Kontorov did not remain the only 
contribution to the debate on reflexive control at this stage, as the topic was also 
discussed in military journals. In an article on how to influence the enemy’s decision-
making published in the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’ in 1971, Major General M. Ionov 
notes that influencing is possible if the plans and intentions of the enemy are revealed. 
According to Ionov, the enemy can be persuaded to make decisions that are to one’s 
advantage based on the following conditions: the enemy is placed under pressure; 
influence is exerted on the enemy’s situational assessment, decision-making algo-
rithm, and the way in which it selects its goal; and influence is exerted on the timing 
of the enemy’s decision-making. Placing the enemy under pressure is the easiest con-
dition to understand. Its aim is to influence the psychological state of decision-makers 
and to persuade them to avoid combat. Disguise, deception, unexpected new instru-
ments, and changes in troops are used to influence the enemy’s situational assessment 
(Ionov, 1971, p. 165). 
 
It is difficult to list any specific ways of influencing the enemy as it selects its goals. 
To use them, a commander must have a high intellectual capacity, and possess intui-
tion and experience. He must also apply logical thinking and understand history and 
doctrine, as well as possess information about the specific characteristics of the enemy 
commanders. These instruments are used to counter the deductive decision-making 
of enemy commanders. Commanders base their decisions on limited information, and 
if uncertainty concerning real goals is maintained for a sufficiently long period by 
presenting a range of different options, the commander has no time to determine 
which is the right one. Such action makes it more difficult for the enemy to determine 
its goals. Thus, it also disrupts the enemy’s decision-making algorithm (Ionov, 1971, 
p. 166). Ionov uses the same terms as Lefebvre (such as decision-making algorithm). 
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In his article, Ionov describes links between control, psychological warfare, and bat-
tlefield support. In his view, the methods applied in the West show that when meth-
ods for exerting control over the enemy are planned, both psychology and the social 
systems for which the methods are intended should also be understood. In line with 
dialectical Soviet thinking, Ionov also asks whether Western countries are publicising 
their methods to deceive the Soviet Union.2 Ionov concludes his article by noting that 
influencing the enemy’s operations constitutes a complex logical problem that can 
only be solved if a large amount of information is processed. This is beyond the ca-
pabilities of the commander and his staff and automated systems are required for the 
work (Ionov, 1971, pp. 169–171). 
 
In his own article, Ionov does not mention reflexive control by name, but Berezkin, 
who continues with the same topic, introduces the concept to the debate. In Be-
rezkin’s view, Ionov was correct in noting that success in battle can only be ensured 
if the intentions of the enemy can be ascertained. According to Berezkin, heuristic 
methods helping to construct decision-making formulas should be applied to ascer-
tain the enemy’s intentions (Berezkin, 1972, p. 183). Here, Berezkin draws on 
Lefebvre’s thoughts on formalising decision-making and giving it a mathematical ba-
sis. Berezkin continues by noting that different types of information are the key to 
exerting control over the adversary’s decision-making. This information must consti-
tute the objective truth of the battle, irrespective of what the commander or the op-
posite side think of it. The key point is to define the information collected by auto-
mated systems and the amount of information collected to ensure that one’s own side 
can exert influence on the enemy’s decision-making at an early stage. According to 
Berezkin, such redefinition of control-related problems requires new terminology. In 
his view, ‘controlling reflexes’ is the most accurate description of the control process 
that he is describing. This term describes the bidirectional nature of the process, in 
which the aim is not only to influence the adversary’s mind but to prevent the adver-
sary from doing the same. Berezkin continues by noting that controlling reflexes is 
based on probabilities, because the adversary does not necessarily use the information 
conveyed to it in the desired manner (Berezkin, 1972, p. 184). According to Berezkin, 
in selecting the best method, the commander must, in the manner described by Ionov, 
understand both psychological factors and political and social aspects (ibid., p. 185). 
 
According to Lefebvre, in addition to the publicly available books and articles de-
scribed above, secret development work taking place under the auspices of the KGB 
was also underway in the Soviet Union. He claims that a secret report based on 
Lefebvre’s findings written by an agent named Panov was published in 1968, and that 
it marked the start of the process. That year, the KGB allegedly established its own 
facility to study reflexive functions. According to Lefebvre, the theory of reflexive 
control became classified information after the publication of Panov’s report, which 
suggests that it was considered extremely important by the Soviet leadership (Chot-
ikul, 1986, p. 90). The public debate in military journals and the books published on 
the topic do not lend credibility to Lefebvre’s claim (Semenov, 2017, p. 609). How-
ever, the KGB may have developed reflexive control in a different direction, and the 
findings of this work remain unpublished. There are no references in other sources 
to such KGB involvement in the development of reflexive control, and no attempt 
to assess it is made in this study. 
                                              
2 cf. Klimenko’s thoughts about the role of doctrine in deception, Klimenko 1997. 
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 The research phase of reflexive control in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s 
can be summarised as follows: by the early 1970s, with the development of cybernetic 
thinking between systems (second-order cybernetics), the role of reflexive control di-
rected at the adversary’s decision-making had been recognised, the inadequacy of 
game theory in the modelling of real decision-making processes had been noted, 
mathematical modelling of decision-making had been developed under the auspices 
of Vladimir Lefebvre and MMC, and the need for automated and protected infor-
mation processing as part of the control over the adversary’s decision-making had 
been identified. However, the computers used at the time did not allow automated 
information processing to the same extent as today, although at concept level, the 
matter remained at the core of the reflexive control theory. Contrary to what Thomas 
claims (Thomas, 2004, p. 243), reflexive control was openly discussed in the Soviet 
Union in those days, as shown by the publication of the books by Lefebvre and Dru-
zhinin & Kontorov, as well as a number of scientific conferences. Moreover, a defi-
nition of the concept ‘Рефлексивное управление’ can be found in the 1974 Ency-
clopaedia of Cybernetics (Glushkov, 1974, p. 296; refers directly to Lefebvre). Keep-
ing its practical applications secret was apparently more important to the Soviet lead-
ers than keeping the concept itself under wraps. 
2.6.3 Period of practical orientation 
 
Discussion of the practical applications of reflexive control continued in the Soviet 
Union in the 1980s. At the same time, after the period of détente in the 1970s, the 
United States under President Reagan showed renewed interest in Soviet military de-
velopments, and Soviet ideas of reflexive control were now studied in research insti-
tutions as part of general research on the Soviet military. In this subchapter, the author 
presents the conclusions of Reid (1987) and Chotikul (1986) in their research, original 
Soviet texts, English translations of Vladimir Lefebvre’s books, and further research 
that he carried out after moving to the United States. 
 
In 1984, Lefebvre presented the concept of two different ways of exerting control for 
the first time: the cognitive way, in which the aim was to change the processing of the 
information possessed by the enemy; and the informational approach, in which the 
messages conveyed to the enemy were selected. This concept was essential to the 
development of reflexive control in the decades that followed. This division is still 
used today. Lefebvre also divided control into two categories: constructive (creative) 
reflexive control, in which influence on the enemy or one’s own citizens was exerted 
to ensure they voluntarily make the decisions serving the interests of the controlling 
party; and destructive reflexive control, in which the method was used to destroy, 
paralyse, or neutralise processes and algorithms used by the enemy in its decision-
making (Lefebvre, 1984b, pp. 144–145). The author uses this division in the dual 
model of reflexive control presented later. 
 
In 1976, Druzhinin and Kontorov, whose writings were discussed above, had con-
cluded that the adversary’s decision-making process was divided into four different 
factors: 1) the adversary’s understanding of the situation; 2) goals; 3) solution algo-
rithm (doctrine); and 4) the decision. The author has also used this division in the 
model of reflexive control (Druzhinin & Kontorov, 1976, p. 199). 
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The understanding of the situation contains the information on operational troops, 
the operating environment, earlier action, the current situation, and the goals and lim-
itations of the parties. The understanding of the situation can be influenced through 
disguise, deception, and disinformation. The goals constituting the second phase of 
the process are an important part of decision-making, and they can be defined both 
in peacetime and during a conflict (Druzhinin & Kontorov, 1976, pp. 199–200). 
 
According to the original texts compiled by Reid for his study, goal setting can be 
influenced in three ways. One is a show of force to convince the enemy that a goal is 
unachievable. A second is to demonstrate a threat of such significance that its coun-
tering dominates the enemy’s goals. The third way is to keep the enemy in a state of 
uncertainty concerning one’s own actions to ensure that none of its goals can guar-
antee a satisfactory outcome in all plausible sets of events (Reid, 1987, p. 295). 
 
According to Druzhinin and Kontorov, the solution algorithm (doctrine) includes the 
norms of the adversary’s behaviour, analytical operating models, the adversary’s ways 
of describing and assessing the situation, and preparations for further action. It man-
ifests itself in standardised operating models, methods, exercises and the lessons 
learned by military commanders (Druzhinin & Kontorov, 1976, p. 201). According 
to Reid, the conclusion in the Soviet Union had been that it is difficult to influence 
these factors through reflexive control. However, he also quotes Ionov (1971) in 
whose view, surprise is a way to influence the timing of the decision. It is extremely 
difficult to indirectly influence the decision itself and for this reason, the focus in 
reflexive control is on the first two phases of decision-making (Reid, 1987, pp. 295–
296). 
 
For his study, Reid collected details of reflexive control methods published in the 
Soviet Union that also appear in similar form in Lefebvre’s writings (Lefebvre, 1984b). 
They reflect the situation prevailing in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, in which the 
focus was on the practical orientation of reflexive control (cf. Thomas, 2004, p. 238). 
To facilitate the practical application, each of them was accompanied by an example 
of past conflicts or other ways of applying reflexive control. 
 
– Transferring a situational picture to the enemy: in this method of reflexive 
control, the enemy is conveyed a wrong or incomplete situational picture by 
means of deception, disguise or decoys (Reid, 1987, pp. 296–299). 
– Creating goals or a doctrine for the adversary: in this reflexive control method, 
the aim is, by sharing one’s own information, to put the enemy in a situation 
where its only options are also advantageous to one’s own side (ibid., pp. 298–
300). 
– Transferring the desired decision: in this operating model (which requires trust 
and contacts between the parties), the aim is to force the enemy to make a 
decision that provides a basis for action on one’s own side (ibid., p. 301). 
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These three operating approaches are simple models, in which the aim is to directly 
influence the adversary’s situational assessment at specific stages of decision-making. 
The operating models described below are more complex because in them, the aim is 
to shape one phase of the decision-making process by controlling the adversary’s un-
derstanding of another phase. Success in such actions requires extremely good under-
standing of how the adversary makes decisions (Reid, 1987, p. 301). 
 
– Influencing goal formation by feeding a false situational assessment: feigning 
weakness so that the enemy can be lured into a trap is one application of this 
method (ibid., pp. 301–302). This model can also be used by controlling spe-
cific ‘indicators’ identified in advance that the enemy uses as a basis for its 
decision-making. 
– Feeding parts of one’s own situational assessments to the enemy: for example, 
controlled leaks concerning matters presented as important to one’s own op-
erations (ibid., pp. 302–303). 
– Feeding details of imaginary goals to the enemy: the purpose of this method 
is to shift the enemy’s attention away from one’s actual goal to the desired goal 
(ibid., pp. 303–304). 
– Feeding a fake version of one’s own doctrine to the enemy: exercises, in which 
the troops are deployed differently than in the real situation are an example of 
this method (ibid., p. 305). 
– Modifying one’s own action so that the enemy gets a wrong situational picture: 
in this method, one takes a controlled risk and moves troops to an area from 
where no attack is planned. The assumption is that the enemy expects an im-
minent attack (ibid., pp. 305–306). 
– Reflexive control of bilateral engagement by a third party: in this method 
(which is directed at decision-makers), a third party attempts to get two other 
parties into a situation that is advantageous to it (ibid., p. 306). 
– Reflexive control over an enemy applying reflexive control: in this operating 
model, it is assumed that the adversary is using reflexive control, and the aim 
is to uncover its stratagems and to use them against the other side (ibid., pp. 
306–307).  
– Reflexive control over an enemy relying on the game theory: in this method, 
which is based on the conservative nature and inflexibility of the game theory 
and answers known in advance, inputs in line with these characteristics are fed 
into the adversary’s decision-making process (ibid., pp. 307–308). 
 
By the mid-1980s, it had become clear to Soviet actors that a comprehensive plan 
containing a response to every enemy move or random event would be critical to 
ensuring successful application of reflexive control. It had also been noted that the 
inconspicuous nature of reflexive control made it an excellent strategic-level tool to 
facilitate choices between different options (Druzhinin & Kontorov, 1976, p. 192). 
As Lefebvre himself wrote: “In contrast to a scholarly debate, the most inventive liar wins in 
conflict” (Lefebvre, according to Chotikul; Chotikul, 1986, p. 80). 
 
It was also noted in the 1980s that reflexive control does not need a continuous feed-
back chain, which until then had been seen as an essential component in all cybernetic 
control systems. According to Chotikul, Soviet actors realised that feedback is useful 
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when the effectiveness of the control is assessed and errors are corrected but when 
receiving feedback is not possible, it can be left out (Chotikul, 1986, p. 81). 
 
Chotikul notes in her report that one of the key findings is that underestimating the 
enemy and its reflexion capacity may substantially undermine the effectiveness of re-
flexive control methods. It is also important to understand that a variety of different 
techniques should be applied, and the same technique should not be used repeatedly. 
This prevents the enemy from deducing which methods and techniques are used and 
from developing appropriate countermeasures (Chotikul, 1986, p. 83). 
 
There were many Western researchers in the 1980s holding the view that reflexive 
control cannot be developed into a scientific method as thought processes and psy-
chological functions cannot be quantified in a precise manner, which would make 
such a theory ineffective (Chotikul, 1986, p. 96). With advances in computer technol-
ogy and increases in the amount of data, this may actually now be possible. Never-
theless, already in the 1980s, researchers suggested that thinking on the basis of re-
flexive control concepts would provide a useful operating model. Understanding the 
enemy, analysing potential movements and counter-movements and the resulting 
need to develop a methodology providing a basis for analysing strategic problems and 
for making optimal decisions are the key features of such a model. In researchers’ 
view, this already gave the Soviet Union a head start over the rest of the world, and it 
is also noted that orienting decision-making in accordance with reflexive control con-
cepts may in fact be as dangerous to the enemy as applying the theory in practice 
(Reid, 1987, p. 309; Chotikul, 1986, p. 96). 
 
The conclusion is that in the 1980s, the Soviet Union had been able to build a theo-
retical and practical basis for using reflexive control in the simulation and control of 
one’s own troops and the enemy’s decision-making process. It had been accepted as 
an instrument for military operations and training and its vocabulary was used in pub-
lic debate, at least in the contributions made by military officers and cyberneticians. 
Lefebvre’s emigration to the West and his book ‘Algebra of Conscience’ also in-
creased awareness of the topic in the United States in the early 1980s where research 
reports on the subject were produced on the basis of publicly available Soviet sources. 
There was little discussion of the mathematical basis of reflexive control in these re-
ports as the focus was on its practical aspects. 
2.6.4 Psychological-pedagogical period 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian armed forces were thrown 
into a chaos. For all practical purposes, the Soviet Union had been a military organi-
sation spending most of its budget on external and internal security (Allen, 2001, p. 
867). However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union did not stop the development 
of reflexive control as the research work continued. The reasons for this are discussed 
later but the author first takes a look at a number of articles in which the theory of 
reflexive control was taken further. Following on the Russian practice, Timothy 
Thomas has named this era the psychological-pedagogical phase (Thomas, 2002, p. 
61). There was growing interest in reflexive psychology in the general Russia debate 
in the 1990s.   
 42 
The status achieved by the concept of reflexion in the post-Soviet Russia is illustrated 
by the article by Lazarev in the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’ in 1992, in which the author 
attempts to formulate a general theory of security. According to Lazarev, the United 
States uses information as a reflexive control instrument, and for this reason, infor-
mation security of the state must be given a high priority (Lazarev, 1992). The same 
topic was discussed by Skvortsov, Klokotov and Turko in 1995. In their view, reflex-
ive control is the most complex way of influencing decision-making at government 
level. They, too, refer to the inputs made by the United States in information tech-
nology and information warfare and in protecting information through legislation 
(Skvortsov, Klokotov & Turko, 1995). At the time, there was also discussion of the 
future shape of the Russian military doctrine, and Klimenko was one of those noting 
that an open doctrine should contain both descriptive and reflexive elements so that 
it can induce the desired reaction in the audiences (Klimenko, 1997). In other words, 
at this stage, reflexive control was seen as being used by the West but Western coun-
tries were not characterised as enemies but as models that should be emulated. In the 
1990s, there were already differences between the Western and Russian approaches 
to the concept of information security (which later became a key component of Rus-
sia’s security strategy).  
 
‘Reflexive control of the enemy’ (Рефлексивное управление противником), written 
by Colonel S. Leonenko, is the earliest Russian article on the practices of reflexive 
control used in this study, and it has also been quoted in a number of Western studies 
(such as Thomas 2004, Giles, Seaboyer & Sherr, 2018). The article first appeared in 
the journal ‘Armeiskij Sbornik’ in 1995. According to Leonenko, reflexive control 
consists of transmitting motives and grounds from the controlling entity to the con-
trolled system that stimulate the desired decision. The nature of these motives and 
grounds must be kept secret, and the controlled system must make its decisions inde-
pendently. According to Leonenko, a ‘reflex’ means a specific process used to model 
the enemy’s thinking or imitate its potential behaviour. A reflex prompts the enemy 
to make decisions that are to its disadvantage. Leonenko examines the ‘filter’ origi-
nally described by Druzhinin and Kontorov, which means the concepts, information, 
ideas and experiences used by the enemy commander as a basis for his decision-mak-
ing allowing him to separate useful facts from irrelevant information, correct infor-
mation from the wrong information, etc. (Leonenko, 1995, p. 28). 
 
Leonenko adds a new dimension to the debate by noting that locating the weak point 
of this filter and exploiting it in one’s own actions lies at the core of reflexive control. 
Like Druzhinin and Kontorov, Leonenko also notes that reflexive control makes use 
of moral, psychological and other elements, such as the personal characteristics of the 
commander. Biographical data, habits and psychological deficiencies can be used to 
create a picture of these personal characteristics, which can then be exploited in de-
ception operations. According to Leonenko, in a situation where reflexive control is 
applied, the side with the highest degree of reflex (the side best able to imitate the 
other side’s thoughts or predict its behaviour) will have the best chances of winning. 
The degree of reflex depends on many factors, the most important of which are ana-
lytical capability, experience and the scope of knowledge about the enemy. In his ar-
ticle, Leonenko concludes that disguise and deception have replaced the stratagems 
used in the past. Leonenko continues by noting that even though no official or formal 
terminology of reflexive control was available in the past, it has nevertheless been 
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intuitively used to deceive the adversary (Leonenko, 1995, pp. 29–30). In this, Leo-
nenko agrees with the conclusions reached by Chotikul in her own study. It is not 
clear from the article to what extent Leonenko has drawn on Soviet-era literature but 
the vocabulary he uses is identical with that used by Lefebvre, Ionov and Druzhinin 
& Kontorov. Leonenko adds to their analysis by suggesting that ‘filters’ can be found 
in both human mind and computers. During the information age, filters are involved 
in the processing of both human and computer data (Leonenko, 1995, p. 29). 
 
M. Ionov, now a retired General, continued his research on reflexive control that he 
had already started in the early 1970s. In an article published in the journal ‘Voennaya 
Mysl’ in 1995, he noted that the purpose of reflexive control is to influence or control 
the adversary’s decision-making by ensuring that the adversary makes decisions that 
it has carefully analysed, and that lead to its defeat. Like Lefebvre, Ionov also con-
cludes that reflexive control is more likely to bring success if the original plan of the 
enemy is known. In that case, the controlling side is better placed to induce the enemy 
to make wrong decisions by applying reflexive control methods. The aim of these 
methods is to reduce the enemy’s decision-making time by all means possible and to 
bring about a surprise in the enemy’s decision-making algorithms (Ionov, 1995a). 
 
In a new approach, Ionov identifies a military coalition as an adversary. In his view, 
it is a much more complex system than an individual country. The stability and deci-
sion-making capacity of the coalition largely depend on how the situation is viewed 
by each individual member country. According to Ionov, there are such huge differ-
ences in thinking, goals, policies and ethics between these countries that each party 
must first determine how different ways of exerting influence could work against 
them (Ionov, 1995a). 
 
Ionov had updated the four techniques of exerting control over the enemy that he 
presented in 1971 and now described them as follows: show of force, different ways 
of presenting a wrong situational assessment, influencing the enemy’s decision-mak-
ing algorithm and changing the decision-making time. In his view, these four tech-
niques serve as a checklist for commanders at every level. In his article, Ionov lists a 
variety of different methods to apply these techniques. The first of them includes 
threats of different types such as sanctions, reconnaissance, testing of weapons, rais-
ing the readiness level of one’s own troops, forming of coalitions, limited strikes, ex-
ploiting victories, demonstrations of brutality and mercy towards those who have 
given up fighting. In presenting a false situational assessment, the following methods 
can be used: concealment, construction of mock structures, changing of positions, 
Trojan horses, encrypting the communications between troops, keeping new weap-
ons secret, bluffing with weapons and deliberately losing documents. The enemy can 
also be forced to act through provocation and deception or be forced to take time-
consuming retaliatory action tying down its troops. Influence on the adversary’s de-
cision-making algorithm can be exerted by presenting a false doctrine, by acting in a 
deceptive manner on a routine basis, by striking at command posts and commanders, 
by conveying false background information, by continuously maintaining a high level 
of readiness and by taking measures against the enemy’s operational thinking. Launch-
ing surprise attacks or to induce the enemy to draw hasty conclusions by persuading 
it to draw parallels with a past conflict are methods used to change the timing of 
decision-making (Ionov, 1995a). 
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Ionov continued on the same theme in his article ‘Control of the Enemy’ 
(Управление противником), which appeared in the journal ‘Morskoi Sbornik’ later 
in the same year. In this article, Ionov notes that in order to exert control over the 
enemy and to prevent the enemy from doing the same, information must be collected 
on the enemy troops, the nature of their operations and their capabilities. Ionov pre-
sents a number of different principles to exert control over the enemy. First of all, he 
emphasises the reflexive nature of the response: the commander should always visu-
alise how the enemy can respond to the circumstances imposed on it. Secondly, the 
response may be problematic because the enemy may have noticed the control at-
tempts, and takes countermeasures. Thirdly, Ionov emphasises the level of technical 
tools, especially reconnaissance. It has become increasingly likely that the measures 
directed at the enemy are exposed. Finally, Ionov urges the use of harsh measures to 
put pressure on the enemy and in his view, the priority in them should be on social, 
psychological, ethical and ideological considerations. According to Ionov, such 
measures could include deliberate brutality towards civilians or prisoners of war or 
unlimited submarine warfare (Ionov, 1995b, pp. 25–31). 
 
Advances in technology and incorporating them into reflexive control and into the 
measures to counter it were also discussed in the articles published in the military 
journals. In the article already presented above, Colonel S. Leonenko notes that the 
use of computers may interfere with reflexive control because the measures may be 
more easily exposed. Speed and accuracy of the computers play a role in this though 
computers also have features that can be used when applying reflexive control. Com-
puters lack the human ability of intuitive reasoning, and they can provide new oppor-
tunities for the use of reflexive control. In fact, in his article, Leonenko gives a new 
definition to reflexive control: Reflexive control consists of transmitting motives 
and grounds from the controlling entity to the controlled system that stimulate 
the desired decision. The goal of reflexive control is to prompt the enemy to make 
a decision unfavourable to it. Naturally, one must understand the way in which the 
enemy thinks (Leonenko, 1995, p. 28). 
 
In Leonenko’s view, computers open up new opportunities, and he notes that in to-
day’s situation, there is a need to act not only against people but also against technical 
reconnaissance systems and high-precision weapons. Unlike humans, technical sys-
tems do not try to analyse what is happening, and they do not perceive to what hu-
mans react (ibid., p. 28). In his article, Thomas asks whether this means that there are 
two layers in reflexively control: the first layer consisting of sensors and the other of 
humans. According to Thomas, one example of this was the war in Kosovo where 
Yugoslav forces fooled NATO sensors, which resulted in NATO shooting at fake 
targets (Thomas, 2002, p. 69). This is also shown in the model prepared for this study. 
 
The article by Komov in the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’ in 1997 is the last of the articles 
on the psychological-pedagogical phase used in this study. Komov’s article has been 
quoted in a large number of documents on reflexive control. In his view, exerting 
reflexive control over the enemy is a form of ‘intellectual’ information warfare, and 
he lists basic elements of such an approach in his article. In information warfare tar-
geting systems, the offensive elements of such intellectual information warfare in-
clude: 
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– distraction, which already creates a real or imaginary threat against an im-
portant enemy target during preparations for the battle – this forces the enemy 
to consider the soundness of its own operational plans; 
– overload, in which the enemy is continuously provided with conflicting infor-
mation; 
– paralysis, in which the enemy is given the impression of a threat against an 
important interest or weak spot; 
– exhaustion, in which the enemy is forced to carry out useless operations so 
that it is forced to enter combat with weakened resources; 
– division, in which the aim is to convince the enemy to act against the interests 
of the coalition; 
– pacification, in which the aim is to convince the enemy that pre-planned exer-
cises (instead of combat preparations) are underway, leading the enemy to re-
duce its vigilance;  
– deterrence, in which the aim is to create an impression of overwhelming su-
periority; 
– provocation, in which the enemy is forced to act in a manner advantageous to 
one’s own side; 
– suggestion, in which the enemy is provided with information affecting it le-
gally, morally, or ideologically; 
– pressure, or distribution of information which discredits the enemy govern-
ment in the eyes of its own citizens (Komov, 1997; Thomas, 2004, pp. 248–
249). 
 
Komov also lists the following defensive elements: gathering of information by all 
possible means (including military); and corroborating the information from more 
than one source (Komov, 1997). 
 
Thus, the development of reflexive control continued in Russia in the 1990s, and 
there was also discussion of its practical applications. Compared with the Soviet era, 
Russian views on fighting from the position of weakness and fighting against military 
coalitions were more prominently reflected in the articles. At the same time, consid-
eration was also given to technological advances and the use of computers in decision-
making. Cybernetic research carried out in the Soviet Union had already created a 
strong basis for this, but the findings could now also be applied at a practical level: 
reflexive control was seen as warfare in which the focus was on influencing the ad-
versary’s decision-making. According to this study, there was no practical application 
of reflexive control in the Russian military operations in the 1990s, as the focus was 
on examining past events in world history. Moreover, there are no references to the 
mathematical modelling used by Lefebvre in these articles by military officers, as the 
issue is discussed against the background of operational applications. 
2.6.5 Psycho-social period and observations from Russian operations 
 
By the early 2000s, Russia had largely recovered from the chaos following the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union and was at least trying to use reflexive control in domestic 
counter-terrorism operations, such as the Dubrovka Theatre hostage crisis (Berger, 
2010, p. 88). Parallel to the war against terrorism launched by the United States in 
2001, Russia under Vladimir Putin was working to achieve rapprochement with the 
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West. In those years, there was more public discussion of reflexive control and re-
flexivity, and Russian researchers were engaged in close cooperation with their US 
counterparts. In 2001, Vladimir Lepsky, who had collaborated with Lefebvre since 
the 1960s, launched the publication Рефлексивные процессы и управление. Be-
tween 2001 and 2004, it also appeared in English under the title ‘Reflexive Processes 
and Control’. In their articles and other publications, Lefebvre, Lepsky and other ci-
vilian researchers continued the discussion of how reflexivity could be used in nearly 
all scientific fields in Russia and elsewhere in the world. Timothy Thomas, a US re-
searcher, who had already studied Lepsky’s and Lefebvre’s ideas, published his first 
article on the military applications of reflexive control in this journal (Thomas, 2002). 
It provided the basis for other articles on the same topic (such as Thomas, 2004 and 
Thomas, 2011). According to the author’s findings, the articles and other publications 
by Thomas are the most frequently quoted articles on reflexive control in Russia and 
the West. 
 
The article by Chausov entitled ‘Fundamentals of reflexive control over the enemy’ 
(Основы рефлексивного управления противником) has been used as the main 
Russian source for the psycho-social phase (Thomas, 2002, p. 61), and it has also been 
quoted in a large number of different publications. The article was published in the 
journal ‘Morskoi Sbornik’ in 1999. Chausov differs from other soldiers in that he also 
writes about theoretical aspects, whereas most other military officers focus on the 
methods of reflexive control. 
  
In his article, Chausov defines reflexive control as “the process of deliberately con-
veying to the opposing side of a certain aggregate information, which will 
cause that side to make a decision appropriate to that information” (Chausov, 
1999, p. 12). This is in line with the definitions presented by such writers as Leonenko 
(1995). 
 
In his article, Chausov lists a number of components that can be used as a basis for 
planning the use of reflexive control. According to Chausov, the following is required 
for the planning of reflexive control: 
– a goal-oriented process describing all the reflexive control measures required 
in the operation; 
– a sufficiently comprehensive situational assessment of the intellectual potential 
of the commanders and their staff officers, allowing the implementation of the 
plans; 
– conformity of the goals, missions, place, time, and methods for reflexive con-
trol; 
– anticipation or modelling describing the situation of both parties at the mo-
ment reflexive control is applied; 
– anticipation of situations on the basis of which reflexive control can be applied 
at an early stage, and as soon as the situation permits  
(Chausov, 1999, pp. 12–13). 
 
In his article, Chausov also discusses the way in which the flow of information be-
tween the enemy commander, command system and staff relates to reflexive control. 
In his view, the system of reflexive control is placed in the enemy’s command system 
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in parallel to the system conveying the orders. Thus, all messages conveyed to the 
commander by his staff pass through the system of reflexive control, distorting them 
in the desired manner. When this model developed by Chausov is compared with the 
command and control model detailed in this study, it can be noted that exerting in-
fluence on the commander is also the most effective tool in Chausov’s model (Chau-
sov, 1999, p. 15). Chausov’s ideas also have similarities with the dual control model 
described in the next subchapter. 
 
However, the theory of reflexive control has also aroused criticism in Russia. An ar-
ticle by Polenin was published in 2000 in response to the article referred to above. In 
his article, Polenin who has extensively studied Lefebvre’s theories, criticises Chausov 
for presenting reflexivity as an all-encompassing activity. In his view, the original idea 
of reflexive control as an instrument to control the adversary using desired infor-
mation is misunderstood in this approach. In general, Polenin considers the reflexive 
control model too abstract and theoretical for practical applications. In his view, mod-
elling the enemy’s intentions is ultimately a subjective process, and guesswork and 
using it as a basis for decision-making is not without risks (Polenin, 2000, p. 68). 
However, Polenin is alone in his criticism. No other similarly critical articles have 
appeared, and in general, modelling the adversary’s decision-making is considered en-
tirely possible. 
 
The article by Ermak and Raskin, published in the journal ‘Armeyskiy Sbornik’ in 
2002, examines reflexive control from a new perspective. They discuss the use of 
simulations in the modelling of reflexive control. The article relates to the decision 
support systems discussed above. In their view, reflexive control can be used in com-
bination with an automated decision support system, allowing the party applying re-
flexion to identify the situation, locate it in a database, and produce proposals for 
deploying troops in the situation (Ermak & Raskin, 2002, p. 46). According to Ermak 
and Raskin, this should be followed by the selection of the simulation-produced op-
tion that provides one’s own side with the greatest advantage. In their view, this calls 
for creativity on the part of the commander and his staff. At the same time, Ermak 
and Raskin also emphasise that exerting reflexive control over the enemy is only pos-
sible if warfare is examined as a holistic struggle between systems (Ermak & Raskin, 
2002, p. 46). 
 
The article, published in the journal ‘Reflexive Processes and Control’ in 2003, can be 
considered a practical example of the anticipation, simulation, and comprehensive 
planning discussed by Chausov and Ermak & Raskin in their writing. Contributors to 
the publication included Lefebvre and a number of Western researchers. The article 
is aptly titled: ‘From Prediction to Reflexive Control’. According to the authors, in 
traditional decision-making theories, the adversary is considered an uncontrolled fac-
tor, which naturally leads to the paradigm of anticipation. This means that a decision-
maker attempts to anticipate the potential responses of the other side in different 
situations. Correspondingly, by applying reflexive control, anticipation can be re-
placed by defining the future. The authors introduce a new term, reflexive decision, in 
referring to decisions that contain an informational message for the other side 
(Lefebvre, Kramer, Kaiser, Davidson, & Schmidt, 2003, p. 86). 
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The authors present two potential operating models for reflexive control: model 1, in 
which the party applying reflexive control has one feasible option and tries to induce 
the adversary into a situation corresponding to this option; and model 2, in which the 
party applying reflexive control can rely on a limited number of ‘tricks’ but a large 
number of potential options. According to the authors, the Gulf War is an example 
of the application of model 1: coalition forces exploited the personal preferences of 
Saddam Hussein to lure his troops into the right positions to carry out a flank opera-
tion. The tactics used by the British Eighth Army in El Alamein is given as an example 
of model 2: the Germans were fed false information as a basis for their action, but 
they made the decision to use it (Lefebvre et al., 2003, pp. 87–90). This duality of 
models has similarities with the division into cognitive and informational models pre-
sented by Lefebvre in 1984. In the first model, the aim is to influence the known 
cognitive dissonance of the adversary (cf. Kahneman, 2003, p. 707), while in the sec-
ond model, the enemy is provided with selective information.  
 
It is important to note that in the authors’ view the adversary is not only an individual 
but a community that has access to strategic and tactical information to support its 
decision-making, that is able to assess the challenges and risks involved in different 
actions and that is capable of modelling the potential countermeasures of the other 
side. The adversary may also review the same situation several times using different 
parameters, which will produce statistical information on the success of the action. 
Moreover, the adversary is expected to act in a rational manner or use methods that 
have the potential of bringing the best results (Lefebvre et al., 2003, p. 94). 
 
The authors note that success can only be achieved if the other side is unaware that 
reflexive control is being applied. However, they point out that the party applying 
reflexive control can also prepare for this by producing cost-efficiency models that, 
even when turned on their head, do not put the actors in an inferior position. The 
authors also add that reflexive control has clear similarities with Shannon’s infor-
mation theory concerning the information that the opposing parties can expect to 
collect on each other (Lefebvre et al., 2003, pp. 99–101). 
 
An article by Karankevich in the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’ is related to the operating 
model presented above. In the article titled ‘How to Learn to Deceive the Enemy’ he 
emphasises the role of deception, listing a number of factors to support this view. 
Karankevich also includes the reflexive control of the enemy commander in these 
factors. According to Karankevich, the purpose of such control is to ensure that the 
decisions made by the decision-makers on the other side are, at least to some extent, 
more advantageous to one’s own troops than to the enemy. He continues by noting 
that this is not possible by relying on a mixed bag of measures prepared in a hurry 
(Karankevich, 2006, pp. 142–143). 
 
According to Karankevich, success requires a systemic approach in which, parallel to 
the actual operational plan, a diversion plan is prepared on the basis of which appro-
priate diversionary moves can be carried out (cf. the model of Kazakov & Kiryushin 
presented in Chapter 4.6). In that case, the commander must determine in advance 
which of the enemy’s decisions are advantageous to his own side. Karankevich also 
discusses the use of information technology, which in his view, is connected with the 
use of reflexive control. He does not only emphasise the role of deceiving the enemy 
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but also highlights the extreme complexity of carrying out deception operations in 
today’s situation. In his view, deception lies at the core of information operations and 
deception measures must be planned at strategic level (Karankevich, 2006, p. 143). 
There are clear similarities between Karankevich’s thoughts and Lefebvre’s approach 
to modelling the information available to the enemy and shaping it in accordance with 
one’s interests (discussed earlier). 
 
The articles described above indicate that in the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, Russia 
was able to use fairly sophisticated methods to model reflexive control directed at the 
adversary’s decision-making and to exert such control. For example, according to 
Berger, the official Russian media portrayed Georgians as victims of reflexive control 
exerted by NATO and Western countries. However, it can also be asked whether this 
was the official Russian projection on what the Russians themselves consider essential 
(Berger, 2010, p. 143). In his own study, Berger also suggests that the aim of the 
reflexive control applied by Russia may have been to provoke Georgia to a conflict 
(ibid., p. 136). 
 
In the articles written in the aftermath of the Georgian war (in 2010 and 2011), Chau-
sov also discussed the lessons learned from the conflict (In Russia, the war is known 
as the South Ossetian conflict and Chausov also uses this term). 
 
The first of these articles appeared in the journal ‘Morskoi Sbornik’ in 2010. Chausov 
first presents three problems of modern warfare that in his view, can be solved by 
applying reflexive control. He repeats his views that he had already discussed in an 
article in 1999 and in a book in 2008 and that are similar to those presented by 
Lefebvre in the 1960s (Chausov, 2010, p. 26). In his opinion, global perspective and 
the diversity of armed combat are at the core of modern reflexivity in the military 
context.   
 
According to Chausov, the methods of reflexive control should be integrated at stra-
tegic, operational and tactical level on the basis of theories developed in earlier re-
search. He notes that even though military commanders have always tried to influence 
the enemy’s behaviour, exerting reflexive control has only been a part of this process 
in the most recent conflicts. He uses the 2003 war in Iraq as an example, noting that 
the coalition fighting in that conflict used psychological operations and conventional 
weapons that were more accurate and effective than those deployed in the past (Chau-
sov, 2010, p. 28). 
 
According to Chausov, the pervasive nature of information technology, especially in 
command and control systems, is a factor facilitating the use of reflexive control. This 
allows one’s own side to infiltrate the enemy’s information networks, filter infor-
mation, block or restrict network access, set up ‘information ambushes’ and traps, 
distort information or replace information with lies. The capacity to create value-
based models of the way in which enemy leaders behave is especially important. These 
models are compilations of behaviour, thoughts and emotions. Such activities can be 
carried out by broadcasting fabricated (but correctly presented) information directed 
against military and political leadership. At the same time, high-ranking officials are 
urged to betray their own country. This helps to create public support for one’s own 
cause and weaken the adversary’s will to fight. Chausov uses the war in Iraq and the 
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2008 conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia (sic) as examples (Chausov, 2010, 
pp. 27–28). 
 
In his view, these factors do not only strengthen the role of reflexive control over the 
enemy in a successful military campaign but they are also an example of the complex-
ity of such operations in today’s conditions. Reflexive control methods should be 
coordinated and be in the right proportion to the goals, tasks, time and actions. First, 
it should be analysed how to act against the enemy’s intellectual resources because 
modern technologies are not necessarily a prerequisite for success. A technologically 
inferior party may find ways to seize the initiative and, using determination, it may be 
able to impose its will on the enemy (ibid., p. 29). 
 
Chausov discusses in his article how one can achieve success in such situations. Re-
peating his earlier ideas, he notes that it requires a comprehensive systemic approach 
in which, parallel to planning one’s own combat operations, a plan for the enemy is 
also prepared. The plan for the enemy should include reflexive control actions helping 
to anticipate the enemy’s decision-making. In this, Chausov agrees with Karankevich 
(2006) and Kazakov & Kiryushin (2013) whose views are discussed later in this study. 
According to Chausov, the thoughts of the commander and influencing them are at 
the core of today’s military conflicts. This means that success requires reflexive anal-
ysis of the enemy’s actions so that the background factors guiding them can be deter-
mined. Chausov attaches great important to using this method in an information en-
vironment. The key is to disrupt the enemy’s actions using intellectual resources and 
combat operations based on information and information technology. In such situa-
tions, reflexive technologies are used to exert control over the enemy’s operations 
rather than on its troops (Chausov, 2010, p. 29). 
 
Chausov notes that the assumption in the process behind decision-making is that the 
enemy, too, relies on a complex and reflexive decision-making process, which requires 
the modelling and understanding of the way in which decisions are made on the other 
side. In that case, future events can be anticipated and the choices weighed by the 
adversary can be compared against the potential rational options available to one’s 
own troops. In such situations, reflexive control comprises two cognitive sectors: 
structural details of the enemy’s plan and information on to what extent the enemy is 
familiar with one’s own plans. These two sectors provide the basis for how one should 
plan the action from the perspective of one’s own troops (Chausov, 2010, pp. 31–
32). These cognitive sectors are similar to the offensive and defensive information 
warfare discussed by Komov (1997) and Lefebvre’s thoughts of knowing the enemy’s 
plans (Lefebvre, 1967). 
 
In his article, Chausov presents a model for preparing a plan against an enemy that 
takes into account reflexive control functions. He adds that exerting control over the 
enemy cannot merely be based on the commander’s intuition. It cannot simply be 
based on coincidence, favourable terrain or weather conditions or on exploiting the 
errors made by the enemy (Chausov 2010, pp. 30–32). 
 
In an article published in 2011, Chausov continues on the same theme, stating that a 
technologically inferior party may find ways to seize the initiative and impose its own 
will on the enemy. The first of these methods is to shift the focus of the conflict from 
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a confrontation between battle systems towards intellectual-informational confronta-
tion. The second method is to apply reflexive control (Chausov, 2011, p. 30–31). The 
parties of a military conflict are complex, dynamic and mutually dependent battle sys-
tems. In addition to being hierarchically and vertically structured, they also have hor-
izontal features. They have the purpose of the activities, information and in particular 
the commander’s will as common features. Chausov notes that in modern warfare, 
thoughts are the key weapon and a crucial factor. For this reason, control can exerted 
more effectively by enhancing the intellectual potential of the commanders and other 
officers (ibid, p. 32). 
 
Chausov concludes that the key to exerting control in a military confrontation is to 
force the adversary to apply methods and forms that are to the advantage of the con-
trolling party. The thoughts of the commander and influencing them play the main 
role. As a result, achieving success requires reflexive analysis of information originat-
ing from both sides during the conflict (synthesis of information, thought and action). 
Using this approach, the factors behind developments can be determined and the 
correct line of action selected (Chausov, 2011, p. 34).  
 
The conclusion from the above articles is that theoretical development of the control 
based on reflexion between systems continued in Russia during the first two decades 
of the 2000s and at the same time, efforts were also made to use it in military opera-
tions. This development phase was also characterised by the expansion of the reflex-
ive perspective from cybernetics and psychology to nearly all fields of science (Se-
menov, 2017) and, in connection with this, the work carried out by such researchers 
as Lefebvre, Lepsky, Novikov and Thomas in the United States and Russia. With 
these developments, in Russia, reflexivity became a concept that is associated with 
such areas as personnel management (Giles, Seaboyer & Sherr, 2018, p. 5). At the 
same time, reflexive control assumed new forms, especially when it was connected 
with the opportunities arising from information operations. 
2.6.6 Latest theoretical discussion and use of reflexive control 
 
The latest phase of reflexive control is considered to have started after 2010. In those 
years, drawing on the lessons from the war in Georgia, Russia began to enhance the 
performance of its armed forces and to build new military capabilities. Moreover, in 
2010, Russia announced a new military doctrine, in which NATO was openly named 
as a potential adversary (Lalu, 2014, pp. 350–354). The period of decline was now 
over. 
 
Contrary to what is suggested in a number of studies (such as Giles, Seaboyer & Sherr, 
2018, p. 4), the concept of reflexive control was still discussed in Russian military 
journals and other public forums and attempts were made to redefine its practical 
applications in the 2010s. The concept of reflexive control also appears in wider con-
texts, as shown by the examples taken from children’s literature and films used in the 
article on the topic in the Russian Wikipedia (Wikipedia.ru, 2019). 
 
There are also new definitions for reflexion, such as the one listed in the brief ency-
clopaedia of information-psychological warfare published in 2011 (Veprintsev, Man-
oilo, Petrenko, Frolov, 2011). According to the model described by Veprintsev et al., 
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reflexive control is firstly a skill used to manipulate individuals or groups of people 
and secondly a method for exercising social control. According to the authors, reflex-
ive control is based on creating a psychological model of the adversary. The model 
can be used to produce informational stimuli that will lead to desirable reactions. In 
fact, in their own words, the authors base their approach on Jungian psychology (Ve-
printsev, et al., 2011, pp. 446–448). Similar explanations of reflexivity can also be 
found in other sources and the original references to cybernetics and systems theory 
have been deleted from most of them even though similar descriptions were used. 
 
The articles discussing the current state of reflexive control in which the matter is 
examined from Lefebvre’s cybernetic perspective have been selected for this study 
because with them, the theory can be examined from new and different aspects and 
they do not merely repeat the content of past articles. The first of these articles is 
titled ‘Reflexive Processes in Military Art: The Historico-Gnoseological Aspect’, writ-
ten by Valery Makhnin. According to the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’, Makhnin is one of 
the foremost authorities on operational skills and tactics in the Russian Air Force, and 
in his article, he discusses the history of reflexive control and uses examples from the 
past to illustrate reflexive functions. Makhnin also combines definitions presented in 
earlier theories with a new way of describing reflexive control, which is based on 
sending information packets or simulacra. The article by Makhnin is also used by 
Thomas (2015) when describing the use of reflexive control in Ukraine. The article 
originally appeared in the journal ‘Information War’ (Makhnin, 2012) and it was re-
published in a slightly shortened form and with a different title in the journal ‘Voen-
naya Mysl’ in Russian and English (Makhnin, 2013a, 2013b).   
 
Makhnin first takes a look at the history of reflexion and finds its origins in the phi-
losophy of Plato and Descartes. He then discusses the original ideas of Lefebvre, 
which have provided a basis for identifying reflexive processes of opposing battle 
systems and for describing human mind. According to Makhnin, such researchers as 
Ionov, Druzhnin and Kontorov have built on this work (Makhnin, 2013b, p. 32). 
 
Makhnin presents earlier arguments listing the benefits of reflexivity and notes that 
including reflexive factors in the process has helped to create a new, anticipatory 
model for operational planning and decision-making. This reflexive approach makes 
use of reflexive methodology on the basis of which the techniques, instruments and 
phases using information and psychological influence are planned and put into effect. 
Like Chausov, Makhnin also notes that reflexive influence can be achieved through a 
battle system that operates in an information dimension, at cognitive level, at soci-
ocultural level and physically. Makhnin continues by defining reflexive control over 
the adversary as action used to disrupt its capacity to exploit success, to force it to 
reject its original plan and to force it to make non-rational decisions. He also notes 
that when reflexive control operations are planned and implemented, there must also 
be countermeasures to protect one’s own troops against them. (Makhnin, 2013b, p. 
34). 
 
Makhnin introduces a new concept to the theory of reflexive control. The concept, 
which he calls simulacrum, is comparable with the previously used ‘information packet’ 
but it is more extensively used as a philosophical concept to describe a copy or a 
representation that has developed a complicated or questionable relationship with its 
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origins (Tieteen termipankki, 2019). With simulacrum, Makhnin refers to a stimulus 
arising from simulated influence produced by a reflexive system. Based on these stim-
uli, the adversary’s battle system produces decisions and provides the system exerting 
reflexive control with the understanding that it needs to achieve its own goals. Or-
ganisation of reflexive processes between battle systems manifests itself in the devel-
opment and carrying out of measures (sending simulacra) that provide the controlled 
system with areas of interest, motivation and reasons as a result of which the con-
trolled system makes decisions that are in the interests of the controlling system (Ma-
khnin, 2013b, p. 34). 
  
Makhnin describes how the reflexive process advances at all levels (strategic, opera-
tional and tactical) through specific phases. Firstly, the adversary produces observa-
tions of a situation using external information as a basis. This information can be 
freely shaped so that the image based on it produces the desired effect on the adver-
sary’s behaviour. Reflexive control over the adversary requires targeted actions that 
are carried out taking into account reflexive factors that impact the way in which the 
controlled target understands the situation. To achieve this, the decision-makers of 
the controlling system must come up with methods influencing the situational picture 
created by the controlled system and that help their own troops to achieve their goals 
(Makhnin, 2013b, p. 35). 
 
According to Makhnin, the reflexive variation is a focused three-phase action: it com-
prises process inputs (desired real-world objects), modifying inputs in a desirable 
manner, and outputs (targets that are susceptible to reflexive influences). In accord-
ance with this process, when a party wants to exert reflexive influence on its adversary 
at a specific moment, the inputs are subjected to a reflexive conversion and the re-
sulting outputs exert influence on the adversary’s action moments later (Makhnin, 
2013b, p. 35). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5: Reflexive conversion of inputs (Makhnin, 2012) 
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In accordance with the figure above, different ways of producing variations can be 
defined. Makhnin presents the variations of real-world objects, information world 
objects and variations of psychological impacts and the resulting categories of simula-
cra. By doing this, he expands the concept of reflexive control beyond the concept of 
information operations. 
 
In his view, inputs can be converted into reflexive real-world objects in three ways. 
The first of them is the real reflexive object made of the real-world matter (shown as 
RR in the figure above). Laying of mines that impacts the adversary’s decision-making 
is a concrete example of this. The second method is the real object made of an infor-
mation world object and the third involves the generation of real-world objects using 
internal psychological models (Makhnin, 2013b, p. 35). 
 
According to Makhnin, inputs can be converted into information world reflexive ob-
jects in two ways. The first of them involves converting a real-world object into in-
formation (RI). A photo or an infrared image of an enemy target is a concrete example 
of this. The second variation is the conversion of an information world object into 
information (II) (ibid, p. 36). 
 
Inputs can also be converted into psychological reflexive influences in three ways. 
The first of them involves converting a real-world object into a psychological influ-
ence (shown as RP in the figure above). The second variation (IP) is the situation 
where information world objects or the information substitutes of real objects are 
converted into psychological influences. The final variation is the conversion of a 
psychological object into a psychological reflexion (PP). The workings of the com-
mander’s mind is an example of this (ibid., pp. 36–37). 
 
According to Makhnin, the variations described above can be divided into two parts, 
one (RP, PR, IP and PP) comprising the variations in which humans play a role, and 
the other (RR, RI, IR and II) the variations in which human action is irrelevant. In 
Makhnin’s view, by analysing past experiences and operational plans in which the aim 
had been to deceive the enemy, it can be noted that the reflexive influence over the 
adversary had been achieved in the above manner, using simulacra (false information 
perceived as true) (Makhnin, 2013b, p. 37). 
 
In Makhnin’s view, the key elements of reflexive influence are as follows: 1) the inputs 
creating the influence; 2) order of the inputs; and 3) the procedures used to create 
information packets. The fourth important thing is to identify the reflexive techniques 
used by the enemy and against which protective measures must be taken. Like 
Lefebvre et al., Makhnin also identifies two different principles for applying reflexive 
control (cf. Lefebvre et al., 2003): the first principle is to use predetermined simulacra 
so that the enemy can be induced to select the desired line of action. The second 
principle is to use simulacra with a vague chain of action. This means that the enemy 
uses the information as a basis for its own action and can choose between a number 
of different options. One must be able to shape one’s own action on the basis of the 
option selected by the enemy (Makhnin, 2012, pp. 52–53). 
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Unlike earlier researchers, Makhnin is of the view that decision-makers do not need 
to be thoroughly familiar with the enemy’s ideology, history or training methods when 
planning and exerting reflexive influence. In his opinion, military planners must find 
the weakest point in the enemy’s battle system (cf. Leonenko, 1995) and strike at it so 
that the system collapses and forces the enemy to respond. According to Makhnin, 
reflexive actions are at their most effective when replacing rational stereotypic algo-
rithms with entirely new methods and tactics and take the enemy by surprise. Like-
wise, reflexive actions can disorientate the adversary’s command and control system 
by paralysing its components, one by one (Makhnin, 2013b, p. 43). 
 
Like Lefebvre, Makhnin divides reflexive actions into creative and destructive cate-
gories. Creative reflexive actions can be used in slow-pace combat where the enemy’s 
goals are known. In that case, the commander and his staff have time to analyse the 
situation and make conclusions of how it will develop. A plan that has been prepared 
well in advance can be revised if the situation is not developing as envisaged. In rap-
idly changing combat situations, quicker action is needed. In that case, the com-
mander’s decisions that are based on training and experiences, usually lead to destruc-
tive reflexive action (Makhnin, 2013b, p. 44). This division proposed by Makhnin has 
been used in combination with Lefebvre’s similar model to create a reflexive control 
model for research purposes. 
 
Makhnin’s ideas were taken further by Kazakov and Kiryushin, and later also by Lazu-
kin. The two articles of these authors from 2013 and 2014 discuss two-level control 
of combat operations in which the aim is to exert control over one’s own troops and 
to develop capabilities to control the enemy at tactical level. 
 
In their first article, published in the journal ‘Voennaya Mysl’, Kazakov and Kiryushin 
discuss the basis for action. The two suggest that there is a need to move from a 
reflexive theory to practice and to find realistic ways of applying the findings already 
made. In their own words, Kazakov and Kiryushin focus on how to control the en-
emy and apply two-level control in practice, or on whether it is possible to control 
troops that are not directly subordinated to the decision-maker (Kazakov & 
Kiryushin, 2013, p. 144). 
 
The authors note that unlike in the civilian processes of reflexive control, in this case 
it is a question of exerting control over an enemy. Referring to existing research, they 
approach the subject by applying mission command to military engagement. Accord-
ingly, the authors divide the concept of control into 1) mission command (mission 
based tactics directed at one’s own troops; in Russian: командного управления); and 
2) reflexive control (secret control exerted on enemy troops) and expand the perspec-
tives of the articles and studies already published on the topic. The authors emphasise 
the differences between these two approaches to control in the execution of combat 
missions. Combining reflexive control and mission command enhances the effective-
ness of the two-level control in which the aim is to manipulate one’s own troops and 
control and direct enemy action. They call this reflexive superiority (Kazakov & 
Kiryushin, 2013, p. 145). 
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Combining Lefebvre’s theory and the ideas of Makhnin described above, Kazakov 
and Kiryushin note that in Makhnin’s view, key to reflexive control is the chance to 
generate influences preventing the enemy from using new information, to paralyse 
the enemy’s creativity and to prevent the enemy from making full use of its combat 
potential (ibid., p. 146). 
 
They note, however, that it is equally important for a researcher of reflexive control 
to identify the messages essential to reflexive control (the information packets used 
by the enemy as a basis for its decision-making). Like Makhnin, they recommend that 
the term ‘simulacrum’ should be used. In their view, it provides an adequate theoret-
ical basis for the information packets used for deceptive purposes. They note that 
such information packets should be divided into two general models: representational 
and non-representational. A representational information packet is a copy of a copy 
(pretending to be the real thing). In the context of reflexive control, such information 
packets are used when one wants to conceal one’s intentions. The information is par-
tially false but its sole purpose is to conceal the real information and to deceive the 
enemy (Kazakov & Kiryushin, 2013, p. 146). 
 
A non-representational information packet, on the other hand, does not pretend to 
be a copy of a real thing. Its purpose is to act as a cover for the original matter and to 
convey false information about a matter, action or an event. According to Kazakov 
and Kiryushin, these two content-based information models are the two sides of re-
flexive control, which they use as a basis for reflexive interaction in their own theo-
retical combat control model (ibid., p. 147). In their view, the concepts ‘map’ and 
‘doctrine’ used by Lefebvre should also be reconsidered when used in a military con-
text. The map is a description or a model of the objective reality of warfare. It may 
be subjective (inside the commander’s head) or objective (on paper or as a computer 
file). Kazakov and Kiryushin approach the concept of doctrine (which, in addition to 
Lefebvre, has also been used by a number of other researchers of reflexive control) 
as an algorithm providing solutions for reflexive superiority. Their doctrine also con-
tains ‘filters’, which were already used as research concepts between the 1960s and 
1990s and which are used by a commander to separate relevant information from the 
irrelevant facts, wrong details from the right ones, etc. (Kazakov & Kiryushin, 2013, 
p. 147). 
 
According to the authors, understanding doctrine (filters) helps to identify the meth-
ods, techniques and options that the troops can use to execute their tasks. In their 
own words, their aim is to prepare practical instructions and they also note that deci-
sion-making in general and preparing battlefield plans in particular are areas where 
mission command and reflexive control can be effectively combined. Both elements 
of two-level control can be used separately but coherence between them is needed so 
that effective two-level control actions can be carried out. Kazakov and Kiryushin 
note that if the above is accepted, an effective algorithm for decision-making can be 
created and it can be incorporated into rules of procedure (Kazakov & Kiryushin, 
2013, p. 148). 
 
Kazakov, Kiryushin with Lazukin continued on the same theme in another article, 
published in ‘Voennaya Mysl’ in 2014. They note that in their previous article, they 
recommended that research should be expanded to include the two-level control in 
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which the control over one’s own troops and the enemy’s troops is combined using 
advanced technologies and reflexive control methodology. However, they add that 
the theory should be further developed before it can be applied to command and 
control (Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin, 2014a, p. 136). 
 
According to the authors, the focus in the currently used models is on concealing the 
preparation and execution of the tasks. This is no longer enough and there is a need 
for methods combining the mission command of one’s own troops with reflexive 
control over the enemy. In their view, ways must be found to synchronise mission 
command and reflexive control because they have been created for different pur-
poses. It is, however, essential to describe how the elements of reflexive control and 
mission command can be combined chronologically during planning and execution 
based on successive information packets (Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin, 2014a, pp. 
136–138). 
 
In their view, both the elements of mission command and reflexive control actions 
should be created simultaneously after the missions have been assigned, when the 
basic idea behind the action is formulated. The preparations for both actions should 
also be launched at the same time. When the order of decision-making is already 
known, a similar operating model compatible with the model selected for decision-
making should also be developed for the planning of reflexive control (ibid., pp. 137–
139). 
 
According to the authors, enough force should be allocated for mission command 
tasks and reflexive tasks at each phase of two-level control. A certain number of 
troops should be set aside for reflexive control operations, while combat troops can 
also be redeployed to execute reflexive control missions. According to Kazakov et al., 
timing should be a key priority: 
 
– during the preparatory phase, the troops engaged in reflexive control should 
use the time between the assignment of combat missions and their execution 
to carry out pre-planned tasks to make the situation more advantageous to 
one’s own side; the troops executing combat missions prepare their own ac-
tions themselves; 
– during the combat missions, combat troops and troops engaged in reflexive 
control must launch their operations simultaneously (Kazakov, Kiryushin & 
Lazukin, 2014a, p. 139). 
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FIGURE 6: Chronological connection between reflexive control and mission com-
mand methods (Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin, 2014b) 
 
 
According to the authors, implementation of the procedure that helps to achieve re-
flexive control over the enemy starts with the sending of information packets (IP) to 
the enemy (cf. Lefebvre, 2003, p. 90; Makhnin, 2013). The information packets may 
be representational or non-representational simulacra prepared so that the enemy ac-
cepts them as inputs for its own system. These information packets are used as the 
main tool for reflexive control and they can be used as a basis for exerting reflexive 
control over the enemy (Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin, 2014a, pp. 139–140). 
 
According to Kazakov, Kiryushin and Lazukin, the method of exerting reflexive con-
trol over the enemy can be defined as the sequenced totality of the information pack-
ets that have been sent to the enemy to create conditions in which one’s own troops 
can successfully execute their combat mission. They expand this definition by adding 
that each information packet describes an imaginary situation or attempts to conceal 
the real situation and the actions of one’s own troops (Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin, 
2014a, p. 140). 
 
It is essential to prepare an algorithm on the basis of which information packets are 
sent during combat missions to ensure that future missions can be carried out more 
effectively. In their article, Kazakov et al. have created a cyclical model for executing 
combat missions and the two-level control should be exerted in accordance with this 
model. It starts from the assignment of the combat mission and continues with a 
situational assessment, in which the commander uses his own experience in carrying 
out reflexive control in accordance with the plan prepared by higher-level command-
ers. At the same time, the commander starts developing his own method of reflexive 
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control and weighs the options of how to execute the combat mission. The totality 
of the model is described in the figure below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7: Cycle of two-level control (Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin, 2014b) 
 
All available information on the situation, including any changes during combat mis-
sions, should be reviewed by the commander in two different ways: 
 
Firstly, by means of informational reflexion, in which the situational picture used by 
the enemy and possible enemy action are analysed. The purpose of this reflexion is to 
ascertain what the enemy knows about one’s own forces and of their potential actions. 
This is done by analysing the reconnaissance methods used by the enemy, their capa-
bilities and location, and to assess the capability of the enemy to process the infor-
mation collected by it (Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin, 2014a, p. 140). 
 
Secondly, the commander should apply cognitive reflexion. This process produces an 
assessment of the criteria used by the enemy when making decisions and an assess-
ment of the personal characteristics of the enemy commander behind this decision-
making process. The cognitive dimension is a key factor in the decision-making pro-
cess. It provides an instrument for analysing perceptions of the battlefield situation 
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and the elements behind decision-making (Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin, 2014a, pp. 
140–142). 
 
On the basis of these two actions, the commander must be able to formulate a picture 
of how his forces are viewed by the enemy. He must work to prevent the enemy’s 
responses to the action taken by his own troops. Using informational and cognitive 
reflexion, the commander creates an image of a specific situation and this image can 
be supplemented with computer simulations that visualise the situation and increase 
the number of individuals involved (Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin, 2014a, p. 142). 
 
In the next phase, the commander determines how the enemy can be provided with 
a favourable image of his forces by sending the enemy a specific number of infor-
mation packets. Knowing the real situation and the state of his own forces and deter-
mining what should be conveyed to the enemy so that the mission can be executed, 
the commander sets out the goals for reflexive control. Following this, the com-
mander compares the goal against the troop strength at his disposal and breaks down 
the goal into reflexive control tasks and determines their order of priority before and 
during the combat mission. The framework for carrying out the reflexive control mis-
sions is prepared in this manner. The commander assigns a troop contingent for each 
reflexive control mission and the task of these contingents is to send specific infor-
mation packets in a specific order. Each of these missions must be carefully prepared 
and coordinated with the mission command method. This is how synchronisation 
between mission command method and reflexive control, process of specifying their 
details during the planning process and their joint implementation are given priority 
in the two-level control method. Each phase of the combat mission must be con-
cluded with an analysis, in which the results of these two methods are reviewed and 
the results are used in the execution of next phases and missions (ibid., pp. 142–143). 
 
Depending on the situation and the mission, the order of priority between these two 
methods may vary and it may be more advantageous to continue reflexive control at 
the expense of the control of the troop contingent engaged in battle. If the com-
mander wants to enhance the effectiveness of reflexive control, he should have a 
military unit specialising in information and psychological warfare that is able to de-
velop alternatives to reflexive control and combine them with his tactical decisions 
(Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin, 2014a, p. 143). According to the authors, combat 
missions can be executed more effectively if there is a shift from concealment of 
actions to two-level control and measures are taken to establish coordination between 
the combat troops and the troops carrying out reflexive control tasks (Kazakov, 
Kiryushin & Lazukin, 2014a, p. 143). 
 
Finally, the authors link their own theory with the articles in the journal ‘Voennaya 
Mysl’ already discussed in this study, concluding that the theory is flexible enough to 
tolerate many of the past inconsistencies. In fact, the text has a number of similarities 
with the ideas presented by Karankevich and Chausov but Kazakov et al. present 
them in a clearer and a more practical form. 
 
In an interesting side note in the debate on reflexive control, Alexandr Raskin, a senior 
officer in the Russian Air Defence Troops, published an article in 2015, in which he 
discusses reflexive control in social networks and the social media. Raskin’s ideas can 
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be compared with the sending of information packets discussed above. According to 
Raskin, instruments such as social media allow detailed information to be collected 
on individuals and this information can be used to steer their behaviour. Using social 
media, public opinion can be changed in a manner that forces the military-political 
leadership of the countries concerned to react. At the same time, people’s opinions 
can be influenced so that the leadership comes across as incompetent. Such opera-
tions can reduce the influence of military-political leadership and disrupt the work of 
public authorities (Raskin, 2015, pp. 15–16). 
 
According to Raskin, reflexive control through social networks is particularly well-
suited for this purpose. In that case, the aim is to construct information packets tai-
lored to each individual user that can be built into coordinated structures exerting 
significant influence on the enemy’s decision-making. Social networks can be used to 
influence individuals’ behaviour and their beliefs and such action provides a basis for 
the use of legal ‘agents’. Raskin continues by noting that the act on ‘foreign agents’ 
approved in Russia at the time when the article was published is necessary to ensure 
that this type of reflexive control can be prevented (Raskin, 2015, pp. 16–17). Raskin’s 
views are in line with the plans to prohibit Russian soldiers from publishing material 
in the social media or from using smart devices while on duty (Roth, 2019). It seems 
that the theoretical work carried out in Russia has brought home to the country’s 
leadership that in addition to sending images and geographic data, these social net-
works can also serve as instruments influencing soldiers’ thinking.  
 
It can be concluded from recent developments that Russia is working to build meth-
ods to exert reflexive control over the enemy during combat missions. The model 
presented by Kazakov, Kiryushin and Lazukin combines reflexive control and mis-
sion command into an instrument to achieve the same goals and to coordinate the 
use of troops. When this is combined with Makhnin’s approach to reflexive control 
as a comprehensive action, in which every information packet sent to the enemy is 
analysed from reflexive perspective, the end result is a comprehensive theory of ex-
erting influence over the enemy. In retrospect, it can be said that Russia has operated 
in the social media more or less in the way described by Raskin in his article. Attempts 
to influence elections is one example of this but similar activities have also taken place 
as part of information operations during military campaigns in such places as the Cri-
mea. Prohibiting soldiers from sharing information in the social media may also be 
related to this. 
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3. APPLICATION 
3.1 Model of reflexive control 
 
 variety of definitions for reflexive control have already been presented in this 
study. Lefebvre himself noted in 2010 that reflexive control is based on a 
mathematical model comprising the actors involved, relationships between 
the actors and the options available to the actors in their decision-making, producing 
a reflexive equation, which, when solved, specifies the areas where reflexive control 
is feasible and where it produces the best results (Lefebvre, 2010, pp. 82–94). 
 
To complement this definition, a model has been prepared on the basis of the sources 
discussing reflexive control and presented above. It encompasses all aspects of reflex-
ive control, from the methods of exercising it to its goals, using the division Ends-
Ways-Means produced for strategy by Lykke (Lykke, 1989). The essential feature of 
the model is that, in accordance with the ideas presented by Lefebvre (1984b) and 
Makhnin (2012), it is divided into two implementations: constructive (creative) imple-
mentation, employing procedures aimed at inducing the enemy to make desired deci-
sions, and the destructive implementation, employing methods attempting to weaken 
and disrupt the enemy’s decision-making (Ways). The model also features different 
types of reflexive control (Lefebvre, 1984b; Lefebvre et al., 2003; Makhnin, 2012), 
different forms of control inputs (Makhnin, 2012) and different methods for exerting 
reflexive control (Means). The model combines all these factors to illustrate the areas 
of the military command system targeted for the influencing efforts (Ends).   
 
The focus in the model is on those characteristics that are exploited to exert control 
over the enemy (not over one’s own troops or citizens) and no reflexive equations of 
the methods are constructed in the model. This is based on the idea that the party 
applying reflexive control tries to be part of a second-order cybernetic system that 
exerts control over the target system and its decision-makers in accordance with a 
plan prepared in advance. The model is presented in three separate tables, the first of 
which contains an assessment of the constructive methods, and the second one an 
assessment of the destructive methods. The third table gives estimates of the desired 
impacts on different targets. 
 
 
 
  
A 
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 TABLE 1: Methods and targets – constructive/creative method 
 
Im
plem
entation of Reflexive 
Control (Lefebvre, 1984b, 
M
akhnin 2012)
Type or m
odel of reflexive 
control (Lefebvre, 1984b; 
Lefebvre et al.,  2003; M
akhnin, 
2012)
Reflexive control inputs (M
akhnin, 2012)
Reflexive control m
ethods (source)
Pressure and threats (show
 of force) (1, 3, 5, 6)
Provocations, troop m
ovem
ents and action (3, 
6, 9)
Persuasion, suggestion and pacification (5, 6)
Transferring the decision-m
aking goals, m
otives 
or grounds to the controlled system
 (3, 9)
Taking advantage of bilateral contacts betw
een 
tw
o parties (3)
Cognitive (CG)
Psychological (P)
Determ
ining areas of interest and factors and 
reasons behind the inte rest (4, 5, 7, 8, 9)
1) Ionov, 1971
5) Ionov, 1995a
9) M
akhnin, 2012
2) Druzhin & Kontorov, 1976
6) Kom
ov, 1997
10) Kazakov, Kirjushin & Lazukin, 2014
3) Reid, 1987
7) Karankevits, 2006
4) Leonenko, 1995
8) Chausov, 2010
REFLEXIVE CONTROL M
ODEL CLASSIFIED BY IM
PLEM
ENTATION, TYPE, INPUTS, M
ETHODS AND TARGETS
TARGETS
Personal characteris-
tics and behaviour of 
the com
m
ander
Plans prepared by 
the com
m
ander 
and staff
Decision support 
system
s
Com
m
and and 
control system
O
perational 
environm
ent
Constructive / Creative
Inform
ational (IO)
Real (RE)
x
Inform
ation(I)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
SOURCES:
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TABLE 2: Methods and targets – destructive method 
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The model described above shows that the implementation making use of construc-
tive reflexive control can be based on any of the three inputs. The real inputs are 
based on the action of one’s own troops, while the informational and psychological 
inputs are based on the starting point or situational data created for the enemy’s de-
cision-makers that is advantageous to one’s own side. Using these inputs as a basis, 
the enemy is expected to voluntarily make decisions that are advantageous to one’s 
own side and that one’s own side has been able to anticipate. Destructive reflexive 
control can be applied using real and information inputs that mainly comprise sur-
prise/deception by one’s own troops or the feeding of information to the enemy’s 
system and decision-makers that creates confusion on the enemy side or is otherwise 
harmful to the enemy. These inputs are expected to destroy, weaken or paralyse the 
enemy’s decision-making capacity. 
 
The implementation based on constructive reflexive control usually require more time 
than the implementation of destructive reflexive control. As noted by Makhnin, it is 
better suited for long-term use at higher strategic level. Actions paralysing or destroy-
ing the enemy’s decision-making capacity resembles traditional information or psy-
chological warfare that can be launched at short notice and at lower tactical level. 
 
It can also be noted from the tables that under the division cognitive/informational, 
most of the methods referred to in the sources are of informational type. This is 
probably because exploiting the cognitive dissonance of the enemy requires consid-
erably more information about the enemy so that it is easier to feed selected infor-
mation and allow the enemy to react to it in its own way and adjust one’s own action 
after that. It can be noted that constructive control is mostly directed at the com-
mander’s personal characteristics and his operating environment. The methods ap-
plied in destructive control are equally directed at all areas of command and control. 
When the targets grouped by goal are examined, it can be noted that in most of the 
sources used, the aim is to change the personality and behaviour of the commander 
or to interfere with his decision-making. The lowest number of references were made 
to influencing the command system. This is in line with the ideas already put forward 
by Ionov (1997) in whose view influencing the enemy’s situational understanding and 
goals is the easiest part, while exerting influence on the actions themselves is more 
difficult. 
 
When examining the constructive/destructive division, it can be noted that the con-
structive approach contains significantly more influences and influences that are more 
advantageous to the controlling party, especially when the activities are directed at the 
commander, plans prepared by the commander and his staff or decision support sys-
tems. At the same time, however, most of the goals directed at the command system 
and the operating environment are destructive by nature. This is in line with the ob-
servation concerning the time available (already discussed above): constructive imple-
mentation requires better understanding of the adversary and the factors behind its 
behaviour. When successfully applied, these methods generate considerable ad-
vantages to the controlling party. The methods directed at the command system and 
the operating environment can put into use at short notice but their effects are of 
shorter duration and must be exploited quickly. 
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TABLE 3: Goals of reflexive control (by target) 
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3.2 Examination of Russian debate on RC 
 
A number of reflexive control dimensions have been omitted from the above model. 
One of them is the applicability of the theory at different operational levels (from 
tactical to geopolitical). There is little discussion in the original sources on the opera-
tional levels where reflexive control should be used. For example, Lefebvre only 
makes generic references to ‘decision-makers’. The other writers active in the 1970s 
(such as Ionov) are equally vague. In fact, the operational level only became a topic 
of discussion in the 1980s. This was prompted by American researchers who noted 
that reflexive control is a useful tool at strategic level and that the Soviet orientation 
is systemic-strategic compared with the technical-tactical approach favoured in the 
United States (Chotikul, 1986, p. 35).  
 
According to this study, there were few references to operational levels in the Russian 
debate on reflexive control before the 2010s (Chausov, 2010). Makhnin notes, how-
ever, that reflexive control is based on the same operating model at all levels (Ma-
khnin, 2013a, p. 35), which means that the discussion has remained more or less along 
the same lines over the past few decades. In his book ‘Kremlin Kontrol’, Thomas 
notes that reflexive control can be applied at tactical, operational, strategic and geo-
political level (Thomas, 2017, p. 178). In fact, for the people behind the theory of 
reflexive control and for those responsible for its practical applications, the issue of 
operational levels has not been a prime concern. In their view, it should be applicable 
at all levels listed by Thomas when used in combination with different methods. The 
activities should be directed at the adversary’s decision-makers regardless of whether 
they are heads of state, Members of Parliament or battalion commanders. 
 
The second dimension examined in this study is the objective and comprehensive 
modelling of human decision-making, which is also the key prerequisite for the suc-
cessful application of reflexive control. This is because the whole concept is based on 
the assumption that the enemy’s decision-making can be modelled so that using spe-
cific preprepared inputs, the enemy can be persuaded to take the decisions anticipated 
and desired by the other side. If this philosophy discounting individual actors’ will to 
act independently of the world around them had been questioned in Russia at some 
point, reflexive control had been deemed basically non-feasible and it would probably 
have been rejected. However, this did not happen, not even when the Soviet Union 
disintegrated. 
 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the rest of the society abandoned dialectical 
materialism and the Marxist theory, at least officially. However, in the Russian armed 
forces, this same philosophy continued to set the tone for the debate. Even though 
the purpose of this study is not to find answers to the question why this happened, it 
has become clear during the preparation of this report that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the defeat in the struggle between ideologies triggered surprisingly little 
debate in Russian military journals. The ability of dialectics or the systems theory to 
model reality has not been challenged at any point (cf. Lalu, 2014, p. 368). The as-
sumptions that all world events are objectively true and dialectically connected to each 
other (and thus reflected in human mind) did not disappear with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and its ideology. This also explains why reflexive control is not ques-
tioned and the few critics of the theory do not challenge dialectics as such but the 
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feasibility of the ways in which it is implemented (Polenin, 2000, p. 68). This may also 
explain why the development of reflexive control has continued and the original phil-
osophical assumptions have not been questioned. 
 
The third dimension that should also be considered when a model based on open 
sources is used is the idea put forward by Klimenko that all open doctrines should 
contain normative descriptions and reflexive functions (Klimenko, 1997). This leaves 
open the possibility that some of the articles discussing reflexive control have been 
deliberately written so that the reader can be convinced of the existence of a specific 
method or that specific activities are carried out and shares information that is actually 
untrue. The author of this study has made every effort to avoid such manipulation by 
relying on a broad range of sources. It is difficult to imagine that all this could be 
based on vast censorship and coordination of articles that has allowed the Soviet Un-
ion and Russia to engage in systematic deception over a period of 50 years, especially 
when many of the writers are from the West or from other countries outside Russia. 
However, this possibility cannot be entirely discounted and the descriptions of the 
methods contained in the models should be treated with caution. This problem will 
be discussed in more detail below in connection with the reliability of research. 
3.3 Role of information in Russian military strategy 
 
As set out in the model presented in this study, conveying selected information to the 
adversary has been a key component of reflexive control since the concept was first 
presented by Lefebvre. However, reflexive warfare is not only information warfare 
but a comprehensive operating model, one form of which is information-psycholog-
ical confrontation. In a speech to the Russia Academy of Military Science in 2013, 
Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, noted 
that information warfare continued throughout a conflict and it started long before 
the military action itself (Gerasimov, 2013). This speech has achieved a great deal of 
attention in connection with the occupation of the Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine.  
Indeed, selective information is a concept that often comes up in Russian military 
debate. 
 
Ulrik Franke, a Swedish military researcher, has written a study of information war-
fare, which relies on Russian documents as source material. Like Makhnin, he high-
lights the use of real, informational, and psychological inputs in the conveying of in-
formation. According to Franke, the following measures can be used during peace-
time: attempts can be made to discredit foreign politicians; messages can be sent by 
means of aggressive air operations; or Russian views on the world situation can be 
conveyed through suitable media (Franke, 2015, p. 51). However, as required in the 
implementation of reflexive control, more importance is attached to the adversary’s 
interpretation of the activities than to the activities themselves. 
 
The article by Bogdanov and Chekinov on the development of warfare also discusses 
information and helps in understanding its use as part of reflexive control. They list 
methods of warfare based on destructive reflexive control, in which information and 
telecommunications equipment, as well as computers, is used to paralyse the adver-
sary’s command systems and administration, disrupt the adversary’s computer centres 
and communications networks, destroy military and political command centres, and 
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demoralise the adversary’s troops and wider population (Bogdanov & Chekinov, 
2017, p. 79). 
 
One comment of the authors is interesting in the context of the information dimen-
sion of reflexive control: in their view, we must understand that conflicts are now also 
fought in the information battlefield, an entirely new theatre of war, which sets the 
scene for the struggle taking place in the human mind. Understanding this shows that 
despite technologies, humans and their moral-psychological characteristics remain a 
target of operations. Bogdanov and Chekinov go on to note that in all warfare, it is 
essential to destroy the minds and psyche of individuals capable of setting strategic 
goals. In their view, as information has become an accepted instrument of warfare, 
more tools and methods are now available to achieve this goal. Despite this, armed 
combat cannot be entirely supplanted, but it should be used on a more limited scale 
(Bogdanov & Chekinov, 2017, p. 79). Indeed, reflexive control combines the use of 
information and armed action in a single package. 
 
Influencing cognition, an idea behind creative reflexive control methods, is discussed 
by Kiselyov in his 2017 article. His focus is on the future warfare for which the Rus-
sian armed forces should be prepared.  
 
According to Kiselyov, in technologically advanced countries, cyberspace is seen as 
an operating theatre. It can be combined with other methods, the most important of 
which are electronic warfare, psychological operations, and kinetic effects against the 
enemy (the destructive methods of reflexive warfare). Confrontation at information 
level will be a crucial factor in future warfare, and it will largely manifest itself in 
information-controlled operations. These comprise actions intended to have the de-
sired effect on the adversary’s will, emotions, behaviour, psyche, and morale; in other 
words, they are methods considered to be creative control instruments in the system 
of reflexive control. According to Kiselyov, the goal in information warfare is to in-
fluence the adversary’s decision-makers. Psychological operations, hacking, decep-
tion, electronic warfare, physical destruction of enemy equipment, the capture of the 
enemy’s decision-makers, and network operations are some of the key methods and 
techniques used in such warfare (Kiselyov, 2017, p. 5). In other words, as set out in 
the reflexive control model, Kiselyov combines constructive and destructive meth-
ods, illustrating a system that is described in the dual model of reflexive control. 
 
In Kiselyov’s view, the focus should now be on warfare directed at behaviour. Such 
warfare has only become possible in recent years as methods have been developed to 
collect large amounts of data on human behaviour. Human behaviour is not only 
based on ideas, values, and beliefs, but it is also to some extent founded on stereo-
types, habits, and behavioural models. At the same time, our behaviour is also shaped 
by official and unofficial institutions. Kiselyov goes on to note that there is indisput-
able scientific evidence that human behaviour largely takes place in semi-automatic 
mode and is based on habits and stereotypes (cf. Kahneman, 2011, pp. 20–21). In his 
view, this not only applies to simple solutions, but the effect also manifests itself in 
complex decision-making situations involving choices that require in-depth thinking 
(Kiselyov, 2017, p. 6). 
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Weapons influencing behaviour are the weapons of the future, and Kiselyov claims 
that Western countries, especially the United States, are already developing them. 
Kiselyov notes that it is particularly important to conceal the personal data of senior 
officers to ensure the adversary is unable to anticipate their decisions in conflict 
(Kiselyov, 2017, p. 7). In this, he indirectly admits that the Russian view is that such 
calculations can be made, as this is also set out in the theory of reflexive control. 
 
Without referring to it by name, Kiselyov provides a comprehensive description of 
reflexive control in his article: he describes the asymmetric advantage that in his view 
can be achieved by concealing one’s own preparations and military action, by seeking 
and exploiting weaknesses on the other side, by directing one’s own forces at the 
adversary’s weaknesses and by changing the adversary’s view of the conflict in a man-
ner that is advantageous to one’s own side. Such measures cause only minimum attri-
tion of resources on one’s own side compared to what the adversary must endure, 
and they help to achieve military superiority or equality in a conflict (Kiselyov, 2017, 
pp. 10–11). 
 
Indeed, information and information-based warfare have assumed an increasingly im-
portant role in Russian debate in recent years. In their articles, Bogdanov, Chekinov 
and Kiselyov emphasise the information impacts of real, informational and psycho-
logical inputs in the same way as Makhnin. Kiselyov also describes the efforts to create 
a pre-emptive model (as suggested by Kazakov & Kiryushin), in which the infor-
mation inputs directed at the adversary are coordinated as part of the overall activities. 
On this basis, information warfare and reflexive control become overlapping con-
cepts, but information is not the only instrument to achieve reflexive control. This is 
because reflexive control makes extensive use of cognitive dissonance and the under-
standing of human behaviour. It is essential to understand the process of sending 
information and the attempts to influence the adversary, and to protect one’s own 
troops against the information operations carried out by the other side. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
4.1 Systemic basis of Russian C2 theory 
 
n the context of the fundamentals of cybernetics and systems theory, this study 
shows that since the 1950s, there have been determined efforts in the Soviet Un-
ion and Russia to develop cybernetics for modelling and creating military deci-
sion-making systems, and that this work has continued on a different basis than in 
the West. As early as the 1960s, attempts were made to develop a nationwide infor-
mation network and highly automated control and management systems. 
 
When the system of military decision-making was examined from systemic and cy-
bernetic perspectives, it was noted that in Russia, the command system is examined 
in its totality. The aim is to outline all the components that have a direct or indirect 
impact on the area of study. In the systemic approach, the parts of a command system 
are outlined and studied as a dialectical entity of interactive elements. 
 
When the expectations placed on military commanders and principles of warfare were 
studied, it was noted that, as in the Soviet Union, there is still a strong emphasis on 
unitary military leadership and the commander’s role is emphasized in Russian mili-
tary thinking. This is combined with a strong logical and mathematical chain of de-
duction and the ability to identify causal chains. It was noted that command and con-
trol have assumed a more important role since it has been realised, by trial and error, 
that success in military action at all levels depends on flexible application of command 
and control practices. However, unlike in the Western mission command approach, 
the focus in the Russian debate on military leadership is on the need of commanders 
to control their subordinates to ensure that any deviations from a plan can be identi-
fied at an early stage, and the operations can be redirected. 
 
An important observation was made on the keen interest in Russia on decision sup-
port systems, and that intensive development work in this area is also underway. They 
will assume a more important role when efforts are made to implement a rapid and 
highly automated command system that can use the information available concerning 
the operating environment and produce analyses and recommendations. At the same 
time, protecting them against enemy action and their sensitivity to reflexive control 
have become a major concern. 
 
The commander plays a key role in Russian decision-making. Indeed, one of the con-
clusions made in this study is that this at least partly explains why the focus in reflexive 
control is on the commander, his plans, and his personal characteristics. At the same 
time, it was also noted that the Russian commander-centric model is better suited to 
rapid and automated decision-making than the Western model, in which there is a 
greater need for human involvement, and coordination between individuals. It may 
also be more vulnerable to influencing attempts (such as reflexive control), as it in-
volves fewer individuals whose observations of the environment should be shaped. 
 
I 
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The objective approach is the key weakness of the Russian decision-making system 
in the context of decision-making theory. The idea of dialectical materialism is that all 
reality and awareness have an objective basis, and that all decisions are based on ob-
servations. This may restrict the use of intuition and creativity. However, the author 
was unable to find any signs of this at the practical level. 
4.2 The development of Reflexive Control 
 
The main conclusion drawn from the assumptions behind reflexive control was that 
because of historic and social factors, command and control plays a key role in Russia 
(as was already the case in the Soviet Union). However, these factors were not sys-
tematised before the 1960s, and they were only used intuitively and subconsciously. 
This study notes that in dialectical thinking based on Marxist philosophy, human 
awareness is simply a reflection of objective reality. This may create a situation in 
which reflexive control only needs to use external stimuli to steer the manner in which 
the target perceives its environment. 
 
Vladimir Lefebvre, the man behind the reflexive control theory, attempted to develop 
reflexive equations to model the adversary’s decision-making process and discussed 
that they could be used to calculate the options available to the adversary. In 
Lefebvre’s studies from the 1960’s this creates a situation where the other party to the 
conflict can gain an advantage if it knows the adversary’s situational assessment and 
is aware how the adversary applies its own doctrine to solving the problem. This be-
comes the core of reflexive control. 
 
The research Lefebvre started continued in the Soviet Union on a broad front. It is 
suggested in the study that the bidirectional nature of the process was recognised early 
on: the adversary must also be prevented from exerting similar control over one’s 
own side. By the early 1970s, with advances in cybernetic thinking between systems, 
the role of reflexive control directed at the adversary’s decision-making had been rec-
ognised, the inadequacy of game theory in the modelling of real decision-making pro-
cesses had been noted, mathematical modelling of decision-making had been devel-
oped under the auspices of Vladimir Lefebvre and the Moscow Methodological Club, 
and the need for automated and protected information processing as part of the con-
trol over the adversary’s decision-making had been identified. 
 
Researchers have claimed that reflexive control was a classified topic in the Soviet 
Union, or that attempts had at least been made to keep it secret. However, these 
claims have been proven wrong in this study: a large number of books on the subject 
were published in the Soviet Union, scientific conferences discussing the topic were 
held, and the concept was defined in the 1974 Encyclopaedia of Cybernetics. In the 
Soviet system, an encyclopaedia documented the officially approved truth, which 
means that the appearance of the term in such a publication officially sanctioned the 
existence of reflexive control. The only reference to secret efforts is the claim by 
Lefebvre that development work was carried out under the auspices of the KGB. 
 
The study presents that comprehensive development of reflexive control continued 
in the Soviet Union in the 1980s and that there was also interest in the work in the 
West (as part of the research on Soviet activities), especially in the United States. It is 
 73 
suggested in the study that this was mainly prompted by the emigration of Vladimir 
Lefebvre to the United States in 1974 and the works on reflexive control and the 
differences in ethics between the West and the Soviet Union behind it that he pub-
lished in the United States in 1984. In a key conclusion, it is noted that by the mid-
1980s it had been realised that reflexive control can only be successfully applied if a 
comprehensive plan setting out a response to every movement of the adversary or 
every random incident is prepared.  
 
One of the most important conclusions made in this study (which also requires addi-
tional research) concerns the impacts of the disintegration of the Soviet Union on the 
debate on military theories in Russia. Drawing on the sources collected for the study, 
the author tried to outline how the social collapse may have impacted the assumptions 
behind reflexive control or its development. It transpired that there was surprisingly 
little debate on the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the defeat in the confron-
tation between ideologies in Russian military journals. Reflexive control was not 
touched in the discussion either. The assumptions that all world events are objectively 
true and dialectically connected to each other (and thus reflected in human conscious-
ness) did not disappear with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ideology behind 
the assumptions. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the dominant 
view in the Russian debate in the years that followed was that the confrontation with 
the United States, fought as an information war, did not end with the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union: as the confrontation between societies continued, there was no 
need to question earlier assumptions. 
 
Most of the source material used in the study is from the first two decades of the 
2000s. At the start of the 2000s, there was interest in reflexive control in Russia and 
in the West and there was academic debate on the topic in a variety of different pub-
lications. In addition to Lefebvre, Timothy Thomas, a US researcher who had studied 
articles written by Vladimir Lepsky, also contributed to this discussion. He has prob-
ably written more about the subject than anybody else in the West and he is also the 
Westerner whose writings have been most frequently quoted by other researchers. 
Against the background of further theoretical development, there was more detailed 
analysis of the systemic approach from the early 2000s onwards. In this approach, a 
deception plan to prepare and execute a reflexive control operation is created in con-
junction with the actual operational plan. It was concluded in the study that during 
the first two decades of the 2000s, theoretical development of control based on re-
flexion between systems continued in Russia and that at the same time, efforts were 
made to use it in military and counter-terrorism operations. The expansion of the 
reflexive perspective from cybernetics and psychology to nearly all fields of science 
ran parallel to this development stage. 
 
The theoretical part of the study concludes with an observation that from the early 
2010s onwards, there were also calls for practical applications of reflexive control. 
Chausov was the first researcher to take up the task. In his view, a technologically 
inferior party may find ways to seize the initiative and, using its own determination, it 
may be able to impose its will on the enemy. An article by Makhnin describing how 
to apply the theory in practice was published in 2012. It describes how by analysing 
past experiences and operational plans in which the aim had been deceive the enemy, 
it had been noted how reflexive influence could be exerted by means of simulacra (false 
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information perceived as true). Such methods may have been used in the information 
operations directed at Ukraine, as was noted in the introduction to this study. 
 
It can be concluded from the articles on reflexive control published over the past ten 
years that there has been a shift in Russia from reflexive equations towards reflexive 
control over the adversary that can be used in practical combat operations. The model 
presented by Kazakov, Kiryushin and Lazukin combines reflexive control and Rus-
sian version of mission command into an instrument to achieve the same goals and 
to coordinate the use of troops. The conclusion was that in Makhnin’s view, reflexive 
control is a comprehensive model, in which each of the information packets sent to 
the adversary that is based on the inputs of the real world, the information world or 
the psychological world, is analysed from reflexive perspective. 
4.3 Practical application of reflexive control theory 
 
In this chapter, the author attempts to describe the use of reflexive control systems 
based on the theories of Makhnin and Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin. Illustrating the 
description with an example, the author discusses a possible strategic-level plan for 
reflexive control and its potential goals. The author also prepares a package of two-
level control in conjunction with the example.   
 
In the example, reflexive control is applied to change military decision-making at gov-
ernment level to ensure that it would be in accordance with the wishes of the country 
exerting the control. In that case, in the way described by Makhnin, the first function 
in the reflexive control is to shape the observations made in the system to be con-
trolled. To achieve this, the decision-makers of the system exerting control must plan 
methods influencing the military situational assessment created by the controlled sys-
tem that help to achieve the goals set by their own government. 
 
Subjecting the inputs to reflexive variations is the second phase of reflexive control 
in Makhnin’s model. The aim is to prompt the adversary to use the reflexive variations 
of these inputs as inputs in its own decision-making. In his article, Makhnin empha-
sises the fake nature of the inputs (simulacra). However, variations based on real 
events (such as military exercises and troop movements) can also be used to persuade 
the adversary’s decision-makers to act in a desired manner.  
 
In Makhnin’s view, the sequence of the inputs is the key element in the next phase. 
Some of the inputs can first be placed in rapid communications channels, such as 
social media, after which they can be conveyed (in slightly expanded form) through 
other channels. Attempts may also be made to publish the same inputs through sev-
eral channels simultaneously.  
 
The two-level control method presented by Kazakov, Kiryushin & Lazukin can also 
be used to understand the practical manifestations of reflexive control. 
 
 75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8: Example of practical application of two-level control 
 
 
The assumption is that using the method they have presented, the strategic commu-
nications at government level, and past experiences are used as a basis for the action. 
It is also assumed that informational reflexion is used when future action on the basis 
of this information is planned. In this approach, the adversary’s situational assessment 
and the information on one’s own troops and operations possessed by the adversary 
are analysed. This information forms the basis for the use of reflexive control. 
  
Using the situational assessment as a basis, cognitive reflexion is applied by assessing 
the criteria used by the adversary in its decision-making. According to Kazakov, 
Kiryushin & Lazukin, the country’s leadership must in such situations prepare the 
goal for reflexive control, which is then broken down into constructive and destruc-
tive methods. These are put into practice using a variety of real-world and infor-
mation-world inputs, which will produce real or simulated information packets for 
the adversary’s system. The packets are distributed through a variety of different chan-
nels, and each of the channels has been given specific targets for exercising reflexive 
control. These packets are used to steer the adversary’s decision-making in a desirable 
manner in accordance with a predetermined plan. 
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4.4 Systemic thinking in Russian strategy 
 
During the study the author also familiarised himself with wider aspects of system-
theoretical thinking in Russia and the Russian military doctrine. The main focus in 
this study was on the development of reflexive control directed at command and 
control. The way in which the findings could contribute to the academic debate on 
Russian strategic thinking (or the lack of such thinking) are discussed in this section, 
and the view expressed by scholars in the past that the Russian military action is not 
based on any comprehensive strategy is analysed in more detail.  
 
There was already systemic thinking in Czarist Russia during the first decades of the 
20th century, and it developed rapidly as part of cybernetic thinking in the early years 
of the 1960s. Dialectical ideas about the objective nature of reality and the observer 
also fit into systemic thinking. The author has also concluded that the modelling of 
military and political systems on the basis of cybernetics and systems thinking that 
started in the Soviet Union has continued in Russia, and that the approach differs 
from Western traditions. Already in 1991, Bezuglii & Gavrilenko suggested that the 
focus in the modelling of systems should not only be on battle systems but that con-
sideration should also be given to overall political developments. Such an approach 
in which war is seen as a struggle between social systems is still reflected on the way 
in which military systems are modelled in Russia. 
 
It is noted in the study that in Russia, systems theory and modelling of systems are 
approached as a method helping to ensure that wars can be fought in a highly effective 
manner taking into account the situation and the latest doctrine. Bogdanov & Cheki-
nov in particular, have discussed this idea in their articles over the past few decades. 
Even though there has also been discussion in Russia on combining military and non-
military methods as part of contemporary warfare, war is mostly seen as violent use 
of armed forces. Other ways of exerting influence, such as information, diplomacy 
and the economy are given priority when the aim is to avoid war. When this concept 
is examined on the basis of the Ends-Ways-Means thinking prepared by Lykke for the 
national defence strategy of the United States, it can be noted that in Russia, the Ways 
(doctrines and action) and the Means (available resources) are effectively integrated 
into the systems at the disposal of the country’s government. Thus, the desired goals 
(Ends) remain the only strategic-level pillar whose contents are not discussed in public.  
As a whole, Russia has, as described by Covington and Gressel, managed to mobilise 
its society for the use of its armed forces much more effectively than the West as part 
of its comprehensive approach. The Finnish concept of comprehensive security plus 
the special characteristic of a state aiming to achieve Russian level of control may be 
the closest analogy. It is highly unlikely that such an entity would not be steered on 
the basis of a coordinated strategy anticipating interaction between systems. 
 
In reflexive control integrated into interaction between systems and originating from 
cybernetics and psychology, the inputs fed into the adversary’s decision-making sys-
tem are processed so that the adversary is unaware of being controlled. Exerting con-
trol over the adversary’s systems using one’s own operations and the inputs fed into 
the adversary’s systems was first studied in the Soviet Union in the 1960s. This area 
of cybernetic control was studied by both military and civilian researchers. In the 
context of the debate on the absence of a Russian strategy, it is important to note 
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how systematically the assessment and anticipation of the adversary’s activities have 
been integrated into the command and control of Russian troops at system level and 
into the field manuals, and how systematically the Russian military is working to 
achieve this goal at all levels of command. 
 
The model prepared for this study, in which reflexive control is applied as part of the 
systematic exerting of influence using a variety of different methods and information 
channels, suggests that Russia uses the analysis of the adversary’s command and con-
trol systems at all levels. In accordance with its dialectical traditions, Russia takes an 
analytical and objective approach to all information obtained, and treats them as 
sources of comprehensive lines of action. Against this background, it is highly unlikely 
that senior commanders would be solely guided by opportunism. A more likely ex-
planation is that the higher-level strategy is kept secret to ensure that it would not be 
subjected to reflexive control by the enemy. Lefebvre’s suggestion that the adversary 
gains an advantage if it knows the situational assessment compiled by the other party 
and the way it is used (doctrine) lends support to this view. The suggestion (already 
mentioned before) that Russia has deliberately created an impression that its action is 
unpredictable would seem credible in that case. In this approach, the target for Rus-
sian action and the assumed adversary (the West) remain unaware of how Russia will 
use its doctrine, and is unable to formulate solvable reflexive equations of the options 
available to Russia. 
 
At the same time, Russia remains able to make opportunistic use of its own situational 
assessment and information on how Western democracies solve problems and react 
to threats. Russia is able to exploit identified operating models of the West, which 
makes it easier to make systematic use of reflexive control. It is probably easier to 
apply it in countries based on a transparent decision-making process and free civil 
societies than in countries with authoritarian political systems and strictly controlled 
media (such as Russia). Even if the majority of the citizens were aware of Russia’s real 
intentions, systematic use of information packets may already create uncertainty and 
erode citizens’ trust in the government and other public authorities. It was already 
realised during the development of reflexive control in the 1980s that it does not 
require any feedback channels: sending the information to the adversary is often 
enough. 
 
Timothy Thomas has suggested that Russia uses reflexive control by manipulating the 
thoughts of the public to promote its own interests, relying on the media and ‘troll 
armies’, drawing parallels with the past and even resorting to violence (Thomas, 2015, 
p. 117). The conclusion in this study is that such long-term use of cognitive reflexive 
control requires anticipatory planning and anticipation of the other side’s intentions. 
There have been possible signs of such anticipatory planning and action in conjunc-
tion with the occupation of the Crimea, Brexit vote and support for populist parties 
in Western Europe. Russia had probably started preparing for these situations well in 
advance, which means that decision-makers had plenty of time and opportunities to 
produce a comprehensive plan. Accordingly, Russia was able to apply constructive 
reflexive control methods: influencing opinion, pacification, pressure and transferring 
of one’s own intentions to the adversary’s (Ukraine, EU or NATO) systems (cf. 
Thomas, 2015, pp. 117–118).  
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In general, modelling of activities on the basis of systemic thinking, and reflexive 
control should not be ignored when Russian activities are interpreted at strategic level. 
One has to assume that systemic approach is used as a negotiating tool, in the prepa-
ration of strategies and doctrines and in the planning of systems. Moreover, it cannot 
be assumed that it will disappear if power changes hands in the future, as it will remain 
part of the Russian approach to problem solving. One also has to assume that Russia 
bases its action on a long-term strategy, and that it will make every effort to ensure 
that adversaries cannot exert influence on its ultimate strategic goals. 
4.5 Conceptual differences between western ‘strategic communication’ 
and Russian ‘informational-psychological warfare’ 
 
The focus in this study has been on the Russian model of influencing decision-mak-
ing. At the same time, the author has also given concrete examples to illustrate the 
differences between Russian and Western approaches to exerting influence. Illustrat-
ing and understanding these differences makes it easier to use this study in the future. 
 
According to the American definition, the focus in the Western approach to influenc-
ing opinions and impressions (perception management) is to steer the emotions, mo-
tives and objective deduction of foreign audiences and decision-makers by conveying 
to the target audiences selected information and indications or by preventing the tar-
get audiences from accessing information. This action is based on presenting the truth 
in a desired manner, operational security, deception and psychological operations (JP 
1-02, 2009, p. 403). In addition to (or instead of) the term ‘perception management’ 
the term ‘strategic communication’ is now also used in the West (the concept origi-
nated in the United States). It is described as a government-level activity in which the 
aim is to reach target audiences, and create, strengthen or preserve conditions that are 
in one’s own interests. Strategic communication is carried out using a variety of dif-
ferent methods and all channels available at government level (JP 1-02, 2016, p. 226). 
 
Analysis of the target audiences and decision-makers and of the way in which the 
emotions and motives of the target audiences should be understood (subjective back-
ground factors) is a key component of these methods. In the subjective (understand-
ing) approach to target audiences and to selecting information, there is a need to use 
a feedback channel: measuring and assessing whether this action is creating the de-
sired impacts or whether the action should be adjusted in accordance with the feed-
back has been part of the Western way of influencing opinions ever since the Second 
World War.   
 
This differs from the Russian approach described in this study: in it, the aim is to 
determine the situation in advance, and to plan one’s own action and the sending of 
the information in such detail that there is no need for any feedback channel. The 
assumption in the Russian approach to influencing (which arises from an objective 
world view) is that by feeding specific information through a specific information 
channel, the response can be anticipated in advance: the individual’s subjective opin-
ions on the information are irrelevant. Moreover, in Russian information operations, 
there is no differentiation between foreign and domestic target audiences: the action 
focuses on groups whose opinions are important to achieving one’s own goals or that 
 79 
help to create broader impacts when subjected to information operations. Both do-
mestic and foreign decision-makers are key targets in such activities. 
 
In the Russian theory of information operations, the way in which individual mes-
sages are received is unimportant. Conveying one’s own narrative and views through 
a large number of different channels and hoping that they are seized by at least some 
Western media is the goal. In that case, there is at least something that you can use to 
back up your case when the issue is discussed at different forums. Not even present-
ing facts will change this predetermined approach, in which the main aim is to create 
several alternative truths (instead of one truth), which by their very existence can give 
rise to doubts. Telling ‘tactical truths’ and lack of trust between the government and 
citizens provides a fertile ground for such activities: nobody expects to hear the ob-
jective truth from the official channel as people expect everybody to lie to some ex-
tent.  
 
The observations made over the past ten years show that Russia has, at least to a 
certain degree, managed to create such alternative narratives, independently of the 
objective truth. In the long term, systematic information operations carried out by 
Russia are also producing results: they create uncertainty and suspicion between citi-
zens and the government. At the same time, efforts are made to steer the opinions of 
susceptible citizens in polarised societies.  
4.6 Critique on the selected approach 
 
The author has decided to approach reflexive control as an umbrella concept. By 
doing this, the author avoided the problem faced by past research, in which defining 
reflexive control as a long-term element of information warfare or information-psy-
chological warfare meant that some of the reflexive control methods referred to in 
the sources had to be omitted. For example, Giles, Seaboyer and Sherr have encoun-
tered this problem when trying to define reflexive control as a long-term influencing 
tool that is solely based on advance planning (Giles, Seaboyer & Sherr, 2018, p. 53). 
The author decided to divide reflexive control into long-term constructive methods 
and short-term destructive methods that are applied in different ways. As a result, no 
limits have been set for the time span of reflexive control. 
 
However, the model prepared for the study is not without problems because using it 
leaves room for interpretation. The definitions of the methods described in the model 
are partially overlapping and the translations of the Russian terms are creations of a 
single researcher. Strict division into constructive and destructive methods also in-
volves challenges: it can be difficult to categorise methods by purpose merely on the 
basis of interpreting the source material.   
 
Strict differentiation between methods and the need to find desired reflexions in all 
actions are additional weaknesses in this approach. This may lead to a situation (which 
existed during the Cold War) in which the mere possibility of doing something is 
interpreted as an intention of the other party: a neutral text assumes a different mean-
ing when it is interpreted using the ‘methods’. It is entirely possible that these methods 
only exist in researchers’ imagination and their determination to find a deeper mean-
ing in all human activities.   
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The model provides a comprehensive list of the methods described in the source 
material for reflexive control. At the same time, it also includes actions that can be 
used even though are not part of reflexive control. The context in which the method 
is applied should be discussed in connection with each method: is the intention to 
cause reflexions in the adversary’s actions or is it a question of action without any 
background motivations? When we are examining an identified action by relying on 
an existing model, we should also take into account that some of the methods may 
be used for deceptive purposes as part of a more comprehensive plan. In that case, 
the real targets of these methods are not the same as those specified in the model. In 
the model, the Russian activities may also come across as more extensive and system-
atic than is actually the case and create threats that do not actually exist. 
 
How could the model created for this study be applied? With the methods contained 
in it and the descriptions of their inputs, the model can best be applied to interpreting 
past action, and it has only limited use as an anticipatory instrument. With regard to 
anticipation, potentially useful methods can be identified but they can manifest them-
selves in very different ways. At the same time, however, the changes observed in the 
methods may also be an indication of the changes in background assumptions influ-
encing Russian thinking, which provides an opportunity to follow developments of 
the theoretical debate from a wider perspective. 
 
Using the command system targets selected for influence operations and identified in 
the model, we can also analyse how one’s own activities can be protected against such 
attempts. The model as a whole can also be used as a description of the options avail-
able to Russian armed forces and Russian government when they want to apply com-
prehensive reflexive control. There is a danger that the model is assumed to be com-
prehensive: it is entirely possible, even likely, that in addition to the methods described 
in the model there are also other reflexive control procedures not presented in the 
model.  
4.7 Discussion for further studies 
 
The first of the topics for further studies concerns the manifestation of cybernetic 
and system-theoretical models in Russian military decision-making systems and in the 
systems supporting them. The matter has already been briefly touched in this study 
but as the focus here is not on command systems, it was only discussed to the extent 
required for creating a reflexive model. However, Russia has been continuously de-
veloping decision-making systems and especially decision support systems. For ex-
ample, the establishment of the new Russian national defence command centre in 
2016 indicates that a great deal is expected of them in the future. In connection with 
this, extensive system-theoretical research and research relying on the most recent 
knowledge could provide us with new information on how Russia is planning to use 
military force, and what are the support systems (such as simulation) that it is using. 
According to this study, Russia’s capacity to make quick military decisions and project 
its power is primarily based on a commander-centred approach and comprehensive 
use of support systems.  
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The reflexive control model prepared for this study provides a basis for observing the 
use of different methods and inputs in reflexive control. It could be used in the studies 
of identified long-term influencing operations, such as Russian actions directed at the 
Ukrainian government. The material accumulated over the years could be analysed on 
the basis of models, and the aim could be to illustrate the roles of inputs and infor-
mation channels and the changes in the methods over time. In this manner, using 
long-term case examples as a basis, we could analyse the reflexive control plan that 
may have been used and how it could have been countered at an earlier stage. 
 
Russian military journals, which report on developments from very different angles, 
could also be a topic of long-term research. Examining how specific topics, such as 
NATO’s EFP troops, are discussed in the journals over the long term, could reveal 
interesting differences between these publications. It could also help to determine 
whether they play any role in Russia’s information campaigns and reflexive control. 
 
It was also noted in the study that the assumption in reflexive control is that the party 
applying it is able to anticipate and plan how the other side reacts to the inputs it has 
received. However, it can be asked whether the consequences of the occupation of 
the Crimea or the continuation of the war in eastern Ukraine could actually have been 
anticipated. In other words, what are the potential uncertainty factors inherent in re-
flexive control? Are there weaknesses in the application of dialectical and objective 
approach when action is taken in complex and chaotic operating environments where 
the action often has unanticipated impacts? The willingness and capacity of the cur-
rent Russian military leadership to engage in self-criticism (critical assessment of its 
own actions) might also be an interesting research topic. However, there are probably 
few opportunities for such research as long as the current Russian government is in 
power.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
1 
 
Examples of how simple reflexive equations are used 
 
Marking of reflexive equations and their use in the modelling of reflexive control is 
illustrated in this appendix with the help of simple examples. The examples are from 
the book published by Vladimir Lefebvre in 2010 (Lefebvre, 2010, Chapters 9 and 
13). 
 
1. Direct influence. Expression: a wants b to select x and exerts direct influence to 
achieve its goal. 
 
In this situation, b may choose among options available in series {0, 1} 
 
 
The figure can be made into a polynomial 
a+bc 
which can be written as: 
  [b] [c] 
 [a] + [bc] 
[a + bc] 
Equation in target b can be written as: 
b = a + bc 
or 
b = (a + c)b +ab 
A = a + c, B = a, A ⊇ B , 
which means that all values of b in the interval 
(a + c) ⊇ b ⊇ a 
are solutions of the expression b = (a + c)b +ab. 
 
If c = 0, 
a ⊇ b ⊇ a , 
it follows that b = a. 
If a wants b to select 1, influence of a on b should be 1. If a wants b to select 0, in-
fluence of a on b should be 0. 
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If c = 1, 
1 ⊇ b ⊇ a 
 
If a = 1, it follows that b = 1 (b acts in accordance with a’s choice). If a=0, b has 
freedom of choice and b does not necessarily act in accordance with a’s choice. It 
follows that a can encourage b to select 1 but cannot force b to select 0. 
 
2. Practical example. Detached battalion d is planning to descend from the mountains 
into the valley. The enemy contingent a wants to prevent the battalion from descend-
ing from the mountains. All routes to the valley go through villages b and c. Residents 
of the villages are hostile towards the battalion and support the enemy. The residents 
are also hostile to each other. The interdependencies can be described using the fol-
lowing figure: 
 
 
The set of routes available to the commander contains all routes that the battalion 
can use to descend from the mountains into the valley. The assumption is that they 
cannot be combined, which means that the battalion can only use one route. The set 
of options M contains all available routes that the battalion will not use. When con-
sidering routes in set a, the commander must take enemy action into account. For 
example, there are routes that are not under enemy control, which means that the 
commander may be inclined to select one of them. When considering routes in sets b 
and c, the commander may take into account the activities of the village residents.  
The figure can be made into a polynomial 
 
d + a(b + c) 
 
the content of which can be described using the following expressions: 
 
   [b]+[c] 
  [a][b+c] 
 [d+[a(b+c)] 
[d]+[a(b+c)] 
 
The expression describing the decision-making of the battalion commander is as fol-
lows:  
 
d=d+a 
 
This equation does not include variables b or c, which means that the hostility of the 
residents does not play any role when the commander makes his decision. Solving the 
equation produces: 
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1⊇ d ⊇ a. 
 
If a is not an empty set, the battalion commander can select any option containing 
the subset a, after which he can select any of the options of this subset (specific 
routes). When a=0 or the enemy does not attempt to persuade the commander to 
select any particular route, the commander may select any of the options (including 
an empty set). If the selected option is not an empty set, the commander can specify 
the route that the battalion uses to enter the valley. 
 
In this example, reflexive control manifests itself as follows: The enemy commander 
decides to ambush the battalion on one of the routes and decides to use reflexive 
control. If he uses a = 1 to exert influence and manages to convince the battalion 
commander that all routes leading to the valley are safe, he cannot predict which of 
the routes the battalion will use and ambush the contingency. If he uses a = 0 to exert 
influence (all routes are dangerous) the result will be the same. The best option would 
be to persuade the commander to select the route a or use a={ α} to exert influence. 
In that case, the commander’s choice can be described using the expression 1 ⊇ d ⊇ 
{α} (the commander selects the route from subsets, each of which contains α).   
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